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1. Introduction 
1.1. A case for research in lay economics 
As an undergraduate student of economics, I stumbled across a 
disturbing academic article. Frey and Pommerehne (1993) asked 
German and Swiss citizens how they would judge different means of 
distributing drinking water to hikers reaching the top of a hill. On a 
hot day, demand by hikers clearly exceeded water supply. Only 27% 
of the survey participants judged a price increase for drinking water 
to rebalance supply and demand as fair. In contrast, 76% favored a 
“first-come, first served” principle. Not only did people virtually ignore 
the virtuous and welfare-maximizing role of the price mechanism, but 
they judged it considerably less fair than a dubious procedure that 
provided water to the strongest (those arriving first at the top of the 
hill) and left the presumably more needy (the last to arrive) empty-
handed. For me, a passionate student of economics, this evidence 
was disturbing.  
Apparently, laypeople in the survey have not been aware of basic 
economic principles, such as the mechanics of an efficient allocation 
of resources. Limited economic expertise is the first chapter of the lay 
economics story that addresses the differences in economic reasoning 
between laypeople and economists. Later in my studies, two further 
chapters were added to this lay economics story. Social psychology, 
particularly research on heuristics and biases, makes clear that 
laypeople have difficulties in making consistent and unbiased 
judgments of economic phenomena. The final chapter was added in 
the last year of my graduate studies. I attended a summer academy 
addressing the methodology of different disciplines of social science 
and realized that the reductionist model-based approach of economic 
science was a two-sided coin. I discovered that the utilitarian 
orientation of economics, judging economic and political action 
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(e.g., a socioeconomic reform) based on their consequences, is not the 
only correct way to decide whether such a reform is appropriate.  
Lay economics became one of my primary areas of interest. It was 
apparent that lay economics could help to explain why certain 
political reforms were strongly opposed although they promised to be 
economically beneficial. Laypeople’s positive and normative views of 
the economy influence voters’ preferences, which are reflected in 
political debates and political action in a democracy. Lay economics 
could also explain the dubious perception of economics by the public. 
Economists were often not understood intuitively or were accused of 
being unsocial, both in public political debates and in discussions 
with my student friends in our shared apartment. Thus, a better 
understanding of lay views of the economy and how and why these 
views differ from economists’ views is important. It can help to 
identify obstacles to economically efficient political reforms and to 
improve the perception of economic reasoning by the public. 
Lay economics also led me systematically from economic research to 
psychological research. I found one thing nearly as disturbing as 
laypeople’s ignorance of the alleged superiority of the price 
mechanism to allocate scarce resources: Economics does not identify 
lay economics as a relevant research topic or even as a relevant issue. 
In the economists’ view of the world, there is little space for concepts 
that sacrifice the basic assumption of rationality. Lay economic 
beliefs may differ from economists’ views. However, from an 
economist’s viewpoint, these beliefs might be random variations or 
minor deviations that do not corrupt standard models. As long as 
current public choice models of voters’ behavior based on the 
rationality assumption work sufficiently well, there is no need to 
develop more complex models that weaken the rationality 
assumption. Consequently, Roos (2007a) identified several 
preconditions for the development of economic theories on lay 
economic thinking: they must be formalized, based on some concept 
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of rationality, show general regularities, and allow us to explain 
empirical phenomena better than standard rational choice models. 
Currently, these hurdles cannot realistically be overcome. 
Furthermore, economists might agree that lay economic beliefs and 
the unsatisfactory perception of economics by the public are serious 
issues. However, they are not necessarily issues for economic science. 
Political science, sociology, and psychology may be seen as more 
appropriate domains for addressing these issues. 
In psychological research, the field of lay economics has attracted 
considerably more attention than it has in economics. For example, 
research has examined the economic socialization of children 
(Furnham, 2008; Lunt & Furnham, 1996), laypeople’s cognitive 
models (Williamson & Wearing, 1996), typical cognitive biases in the 
evaluation of political measures (Baron, Bazerman & Shonk, 2006), 
and judgment criteria for economic policies (Haferkamp, 
Fetchenhauer, Belschak & Enste, 2009). This dissertation relates to 
the last field of research and addresses the judgment criteria people 
apply to decide whether to accept certain economic policy proposals.  
1.2. Overview of the present research 
The research in this dissertation extends existing research in two 
innovative ways. First, it not only focuses on laypeople but also 
analyzes the views of teachers, journalists, and economists. Teachers 
and journalists are important promoters of economic knowledge 
through schools and the media. In economics, economists themselves 
are usually seen not as relevant actors but as independent observers. 
However, economists have a certain influence in the politico-
economic sphere through their policy recommendations and their 
communication in public. Thus, the question of how economists form 
their policy judgments is relevant. 
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Second, the research in this dissertation focuses on national 
economic policy proposals that not only affect the country where the 
policy is implemented but also have consequences for foreign 
countries (e.g., immigration policies, trade restrictions, or job 
relocation). This allows us to determine to what extent laypeople and 
economists consider the consequences for foreigners when judging 
economic policies. This extension of research is particularly relevant 
in light of today’s globalized world and the close political and 
economic ties between countries, such as in the European Union.  
The empirical research in this dissertation is based on two separate 
series of telephone surveys. The findings in chapters 2 and 3 result 
from surveys with laypeople, economists, teachers, and journalists, 
which were conducted in Germany in 2007. Chapters 4 and 5 are 
based on surveys with laypeople and economists in 2011. Modified 
versions of the four empirical chapters have been submitted to 
academic journals for publication. Thus, the chapters can be read 
separately. I have been the first author of the four respective articles. 
They have been coauthored with Fabian Christandl and Detlef 
Fetchenhauer.  
As a starting point, chapter 2 presents descriptive results of 
laypeople’s and economists’ views on immigration policies and job 
relocation scenarios. The results suggest that laypeople hold 
parochialistic attitudes. They prefer policies that benefit their home 
country and their fellow citizens while disregarding effects on 
outsiders. Economists, however, showed a more nuanced perspective. 
Around half of economic laypeople approved a policy proposal that 
would reduce the number of foreigners living in Germany and judged 
this fair as well as economically efficient. In contrast, less than 5% of 
the economists supported the proposal or judged it fair or efficient. 
Among laypeople, 70% opposed a job loss in Germany if, in turn, ten 
new jobs would be created abroad, but only 8% if the news jobs were 
created elsewhere in Germany. Again, economists expressed more 
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moderate views. A modified version of chapter 2 was published in the 
journal “Wirtschaftspsychologie” (Jacob, Christandl & Fetchenhauer, 
2011a). 
There are various explanations for the differences between laypeople 
and economists discovered in the literature in general and in chapter 
2 in particular. Chapter 3 focuses on one aspect that has not been 
investigated before. Teachers and journalists act as promoters for 
economic knowledge transfer through schools and media. It is 
presented how teachers and journalists judge two policy proposals 
from the trade and immigration policy domain and whether they are 
closer to an expert or a lay way of thinking. As expected, a large 
majority of the economists favored free trade and labor mobility and 
judged them as economically efficient and fair, while most of the 
laypeople held contrary views. The answers from teachers and 
journalists generally lay in between economists and laypeople—with 
teachers being closer to laypeople and journalists tending more 
towards the economists. Interestingly however, teachers and 
journalists reverted to the same criteria for the judgment of economic 
policies as laypeople. All three groups based their judgments nearly 
exclusively on a policy proposal’s perceived fairness, while economists 
strongly focused on its economic efficiency. A modified version of 
chapter 3 was published in the “Journal of Economic Psychology” 
(Jacob, Christandl & Fetchenhauer, 2011b). 
The following empirical chapters take a closer look at economists’ 
views. There are two possible explanations for the more immigration-
friendly attitudes that economists have shown in the studies of 
chapters 2 and 3. Either do they have a more cosmopolitan mindset 
and hold more positive attitudes toward immigrants in general or 
they believe in the positive economic effects of liberal immigration 
policies in their home country. Results of chapter 4 clearly suggest 
that the latter is true. Economists were asked to judge three policy 
proposals dealing with immigration policies, unilateral reductions of 
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CO2 emissions, and an export ban on military equipment. The 
acceptance of the policy proposals was strongly influenced by 
national economic efficiency judgments. In contrast, global economic 
efficiency judgments did not exert a significant positive effect on 
policy proposal acceptance. Interestingly, economists’ self-
assessments as globally or nationally oriented did not strongly 
influence the importance that economists attached to the national or 
global efficiency judgments. They appear to hold a rather implicit bias 
toward their home country when judging economic policy. A modified 
version of chapter 4 was submitted for publication to the “German 
Economic Review” (Jacob, Christandl & Fetchenhauer, 2012a). 
Chapter 5 aims to bring a more conciliatory tone to the debate about 
laypeople’s and economists’ views on economic policies. It is analyzed 
whether the differences between economists and laypeople persist in 
policy scenarios that do not involve core economic issues, but do 
involve strong ethical considerations. Laypeople and economists 
judged the immigration of highly qualified foreigners, a unilateral 
reduction in CO2 emissions, and an export ban on military 
equipment. Results show that economists’ judgments appear more 
similar to judgments of laypeople for policy proposals outside the core 
areas of economic expertise or proposals that involve strong ethical 
considerations, such as an export ban on military equipment. 
Apparently, the judgments of economists tend to be similar to the 
judgments of laypeople if a policy cannot, or should not, be evaluated 
based on the economist’s toolkit. A modified version of chapter 5 was 
submitted for publication to the journal “Wirtschaftspsychologie” 
(Jacob, Christandl & Fetchenhauer, 2012b). 
In the concluding chapter 6, I summarize the major findings and 
outline some ideas for future studies. Furthermore, I develop general 
thoughts on the judgment criteria economic efficiency and fairness 
and discuss normative implications in an essay style. Practical 
recommendations are also given. 
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2. Cosmopolitan Economists and a 
Parochialistic Public? Different Views on 
Immigration and Job Relocation 
2.1. Introduction 
We live in times of accelerated globalization. The world appears 
increasingly borderless and “flat” (Friedman, 2005). A large part of 
Europe forms a single market with one common currency. 
Nevertheless, we still observe strong national governments that 
keenly follow their national interests in debates on financial bail-outs, 
labor market regulation, or climate policy. In several European 
countries, parties have won elections with nationalist and anti-
immigration slogans. Paradoxically, globalization may have even 
promoted nationalist and anti-immigration sentiments, because 
many people perceive an increasing precariousness through 
globalization and thus strive for security in a national safe haven 
(Haller & Roudometof, 2010, Baughn & Yaprak, 1996).  
Apparently, adhering to a social group, for example, one’s home 
country, is deeply rooted in human nature. At the same time, 
individuals are known to value fairness and to behave altruistically in 
various contexts (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; Tyler, 1994). In the context 
of groups, individuals often sacrifice their own self-interest for the 
benefit of their ingroup. However, this altruism comes at the expense 
of the larger outgroup—a concept that is usually referred to as 
parochial altruism (Bernhard, Fischbacher & Fehr, 2006) or 
parochialism (Baron, 2001; Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1991). In the 
context of national policy, parochialistic views manifest in skeptical 
attitudes toward immigration and policies benefiting other countries 
at the expense of one’s own country.  
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Professional economists, in contrast, do not enjoy the reputation of 
behaving particularly altruistically. In a survey by Jacob and 
Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (2007), a majority of the respondents 
disagreed with the statement that increasing general economic wealth 
was a major goal for economists. However, evidence on the 
selfishness of economists is mixed. A couple of studies detected more 
selfish behavior in economists, for example, in typical social dilemma 
experiments (Frank, Gilovich & Regan, 1993; Frank & Schulze, 2000; 
Marwell & Ames, 1981). However, other scholars could not confirm 
this conclusion and even observed less selfish behavior (Frey & Meier, 
2005; Laband & Beil, 1999; Yezer, Goldfarb & Poppen, 1996). In the 
context of national policy, economists clearly favor free international 
exchange and free labor markets (e.g., Alston, Kearl & Vaughan, 
1992; Coughlin, 2002). It remains unclear, however, whether 
economists hold more positive attitudes toward immigration in 
general. Do they share the parochialistic views of the general public, 
predominantly economic laypeople, or do they follow different 
judgment logic?  
In order to answer this question, this paper pursues two aims. First, 
we extensively review relevant literature from the social sciences. 
Particularly, we link research on social identity, parochial altruism, 
nationalism, and attitudes toward immigration. Furthermore, we aim 
to explain what role nationalism plays in economics and hypothesize 
on economists’ attitudes toward immigration. Second, we contrast 
views on immigration policies and job relocation of economic experts 
and economic laypeople with different levels of education for the first 
time. We also extend the existing evidence on laypeople’s judgments 
of trade and immigration policies (cf. Baron & Kemp, 2004; Kemp, 
2008; Jacob, Christandl & Fetchenhauer, 2011b). The empirical part 
is based on a survey of laypeople and economists in Germany. 
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2.1.1. How laypeople and economists judge economic policies  
More than a century ago, in one of the very first issues of the 
renowned “Quarterly Journal of Economics”, Simon Newcomb noticed 
that economic laypeople and economic experts held widely divergent 
views on economic policy issues (Newcomb, 1893). Numerous studies 
have followed since and basically confirmed Newcomb’s observation 
(e.g., Baron & Kemp, 2004; Blendon et al., 1997; Caplan, 2002; Frey, 
1986; Haferkamp et al., 2009; Henderson, 1986; Jacob et al., 2011b). 
In the trade and immigration policy domain, for example, economists 
usually support free trade and free labor mobility (e.g., Alston et al., 
1992; Coughlin, 2002). Laypeople, however, are far more skeptical 
and often favor protectionist policies (Cass, 2000; Baron & Kemp, 
2004; Kemp, 2007; Rubin, 2003). 
Three major reasons for these differences can be identified. First, 
laypeople do not possess expert knowledge in economics. Second, 
their perception of economic phenomena is affected by cognitive 
heuristics and biases. And third, they use different judgment criteria 
to judge economic policies than economists. 
Regarding the first reason, laypeople naturally possess rather limited 
knowledge on economic facts and basic economic principles (Caplan, 
2003; Walstad & Larsen, 1993; Walstad, 1997). They misjudge basic 
economic mechanisms such as long-term effects of economic growth 
(Christandl & Fetchenhauer, 2009), macroeconomic consequences of 
economically relevant and irrelevant events (Roos, 2007b), or the 
principle of comparative advantage (Baron & Kemp, 2004; Krugman, 
1994). This lack of economic expertise makes it difficult to adequately 
judge the potential consequences of economic policies. To meet this 
challenge, laypeople could simply follow the economists’ 
recommendations. However, people react with mistrust and 
resistance to economic experts as communicators of socioeconomic 
policy proposals (Förg, Jonas, Traut-Mattausch, Heinemann & Frey, 
2007). Consequently, laypeople develop their own mental models and 
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judgments about how the economy works (Caplan, 2007; Roos, 
2007a; Rubin, 2003; Williamson & Wearing, 1996). 
To derive their mental models and judgments of a policy’s economic 
consequences, laypeople apply different cognitive heuristics. 
Heuristics and simple psychological algorithms often lead to 
surprisingly accurate inferences and decisions (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996, Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003). In the context of 
judgments of economic policy, however, they are also prone to 
systematic biases. Baron et al. (2006), Caplan (2007) and Kemp 
(2007) provide overviews of heuristics and biases relevant in the 
context of economic policy. For example, people tend to follow the 
fixed-pie myth. They intuitively, and often erroneously, believe that 
the economy is a zero-sum game. They assume, for example, that 
one’s own country loses if a foreign trade partner benefits from trade 
or that immigrants take away jobs from the locals assuming that the 
total number of jobs is fixed. Another phenomenon, parochialism 
(Baron, 2001; Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1991), will receive 
particular attention in the next subchapter. 
The last and perhaps most important reason for the diverging 
judgments of laypeople and economists is that they apply different 
criteria when evaluating economic policies. On the one hand, 
professional economists focus on economic efficiency considerations 
(Haferkamp et al., 2009; Jacob et al., 2011b, Kirchgässner, 2005; 
Stiglitz, 1998). They usually favor an economic policy if it increases 
overall economic wealth. Other criteria, particularly a policy’s 
perceived fairness, are of secondary importance (Rubinstein, 2006; 
Haferkamp et al., 2009; Jacob et al., 2011b). For laypeople, on the 
other hand, fairness considerations play a preponderant role. 
Fairness is known as a powerful decision factor in general (Tyler, 
1994) as well as in economic contexts (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; 
Davidson, Matusz & Nelson, 2006). Haferkamp et al. (2009) showed 
the importance of fairness for laypeople compared to economists for 
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judgments of labor market policies. Furthermore, fairness judgments 
can be made intuitively and without much cognitive effort (Haidt, 
2001). Given that thorough assessments of economic efficiency are 
cognitively complex, laypeople tend to use their fairness judgment as 
a cognitive shortcut to derive congruent efficiency judgments (Jacob 
et al., 2011b).  
Economic self-interest does not seem to be an important judgment 
criterion when it comes to evaluating economic policies—neither for 
economic laypeople nor for economists. Coughlin (2002) as well as 
Scheve and Slaughter (2001) argue that citizens might oppose free 
trade because they fear its negative consequences on themselves, for 
example, the loss of their jobs. However, public choice theory 
(Brennan & Buchanan, 1984), general surveys from political science 
and psychology (Baron, 2003; Miller & Ratner, 1998; Sears & Funk, 
1990), and studies dealing with trade and immigration policies in 
particular (Citrin, Green, Muste & Wong, 1997; Jacob et al, 2011b; 
Pinto & Le Foulon, 2007) arrive at a similar conclusion: self-interest 
plays only a subordinate role in political contexts. For economists, 
Caplan (2002) finds no strong evidence of a self-serving bias. That is, 
economists do not hold different beliefs about the economy and 
economic policy because it would increase their material wealth. 
Laypeople are primarily concerned about fairness when thinking 
about economic policies. But which factors influence their fairness 
judgment in the context of immigration policies? 
2.1.2. From ingroup bias and parochialism to nationalism 
Judgments of trade and immigration policies involve potential 
benefits and downsides for one’s own nation and other nations. 
Psychologically, the way an individual feels attached to his or her 
nation and a small group are very similar. “At the level of the nation, 
the group fulfills economic, sociocultural, and political needs, giving 
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individuals a sense of security, a feeling of belonging and prestige.” 
(Druckman, 1994, p. 44) 
Past research leaves little doubt that adherence to a group goes along 
with preferring the group and its members over others. Even mere 
assignment to trivial experimental groups leads to a bias in favor of 
this group (Tajfel, 1982). This ingroup bias can also be observed in 
economic experiments involving real financial consequences (Ahmed, 
2007). Ingroup bias can be explained, for example, with social 
identity theory stating that an individual’s self-evaluation is partly 
shaped by their group memberships (Tajfel, 1982). Consequently, a 
positive view of the ingroup enhances self-esteem. The same is true 
for favorable comparisons with other groups and choices improving 
the own group’s situation.  
If intergroup conflicts occur, people tend to behave parochially 
altruistic. They are willing to sacrifice their self-interest for the benefit 
of other members of their group—they behave altruistically. Altruistic 
behavior is generally seen as a key to the development of modern 
societies with their high level of cooperation and their detailed 
division of labor (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Bowles, Choi & 
Hopfensitz, 2003). It is also closely related to the desire for 
compliance with fairness norms (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). In the 
course of human evolution, altruistic behavior proved particularly 
beneficial in the presence of intergroup conflicts. These conflicts 
required cooperation within the group while limiting this cooperation 
to the ingroup (Bernhard et al., 2006; Choi & Bowles, 2007). Thus, 
the altruism observed in the intergroup context favors the members 
of the group or “parish” the individual feels attached to— which is 
called parochialism (Baron, 2001; Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1991). 
Parochialism usually benefits the ingroup, but it can be detrimental 
to the individual and to the outgroup. The aggregate effect for all 
groups, or broader society, may be negative. In an experiment by 
Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), for example, participants were 
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more willing to sacrifice an individual contribution of 5 Shekels for a 
group benefit of 9 Shekels in the presence of a competing outgroup. 
The outgroup lost an equivalent of 9 Shekels. The sacrificed 
individual contribution remained an overall loss. To maximize overall 
outcomes by showing strictly altruistic behavior, participants should 
have behaved exactly the other way around: they should have 
contributed less in the presence of an outgroup, but more if no 
outgroup was present—when the net group benefit exceeded the 
sacrificed individual contribution. 
Given the substantial evidence on ingroup bias and parochialism, the 
prevalence of nationalist attitudes in today’s world is not surprising. 
Schrock and Jacobson (2009) analyzed data from the International 
Social Survey Program for 22 countries. They estimated that 62% of 
the respondents shared nationalist views. Based on questionnaire 
items on feelings of national superiority and outgroup derogation, 
Blank and Schmidt (2003) concluded that 40% of Germans are 
nationalistically oriented.  
However, nationalism itself is a rather broad concept and is not 
clearly defined in the social sciences literature. Dekker, Malová, and 
Hoogendorn (2003, p. 345) notice “a conceptual labyrinth that is 
characterized by questionable instruments, a lack of valid empirical 
data, and poor explanatory power”. We will not attempt to disentangle 
this labyrinth here, but we focus on aspects that relate to attitudes 
toward immigration policies and the impact of level of education.  
2.1.3. Nationalism, attitudes toward immigration, and effects of 
education 
Generally, nationalist attitudes appear to be negatively correlated to 
positive attitudes toward globalization, immigration, and free trade. 
In a study with American students, Baughn and Yaprak (1996) found 
a strong correlation between a general nationalism measure and 
economic nationalism, measured through the acceptance ratings for 
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several protectionist and anti-immigration policy proposals. Pinto and 
Le Foulon (2007) analyzed data of the International Social Survey 
Program for the USA and estimated a higher probability of supporting 
trade restrictions for respondents showing more nationalist attitudes. 
Among German adults, Blank and Schmidt (2003) found a strong 
correlation between nationalism and devaluation of foreigners. 
Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, and Schmidt (2010) used similar 
measures, but employed a longitudinal design with two time periods 
to test causal hypotheses. Nationalism exerted a significant effect on 
future ethnic prejudice.  
Although methodologies may differ, it becomes clear from past 
research that there is considerable variance in nationalist attitudes 
on the country level as well as on the individual level (e.g., Shulman, 
2002; Pinto & Le Foulon, 2007; Schrock & Jacobson, 2009). 
Numerous studies have found correlations to sociodemographic 
variables. One of the most important factors proved to be education. 
A higher education reduces the probability of sharing nationalist 
attitudes (Schrock & Jacobson, 2009; Pinto and Le Foulon, 2007) and 
positively influences attitudes toward immigrants and immigration 
(Pettigrew, Wagner & Christ, 2007; Rustenbach, 2010). This can be 
explained, for example, with realistic group conflict theory (Sherif, 
1966). Lower educated people often hold lower-qualified jobs that 
might be more threatened by foreign competition and globalization. 
This perceived competition for jobs constitutes a source for an 
intergroup conflict, which nurtures outgroup derogation and negative 
feelings toward foreigners. 
Overall, ingroup bias and parochialism seem to be deeply anchored in 
the human mind. Nationalist views and negative attitudes toward 
immigration can be widely observed. We expect laypeople to express 
more negative than positive views toward immigration policies and to 
favor policies which they believe would benefit their own country. A 
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higher level of education should reduce the parochialistic answer 
pattern. Are economists likely to share this lay perspective? 
2.1.4. Economics and economists – nationalist or cosmopolitan? 
Many concepts of economic science directly or indirectly relate to the 
national state as the major unit of analysis: national income, balance 
of payments, trade deficit, and others. This proliferation of nation-
oriented concepts does not necessarily have normative reasons, that 
is, because economic science would judge strong independent nations 
as the one way to increase global economic wealth. Rather, this may 
be due to situational factors and can be traced back to the 
traditionally strong role of national states in the past centuries. 
Indeed, classical economics developed as “national economics”. In 
Germany the term “Nationalökonomie” for economic science had been 
widely used far into the 20th century. Several scholars argue that 
traditional classical economics basically followed the motive to 
augment national power (Greenfeld, 1995; Helleiner, 2002; Nakano, 
2004). One of its first and most famous exponents, Adam Smith, was 
quite literally concerned with increasing “the wealth of nations” 
(Smith, 1789). Other economic thinkers of the 19th century like 
Friedrich List or Alexander Hamilton explicitly defined economics as a 
science aiming to obtain prosperity of a given nation (Helleiner, 2002; 
Preparata & Elliot, 1996). According to Greenfeld (1995, p. 581) 
"nationalism should be seen as, to some extent, an explanation of the 
emergence of economics".  
However, Smith and most of his liberal successors advocated free 
worldwide trade—not protectionist policies. How can this be 
explained? Preparata and Elliot (1996) argued that the first British 
economists just represented the “word of the victors”. At the time, 
Great Britain had obtained naval, technological, and commercial 
supremacy and had become the workshop of the world. Economic 
liberalism proved a beneficial strategy for maintaining and 
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strengthening this position. Moreover, the reason for the 
endorsement of free trade by political groups was most often not its 
promise to lead to an economically efficient outcome. Rather, political 
groups associated liberty and free exchange with British national 
identity (Helleiner, 2002).  
Apparently, economic nationalism does not necessarily imply 
protectionism and anti-immigration policies. On the contrary, 
economic nationalists could support liberal policies and free trade as 
long as it benefits their own nation, a view that is generally shared in 
the literature (Helleiner, 2002; Nakano, 2004; Pickel, 2003). 
This leads us to the first reason why we expect economists to deviate 
from the parochialistic views of economic laypeople and their 
skeptical attitudes toward free trade and immigration: liberal trade 
and immigration policies might increase the wealth of one’s own 
country. Even economists sharing nationalist attitudes might support 
these policies because they are known to focus on economic efficiency 
when evaluating economic policies.  
We suggest a second reason why the views of laypeople and 
economists might differ. Economists do not exclusively apply 
efficiency criteria when considering political decisions (Haferkamp et 
al., 2009). This should be particularly true for immigration policies 
evoking non-economic considerations. For example, one might 
consider how much value to put on tolerance or cultural diversity. 
Thus, economists’ attitudes should influence their judgments of 
immigration policies. However, to the best of our knowledge, no 
studies exist that analyze the inclination of economists toward 
immigration or nationalism. A survey on personal values of social 
scientists by Lucey & Delaney (2007) suggests that economists rate 
self-direction, achievement, and benevolence higher than the average 
citizen. However, effects on attitudes toward immigration are unclear. 
Studies in the general public identified several sociodemographic 
factors related to weaker nationalist and stronger cosmopolitan 
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attitudes, for example, higher education, higher income, residence in 
urban communities, female gender, or leftist political orientation 
(Pichler, 2009; Rustenbach, 2010; Schrock-Jacobson, 2009). While 
education, income, and urbanity should lead to weaker nationalist 
and more cosmopolitan attitudes among economists, the other two 
factors might have a reverse effect. First, the economic profession is 
dominated by male economists. Second, we know that economists are 
less inclined to vote for left-wing parties. In a German survey by 
Jacob, Christandl, and Fetchenhauer (2010), 39% of the economists 
supported left-wing parties, compared to 61% of non-economists. At 
the same time, economists show strong support for liberal parties 
(Jacob et al., 2010), which are known for promoting liberal 
immigration policies. It remains an empirical question which effects 
dominate. 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Participants 
In order to compare the judgments of laypeople and economists, two 
separate surveys were conducted via telephone. For the first survey, 
adults were randomly selected based on random German telephone 
numbers (N=1,133). This sample formed the respondent group of 
laypeople. The vast majority of the participants held German 
citizenship (95%); 53% were female; 75% had grown up in the 
Western part of Germany. The participants' average age was 46 years 
(SD=17).  
To control for effects of education, we formed a separate subgroup 
from the sample for more highly educated laypeople, holding 
university entrance qualification after a minimum 12 years of formal 
education (N=379; 92% German citizenship; 48% female; 74% West 
German; average age = 42 years with SD=16). 
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The economist sample was based on the member index of the “Verein 
für Socialpolitik”—the major association of economists in Germany, 
which has more than 3,600 members. In a two-step approach, 
university departments were randomly selected from the member 
index and then one faculty member was randomly chosen from each 
department (N=80; 96% German citizenship; 18% female; 93% West 
German; average age = 40 years with SD=13). 
2.2.2. Survey Design 
The survey consisted of two major parts for both respondent groups. 
In the first part, interviewees were presented two policy proposals 
from the immigration policy domain: (1) The number of foreigners 
living in Germany should be reduced as much as possible and (2) 
Employers should only be allowed to hire foreigners if no Germans 
apply for the job. While all interviewed economists (N=90) participated 
in the first part of the survey, only a part of the economic laypeople 
sample was interviewed on the two proposals (N=188). 
For each proposal, the respondents first had to disclose if they were 
in favor of or against the policy proposal. Participants were 
subsequently asked to judge the economic efficiency of the policy 
along three dimensions: long-term consequences for unemployment 
(decrease or increase), for national economic growth (increase or 
decrease), and for the federal budget deficit (decrease or increase). A 
fifth question targeted the fairness of the policy (fair or unfair) and the 
last question asked whether the participants assumed the policy 
served their personal interest (positive, neutral or negative). Table 1 
gives an overview of the six questions with their exact phrasing. 
In the second part of the survey, both respondent groups were asked 
whether they accepted a job loss in Germany if, in turn, one new job 
would be created abroad. In addition, the laypeople group was asked 
in a 3 × 2 between-subjects design whether they accepted the job loss 
if one, five, or ten new jobs would be created, either elsewhere in 
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Germany or abroad. To collect the answers in the second part, we 
used a five point Likert scale from 1=Fully disagree to 5=Fully agree. 
The two parts of the survey allowed us to examine potential 
parochialistic attitudes of laypeople and economists from two 
different angles. The first part focuses on the judgments of potential 
political interventions, the second part deals with an economic 
scenario that participants are confronted with. One might argue that 
the policy proposals were not very specific in how they should be 
implemented and left room for interpretation, for example, how one 
does define a “foreigner”. We considered this less critical because we 
did not aim to test for specific psychological biases. Rather, a 
different awareness for implementation issues and varying mental 
representations evoked by the proposals represent the very reasons 
for the differences between economic experts and laypeople.  
Table 1: Phrasing of the policy proposals and the questions asked for each 
proposal 
Item Concept Phrasing 
1 Acceptance Are you in favor of or against this proposal? 
2 Unemployment If the policy was implemented, what do you think the 
long-term consequences would be for the unemployment 
rate – an increase or decrease? 
3 Economic 
growth 
If the policy was implemented, what do you think the 
long-term consequences would be for the national 
economic growth – an increase or decrease? 
4 Federal budget 
deficit 
If the policy was implemented, what do you think the 
long-term consequences would be for the federal budget 
deficit – an increase or decrease? 
5 Fairness Do you consider the policy to be unfair or fair? 
6 Self-interest Does the policy serve your personal interests or those of 
close friends, that is, are the consequences for you 
negative, neutral or positive? 
Policy Proposal 1 
(German) 
Die Anzahl der in Deutschland lebenden Ausländer 
sollte so stark wie möglich gesenkt werden. 
Policy Proposal 1 
(English) 
The number of foreigners living in Germany should be 
reduced as much as possible. 
Policy Proposal 2 
(German) 
Arbeitgeber sollten freie Stellen nur dann an Ausländer 
vergeben, wenn sich kein Deutscher darauf bewirbt. 
Policy Proposal 2 
(English) 
Employers should only be allowed to hire foreigners if no 
Germans apply for the job. 
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2.3. Results 
2.3.1. Judgments of immigration policy proposals 
The results of the first part of our survey by and large confirmed our 
hypothesis of parochialistic attitudes in the general public, but 
revealed a more nuanced picture for economists. In both policy 
proposals, we observed a wide gap between the answers of laypeople 
and economists (see Tables 2 and 3). 
More than half of laypeople with a lower level of education approved 
the first policy proposal to reduce the number of foreigners in 
Germany as much as possible. Among highly educated laypeople, the 
support was clearly lower and amounted to 27%. Economists, 
however, opposed the policy almost unanimously. The differences 
between the three groups were statistically significant based on 
Tukey’s HSD test procedure (Toothacker, 1993). 
Table 2: Percentages of agreement across all respondent groups to policy 
proposal 1: “The number of foreigners living in Germany should be reduced as 
much as possible” 
 
Laypeople 
with low level 
of education 
Laypeople 
with high 
level of 
education Economists 
Acceptance (yes) 53a 27b 1c 
Unemployment (positive consequences) 66a 68a 24b 
Economic growth (positive consequences) 66a 52b 3c 
Federal budget deficit (positive 
consequences) 66a 56a 16b 
Fairness (yes) 48a 35b 3c 
Self-interest (positive consequences) 12a 12a 0b 
Sample size N=134 N=54 N=79 
Note. Percentages of agreement that do not share a common subscript differ at p<.05 according to the q-statistics 
of Tukey's Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) test procedure (Toothacker, 1993). 
Degrees of freedom for acceptance, unemployment, economic growth, federal budget, fairness: df = 1. Degrees of 
freedom for self-interest: df = 2 
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The judgments of the policy’s economic consequences of laypeople 
and economists also diverged. About two thirds of the laypeople 
expected positive employment effects—independent from their level of 
education. In contrast, only 24% of the economists saw positive 
effects for employment. In the other two items related to economic 
efficiency, consequences for economic growth, and the federal budget 
deficit, the differences between laypeople and economists were even 
larger. Furthermore, 48% of the laypeople with a lower level of 
education versus 35% of those with a higher level of education judged 
a reduction of the number of foreigners as fair. In contrast, only 3% 
of the economists agreed. Regarding the last question on self-interest, 
12% of laypeople assumed positive consequences for themselves, but 
not a single economist did.  
Table 3: Percentages of agreement across all respondent groups to policy 
proposal 2: “Employers should only be allowed to hire foreigners if no 
Germans apply for the job.” 
 
Laypeople 
with low level 
of education 
Laypeople 
with high 
level of 
education Economists 
Acceptance (yes) 39a 15b 3b 
Unemployment (positive consequences) 71a 70a 23b 
Economic growth (positive consequences) 70a 63a 1b 
Federal budget deficit (positive 
consequences) 62a 72a 7b 
Fairness (yes) 60a 51a 3b 
Self-interest (positive consequences) 22a 7b 0c 
Sample size N=134 N=54 N=79 
Note. Percentages of agreement that do not share a common subscript differ at p<.05 according to the q-statistics 
of Tukey's Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) test procedure (Toothacker, 1993). 
Degrees of freedom for acceptance, unemployment, economic growth, federal budget, fairness: df = 1. Degrees of 
freedom for self-interest: df = 2 
The results for the second policy proposal largely resembled the 
results for the first policy (Table 3). A larger share of laypeople with 
lower education (39%) than higher education (15%) agreed that 
employers should only be allowed to hire foreigners if no Germans 
applied for the job. In contrast, only 3% of the economists approved 
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of this policy. As for the first proposal, a majority of laypeople with 
both a low and high level of education expected positive effects for 
employment, economic growth, and the federal budget deficit. 
However, most economists disagreed and argued the contrary. More 
than half of the laypeople with lower (60%) and higher education 
(51%) found the policy fair, but only very few economists (3%) agreed.  
To summarize, our hypothesis that laypeople would show more 
negative than positive attitudes toward immigration policies 
corresponded well with the data. Around half of the laypeople with a 
low level of education accepted the two policy proposals, a higher 
level of education significantly reduced acceptance. However, a clear 
majority of laypeople, independent from level of education, judged the 
policies as economically efficient and a considerable share found 
them fair. In contrast, economists strongly opposed the two policy 
proposals and judged them as neither fair nor economically efficient. 
2.3.2. Judgments of job relocations 
In the second part of our survey, we also found evidence for 
parochialistic attitudes among economic laypeople. Economists 
expressed a more moderate opinion. Laypeople opposed a job loss in 
Germany if, in turn, new jobs would be created abroad. Opposition 
decreased dramatically if the new jobs would be created elsewhere in 
Germany instead. 
A large majority of laypeople with low and high levels of education 
disapprove of a job loss in Germany if one new job would be created 
abroad. Less than 10% of laypeople partly or fully agreed with the job 
relocation. The mean agreement rating on a five-point scale from 
1=fully disagree to 5=fully agree amounted to M=1.83 (SD=1.17) for 
laypeople with lower education. For laypeople with higher education, 
we observed a slightly higher agreement (M=2.09; SD=1.01). However, 
this difference was insignificant (p=.12) according to Tukey's Honestly 
Significant Difference (HSD) test procedure (Toothacker, 1993). 
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Among the economists, the picture appeared more balanced. With a 
mean rating of M=2.72 (SD=1.03) they judged the job relocation 
scenario significantly more positively than laypeople with lower and 
laypeople with higher level of education (p<.01). 
Additionally, we had asked the laypeople respondent group if they 
accepted the job loss if either one, five, or ten new jobs would be 
created in turn—either elsewhere in Germany or abroad. We 
conducted a 2 × 2 × 3 analysis of variance to quantify the effects of 
level of education (high or low), location of the new jobs created (in 
Germany or abroad), and the number of jobs created (one, five, or 
ten) on the agreement rating. Figure 1 plots the mean agreement 
ratings, differentiated by the three factors.  
Figure 1: Agreement ratings by number of new jobs created, location of new 
jobs and level of education for the statement: “The loss of one job in Germany 
is acceptable if one (five/ten) new job(s) is (are) created abroad (in Germany)” 
As expected, the analysis revealed a significant effect of the new jobs’ 
location, F(1, 1085)=480.2; p<.01; ɳ2=.31. If the new jobs were created 
abroad, mean agreement was M=2.03, while it increased to M=3.74 
for new jobs in Germany. The variance of the number of jobs created 
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also explained a significant part of the variance of the agreement 
rating, F(2, 1085)=16.5; p<.01, ɳ2=.03, with factor means of M=2.58 
for one new job, M=3.08 for five, and M=2.99 for ten new jobs. 
Increasing the number of jobs offered from 5 to 10 did not further 
increase the mean agreement rating. Offering more than five jobs may 
have appeared implausible to the participants. 
The level of education did not exert a significant independent effect 
on the acceptance rating: F(1, 1085)=2.3; p=.13; ɳ2<.01. However, the 
interaction effect between level of education and the new jobs’ 
location suggests that more educated laypeople held less 
parochialistic views. This two-way interaction proved significant, yet 
with a very small effect size: F(1, 1085)=5.4; p=.02; ɳ2=.01. Laypeople 
with a higher level of education shared a slightly more positive view 
on jobs created abroad than laypeople with a lower level of education. 
Furthermore, we observed a significant but also relatively small two-
way interaction between the number of jobs created to compensate 
for the job loss and the location of the new jobs with F(2, 1085)=4.8; 
p=.01; ɳ2=.01. On the one hand, if the new jobs were created in 
Germany, increasing their number from one to five had a positive 
effect on the agreement rating. On the other hand, respondents did 
not care for jobs created abroad—the agreement rating did not 
change significantly when altering the number of jobs created.  
To summarize, laypeople heavily opposed a job loss in Germany, 
regardless of the number of jobs created abroad in turn. Economists 
expressed more moderate views. When the new job would be created 
in Germany, however, most respondents in the laypeople group 
accepted a job loss, particularly if more than one job was offered in 
compensation. 
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2.4. Discussion 
The major aim of our study was to contrast views on immigration 
policies and job relocation of economists and laypeople with different 
levels of education. Therefore, we conducted two telephone surveys in 
Germany with randomly selected laypeople and professional 
economists. Participants were asked to judge immigration policy 
proposals and a job relocation scenario. 
Our results revealed huge differences in the judgments of 
immigration policies between laypeople and economists. Around half 
of the laypeople with a low level of education accepted the two policy 
proposals to reduce the number of foreigners living in Germany and 
to allow employers to hire foreigners only if no Germans apply for the 
job in question. Additionally, a clear majority of lay respondents, 
independent from level of education, judged these two policy 
proposals economically efficient. A considerable share of respondents 
found them fair as well. On the other hand, a large majority of the 
economists opposed the two policies and did not assume positive 
economic effects or judged them as fair. In the second part of our 
survey, a significantly larger share of laypeople than economists 
opposed a job loss in Germany if one job would be created abroad in 
turn. The number of jobs created abroad as compensation for the job 
loss did not significantly change the acceptance of the job relocation. 
Acceptance clearly increased, however, if the new jobs were created in 
Germany. A higher level of education had only a small positive effect 
on the mean agreement ratings. Nevertheless, educational effects may 
still explain part of the gap between economists and laypeople. In our 
survey, the respondent group of higher educated laypeople had 
completed a minimum 12 years of formal education, without further 
differentiating between college or graduate education. The 
professional economists, however, had completed graduate studies 
and most of them had obtained Ph.D. degrees.  
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There is a certain irony in the diverging results of economists and 
laypeople. Economics enjoys a reputation as a “dismal science” (e.g., 
Marglin, 2008), allegedly expecting humans to be rational, “cold-
hearted” individuals solely focused on increasing economic wealth. In 
the context of immigration policies, however, economists display 
rather cosmopolitan attitudes, do not value a job in Germany much 
higher than a job abroad, and judge it unfair to prefer Germans over 
foreigners in the labor market. In contrast, the general public values 
one job in Germany higher than ten alternative jobs and would partly 
judge it fair to expel foreigners from Germany. 
The results for economic laypeople conform well to existing research 
on parochialism and nationalism. Acceptance rates of about 50% for 
anti-immigration policies correspond to similar estimates for the 
dissemination of nationalist attitudes in Germany (Blank & Schmidt, 
2003). We know that fairness is the preponderant judgment criterion 
in political contexts for economic laypeople. Our results suggest that 
they share a strongly parochialistic notion of fairness. Simply put, 
people consider fair what they think is good for their own nation and 
their fellow citizens. One reason for this could be that people feel the 
need to reciprocate: “They owe something to their nation because of 
what it has done for them. In particular, they have a duty as citizens 
to support policies that benefit other citizens” (Baron, Ritov & Greene, 
2009, p. 23). Consequently, it seems inappropriate to support policies 
that harm one’s own nation, even though the benefit for other nations 
might be significant as was the case in our job relocation scenarios. 
People do not simply determine the adequacy of an action based on 
its consequences. This is what consequentialist ethics or 
utilitarianism would suggest, which is usually advocated by 
economists. Instead, laypeople adhere to a deolontogical ethics: they 
follow general rules, for example the rule to reciprocate. 
Moreover, the results for the different job relocation scenarios suggest 
that laypeople did not completely ignore economic efficiency 
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considerations. Only a minority of the respondents opposed a job loss 
if, in turn, a new job was created elsewhere in Germany. Offering five 
or ten jobs in compensation further increased acceptance. On the 
other hand, economic efficiency judgments might have further 
supported parochialistic reasoning. Laypeople rated the economic 
consequences of the two proposed policies considerably more 
negatively than economic experts. Most likely, cognitive biases 
contributed to these diverging judgments. The fixed-pie myth, for 
example, could lead laypeople to think that foreigners take jobs away 
from an assumed fixed pie of jobs available in Germany. They may 
also view the loss of one job and one new job created somewhere else 
as an economic zero-sum game. Economists, on the other hand, 
would point to productivity gains related to this kind of job relocation, 
usually resulting in a net economic benefit. However, the economists’ 
belief in the positive economic effects of free labor mobility is far from 
being indisputable. There might be non-material as well as social cost 
of migration and job relocations that are inadequately reflected in 
standard economic models (cf. Rodrik, 1997; Schiff, 1992). 
Generally, the measures for economic efficiency and fairness in our 
survey can not fully explain the acceptance ratings of the two policy 
proposals. Particularly, most laypeople with higher education 
disapproved the proposals although many of them judged them both 
economically efficient and fair. Apparently, parochialism and the 
perceived duty to support one’s nation conflicted with other 
considerations that were only partially covered by our fairness 
measure. This may have included social desirability, sympathy for 
foreigners, valuing the equality of all humans, or favoring cultural 
diversity. These considerations relate to attitudes and concepts 
developed in the literature as counterparts of nationalism: civic 
national identity (Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Kunovich, 2009), patriotism 
(Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) or 
cosmopolitanism (Haller & Roudometof, 2010; Schrock & Jacobson, 
2009). Future studies could try to discern the different attitudes and 
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the respective facets of justice that are likely to influence judgments 
of immigration policies. 
Economists did not share the parochialistic attitudes of the general 
public. Most of them did not accept the two immigration policy 
proposals and judged them as unfair. Why economic experts express 
different views than economic laypeople remains an open question for 
future research. On the one hand, economists could basically share 
nationalist attitudes, but favor immigration and free transnational 
labor markets because they have positive effects on their home 
country’s economy. Thus, they would not explicitly care about 
immigrants or global justice, but strive to increase their own nation’s 
economic wealth. On the other hand, economists could hold more 
cosmopolitan attitudes and more positive attitudes toward 
immigrants in general. Consequently, they support policies promoting 
immigration and increasing global economic wealth. Either way, 
potential stories of selfish economists not considering the well-being 
of their fellow human beings should probably be revised. 
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3. Economic Experts or Laypeople? How 
Teachers and Journalists Judge Trade and 
Immigration Policies 
3.1. Introduction 
"The fact that there is a wide divergence between many of the 
practical conclusions of economic science, as laid down by its 
professional exponents, and the thought of the public at large, as 
reflected in current discussion and in legislation, is one with which 
all are familiar" (Newcomb, 1893, p. 375). This statement was put 
forward more than a century ago, but has lost none of its relevance. 
The respective professional exponents, the economists, regularly 
deplore that their policy recommendations inadequately resonate in 
public debates and practical economic policy (Frey, 2000; Henderson, 
1986; Stiglitz, 1998; Thorpe, 1940).  
Numerous studies have shown that the public at large, predominated 
by laypeople without expert knowledge in economics, has a different 
view on economic phenomena and economic policies compared to 
professional economists (e.g., Baron & Kemp, 2004; Blendon et al., 
1997; Caplan, 2002; Frey, 1986; Haferkamp et al., 2009; Walstad, 
1997; Walstad & Rebeck, 2002; Williamson & Wearing, 1996). The 
disconnect between economists and economic laypeople appears 
particularly large in the trade and immigration policy domain. While 
economists favor free trade and free labor mobility (e.g., Alston et al., 
1992; Coughlin, 2002), laypeople tend to support protectionist 
policies (e.g., Kemp, 2007; Rubin, 2003). Compared to economic 
experts, they also assume different economic consequences. For 
example, only 30% of laypeople in a survey by Jacob et al. (2010) 
expected lower overall consumer prices from globalization, but 90% of 
the economists did.  
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To elucidate these large differences, two groups of professionals 
deserve particular attention: journalists and teachers. They act as 
promoters for economic literacy because economic knowledge is 
mainly imparted through education and information regarding 
economic policies is predominantly transferred through the media. In 
this context, it becomes relevant what teachers and journalists know 
about economics and how they judge economic policies. However, 
these aspects have not been investigated so far. This study provides, 
for the first time, a closer look at their economic policy judgments. 
The major aim is to examine how teachers and journalists judge 
economic policies and whether they are closer to the lay or the expert 
way of thinking. If they were closer to the lay way of thinking, this 
could partly explain the observed gap between economic experts and 
laypeople. 
Along the way, we also aim to extend existing findings on the 
differences in judgment of economic policies between economists and 
laypeople as well as the judgment criteria they apply. 
Our analysis is based on two policy proposals from the trade and 
immigration policy domain. In telephone surveys we asked 
economists, laypeople, teachers, and journalists in Germany how 
they judged the two policies. For each of the respondent groups, we 
particularly explored if and how self-interest, efficiency and fairness 
judgments can explain the acceptance of the policies. 
3.1.1. Lay and economists’ judgments of economic policies 
According to the homo oeconomicus paradigm of economic science, 
individuals are assumed to maximize their individual utility (Stigler, 
1981; Schwartz, 1986) and to be perfectly informed about their 
choices. In the context of lay judgments of economic policies, these 
two assertions are not empirically warranted.  
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As to the first assertion, self-interest seems to be a subordinate factor 
in voting decisions and the evaluation of economic policies as a broad 
array of studies from both psychology and political science show 
(Baron, 2003; Citrin et al., 1997; Haferkamp et al., 2009; Kinder & 
Kiewit, 1979; Miller & Ratner, 1998; Sears & Funk, 1990). Public 
choice theory also concedes that voters base their political judgments 
on factors other than material self-interest (Brennan & Buchanan, 
1984; Brennan & Lomasky, 1993). However, Coughlin (2002) as well 
as Scheve and Slaughter (2001) argue that citizens might oppose free 
trade because they fear its negative consequences on themselves, for 
example the loss of their jobs. 
The second assertion, full information about the consequences of all 
policy alternatives, is even less appropriate. Numerous surveys show 
that laypeople possess only little factual knowledge of the economy 
and lack basic economic expertise (e.g., Caplan, 2003; Walstad & 
Larsen, 1993; Walstad, 1997). They misjudge basic mechanisms, 
such as long-term effects of economic growth (Christandl & 
Fetchenhauer, 2009). People also appear to have a rather weak 
understanding of the principle of comparative advantage (Baron & 
Kemp, 2004; Krugman, 1994), which lies at the heart of all 
arguments for free trade. 
Given their lack of economic expertise, do laypeople judge economic 
policies in the same way as professional economists, or do they apply 
alternative judgment logic?  
Professional economists base their judgments of economic policy 
proposals mainly on efficiency considerations (e.g., Haferkamp et al., 
2009; Kirchgässner, 2005; Stiglitz, 1998). For example, economists 
support free trade and free labor mobility because they generally 
increase overall economic wealth (e.g., Alston et al., 1992; Coughlin, 
2002). Economists do not neglect fairness considerations, but usually 
follow a utilitarian approach (Baron, 2004). They tend to find a policy 
that increases overall economic wealth to be fair (Haferkamp et al., 
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2009). In our study, we expect economists to favor free trade and 
labor mobility both from an efficiency and a fairness point of view; 
with efficiency being the preponderant judgment criterion. 
Do laypeople follow the judgment logic of economists? There is 
substantial evidence that they do not. Lay and expert judgments of 
economic policies widely diverge (e.g., Blendon et al, 1997; Caplan, 
2002; Frey, 1986; Henderson, 1986; Haferkamp et al., 2009). For 
example, unlike economists, laypeople remain quite skeptical towards 
free trade policies (e.g., Cass, 2000; Kemp, 2008; Kemp, 2007; Rubin, 
2003). Apparently, laypeople develop their own mental models and 
causal hypotheses about how the economy works (Caplan, 2007; 
Rubin, 2003; Williamson & Wearing, 1996). These mental models are 
not only based on daily life experience, but also on what young people 
learn in school and from the media (Furnham, 2008). 
To derive their judgments of a policy’s consequences for economic 
efficiency, laypeople revert to several cognitive heuristics, which, in 
turn, are prone to systematic biases (Baron et al., 2006; Caplan, 
2007). Baron et al. (2006) and Kemp (2007) provide a detailed 
overview of heuristics and biases that are relevant in the trade and 
immigration policy context. They present, to name a few, the fixed-pie 
myth or zero-sum game assumption (Baron et al., 2006; Henderson, 
1986), isolation effects (McCaffery & Baron, 2003; Read et al., 1999), 
parochialism or anti-foreign bias (Baron et al., 2006; Caplan, 2007; 
Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1991), the do-no-harm heuristic (Baron, 
1995; Baron & Jurney, 1993) and the status-quo bias, amplified by 
loss aversion (Kemp, 2007; Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986; 
Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Referring to these biases, we expect 
laypeople to judge free trade policies as less economically favorable, 
or less efficient, than economists do.  
Moreover, laypeople not only succumb to cognitive biases when 
evaluating economic efficiency of policy proposals, but tend to base 
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their judgments on a different criterion: Is the policy proposal 
perceived as fair?  
Fairness is known as a powerful decision factor. Many studies point 
to the importance of fairness (e. g., Tyler, 1994). Experimental 
evidence for its role in an economic context is extensive (cf. Camerer, 
2003; Davidson et al., 2006). Haferkamp et al. (2009) recently showed 
the importance of fairness in the evaluation of labor market 
interventions. Furthermore, fairness judgments are generally derived 
rather intuitively and without much cognitive effort (Haidt, 2001). In 
contrast, the evaluation of economic efficiency is cognitively complex 
and requires sound economic knowledge. Thus, laypeople’s fairness 
judgments may serve as cognitive shortcuts for deriving congruent 
efficiency judgments.  
We therefore expect that, for laypeople, the influence of their 
efficiency judgments on the acceptance of a policy proposal is only 
significant if one does not control for fairness perception—which we 
expect to serve as the strongest predictor for the acceptance of a 
policy proposal. 
3.1.2. The role of teachers and journalists 
Teachers and journalists deserve particular attention when analyzing 
lay economic knowledge. By acting as promoters for economic literacy 
through school and media, they shape the way people judge economic 
policies (Haferkamp et al., 2009). 
How does the process of promoting economic knowledge and 
attitudes towards economic policies basically work? School plays an 
important role in imparting economic knowledge (Furnham & Cleare, 
1988; Lunt & Furnham, 1996). Explicit economics courses in 
secondary school significantly improve students' performance in tests 
of economic literacy (e.g., Walstad & Buckles, 2008; Walstad & 
Rebeck, 2001), although students still lack an understanding of 
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several basic concepts after a one-semester course (Walstad & 
Allgood, 1999). The more economics courses teachers have taken in 
university, the higher their students' achievements in economics 
(Allgood & Walstad, 1999; Bosshardt & Watts, 1990). The level of 
economic literacy, in turn, can shape economic policy judgments 
(Walstad & Rebeck, 2002). Thus, teachers have considerable leverage 
in transferring economic knowledge and attitudes. Besides, economic 
literacy can influence civic attitudes: Eriksen and Fallan (1996) found 
a positive effect of tax system knowledge on the perceived fairness of 
the tax system and intended tax compliance.  
In Germany, where our study has been conducted, only few federal 
states offer a separate subject Economics (Burkard, 2004). However, 
the curriculum of Social Studies, which is a compulsory course in 
secondary schools across Germany, includes considerable economic 
content.  
The promotional role of journalists rests upon the observation that 
people learn most of the things they know about economics and 
politics from the media (Luhmann, 2000). People state that they are 
generally interested in politics and regularly access the media to 
inform themselves (e.g., for the USA: Blinder & Krueger, 2004; for 
Germany: Noelle-Neumann & Köcher, 2002). Albaek, Christiansen, 
and Togeby (2003) detect a steady rise of references to experts from 
the social sciences in newspapers, which helps to transfer economic 
knowledge. The important role of the media in forming public opinion 
is generally acknowledged in political and mass communication 
research (e.g., Bennett, 2010; McCombs, 2004; Scheufele & 
Tewksbury, 2007), although the media’s direct influence is seen 
nuanced and its magnitude remains controversial (Goidel, Procopio, 
Terrell & Wu, 2010; Kleinnijenhuis & Rietberg, 1995; Soroka, 2006; 
Takeshita, 2006). In Germany, Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart (2009) 
found a robust link between news coverage of immigration issues and 
anti-immigration attitudes. 
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What do teachers and journalists know about economics and how do 
they think about economic policies? These aspects have hardly been 
investigated so far. In one survey by Becker, Walstad, and Watts 
(1994), several economic propositions were presented to high school 
teachers in social studies and economics, journalists, and 
professional economists. The scores of the economists clearly differed 
from the scores of the two other groups. For Germany, there is no 
evidence regarding economic literacy and attitudes towards economic 
policies of teachers and journalists so far. However, the economic 
knowledge of German social studies teachers, who are responsible for 
teaching economic content in secondary schools, is expected to be 
rather modest. Only a relatively small number of teachers have taken 
courses at economics departments during their studies (Burkard, 
2004). This should also be reflected in their economic policy 
judgments, which we expect to lie closer to the laypeople's than to the 
economists' answer pattern. For the journalists we likewise expect an 
answer pattern lying in between economists and laypeople. Although 
there is research on political dispositions of journalists (e.g., 
Kepplinger & Ehmig, 1997; Weischenberg, Malik & Scholl, 2006), 
nothing is known about their economic literacy from the literature so 
far. However, journalists who work in the economics departments of 
newspapers and TV stations are confronted with complex economic 
policy issues on a daily basis. They should therefore possess certain 
economic expertise. 
The major aim of our study was to find out how teachers and 
journalists judge trade and immigration policies and whether their 
judgments are closer to the lay or the expert way of thinking. 
Additionally, we aimed to have a closer look at the relative importance 
of economic efficiency, fairness, and self-interest as judgment criteria 
for the acceptance of a policy proposal, again differentiated by 
respondent groups. We therefore conducted telephone surveys with 
economists, laypeople, teachers, and journalists. 
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3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Participants 
In order to compare the judgments of laypeople, economists, teachers, 
and journalists, four separate surveys were conducted in Germany. 
First, adults above the age of 18, randomly selected based on random 
telephone numbers, participated in telephone interviews (N=190). 
This representative sample of the German population formed the 
respondent group of laypeople. However, we did not control for the 
economic literacy of the participants. There may have been 
respondents who possess a certain degree of economic expertise and 
are not economic laypeople in a strict sense. The vast majority of the 
participants hold German citizenship (95%); 53% were female; 75% 
had grown up in the Western part of Germany. The participants' 
average age was 46 years (SD=17). 
To control for effects of education, we formed a separate subgroup 
from the sample for more highly educated laypeople, holding 
university entrance qualification after a minimum 12 years of formal 
education (N=68; 92% German citizenship; 48% female; 74% West 
German; average age = 42 years with SD=16).  
The other three surveys were dedicated to the three groups of 
professionals. They were likewise conducted via telephone. Among the 
economists, teachers and journalists interviewed, 99% had enjoyed 
higher education in the form of at least 12 years of formal school 
education. The economist sample was based on the member index of 
the “Verein für Socialpolitik”—the major association of economists in 
Germany, which has more than 3,600 members. In a two-step 
approach, university departments were randomly selected from the 
member index and then one faculty member was randomly chosen 
from each department (N=80; 96% German citizenship; 18% female; 
93% West German; average age = 40 years with SD=13).  
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The teacher and the journalist samples were based on databases of 
specialized address retailers. We ordered the addresses of social 
science teachers who are responsible for the economic and political 
education of secondary school students. The questions were 
presented to N=97 teachers (96% German citizenship; 57% female; 
52% West German; average age = 42 years with SD=9). In the fourth 
survey we focused on journalists working either in policy or 
economics editorial departments. The N=90 interviewees came from 
newspaper, radio station, or television station editorial offices in 
equal shares. 98% hold German citizenship; 26% were female; 91% 
had grown up in Western Germany and the average age was 43 years 
(SD=8).  
3.2.2. Survey design 
All interviewees in the four surveys were presented the same two 
policy proposals from the trade and immigration policy domain:  
(1) Highly qualified foreigners should be explicitly attracted to 
Germany  
(2) The government should financially support businesses that 
produce exclusively in Germany and not abroad.  
While some of the laypeople were interviewed on only one of the two 
policy proposals, all participants in the other three groups were 
interviewed on both policies. 
Although the policy proposals did not particularly mention trade 
barriers, they refer to the relation to foreign countries and to a free 
transnational exchange of workers. The two specific policies had been 
chosen because they were particularly likely to activate a wide array 
of the heuristics and biases described in the previous subchapter.  
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Table 4: Phrasing of the policy proposals and the questions asked for each 
proposal 
Admittedly, the policy proposals are not very specific in how they 
should be implemented. They therefore leave room for interpretation, 
particularly the second policy. For example, one could introduce 
either direct business subsidies or an additional tax on goods 
produced abroad. Also, it is very challenging from a practical point of 
view to identify those businesses that are actually producing 
exclusively in Germany. Economists and journalists might be more 
aware of these implementation issues than the other groups. 
However, we do not believe that this strongly biases our results. 
Rather, being aware of implementation issues is one major reason 
that the answers of experts and laypeople may differ. 
For each policy proposal, the respondents first had to disclose if they 
were in favor of or against the policy. To investigate potential 
predictors of the acceptance rating, participants were subsequently 
Item Concept Phrasing 
1 Acceptance Are you in favor of or against this policy? 
2 Unemployment If the policy was implemented, what do you think the 
long-term consequences would be for the unemployment 
rate – an increase or decrease? 
3 Economic 
growth 
If the policy was implemented, what do you think the 
long-term consequences would be for the national 
economic growth – an increase or decrease? 
4 Federal budget 
deficit 
If the policy was implemented, what do you think the 
long-term consequences would be for the federal budget 
deficit – an increase or decrease? 
5 Fairness Do you consider the policy to be unfair or fair? 
6 Self-interest Does the policy serve your personal interests or those of 
close friends, that is, are the consequences for you 
negative, neutral or positive? 
Policy Proposal 1 
(German) 
Deutschland sollte gezielt hoch qualifizierte 
Arbeitnehmer aus dem Ausland anwerben. 
Policy Proposal 1 
(English) 
Highly qualified foreigners should be explicitly attracted 
to Germany. 
Policy Proposal 2 
(German) 
Der Staat sollte Unternehmen finanziell unterstützen, 
die nur in Deutschland und nicht im Ausland 
produzieren. 
Policy Proposal 2 
(English) 
The government should financially support businesses 
that produce exclusively in Germany and not abroad. 
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asked to judge the economic efficiency of the policy along three 
dimensions: long-term consequences for unemployment (decrease or 
increase), for national economic growth (increase or decrease), and for 
the federal budget deficit (decrease or increase). A fifth question 
targeted the fairness of the policy (fair or unfair) and the last question 
asked whether the participants assumed the policy served their 
personal interest (positive, neutral or negative). Table 4 summarizes 
the six questions with their exact phrasing. 
3.2.3. Scale building 
Beyond the analysis of the different ratings for the policy proposals 
we aimed to find out to what extent efficiency, fairness, and self-
interest served as predictors for the acceptance rating.  
To keep the analysis tractable, we first verified if the answers from 
Policy 1 and Policy 2 could be integrated into one scale. Cronbach's α 
as a usual measure for internal consistency proved inappropriate in 
our case, because it is not robust when only two binary variables are 
concerned (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2007). Instead, we computed the 
Holsti Index (Holsti, 1969), measuring the relative share of subjects 
that answered identically in both policy proposals. The Holsti Index 
fluctuated from 0.59 for the question on the budget deficit to 0.67 for 
the question on self-interest, which can be deemed acceptable. 
Furthermore, we examined post-hoc if the findings presented in the 
Results section significantly changed if the two policy proposals were 
analyzed separately. However, this was not the case. 
Thus, we calculated six scales for acceptance, unemployment, 
economic growth, budget deficit, fairness, and self-interest, each 
ranging from 0 (e.g., both policies rejected) to 2 (e.g., both policies 
accepted). Coding of Policy 1 was inverted in the process to reflect 
that the two policies had been phrased differently: Policy 1 in a pro-
free-market fashion, Policy 2 in anti-market fashion.  
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Subsequently, we created a single efficiency scale by integrating the 
answers to the three questions regarding unemployment, economic 
growth and federal budget deficit effects. The answers to these three 
questions proved to be quite consistent. A Holsti Index of 0.59 was 
computed and the Cronbach's α reached 0.86. 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Acceptance, efficiency, fairness, and self-Interest 
judgments of the policy proposals across the respondent 
groups 
Based on existing evidence, we expected considerable differences in 
the policy judgments of economists and laypeople. We clearly 
observed those differences in the two presented policy proposals (see 
Tables 5 and 6). The judgments of teachers and journalists, however, 
did not clearly follow the answer pattern of either economists or 
laypeople. 
In the first policy proposal, acceptance ratings as well as judgments 
of economic efficiency and fairness diverged widely. Among the 
economists, a large majority of 87% would attract highly qualified 
foreigners to Germany (Table 5). More than 90% assumed positive 
effects for economic growth and employment. In contrast, only 34% of 
laypeople with a lower level of education approved of the policy 
proposal and about 50% would see positive effects for growth or 
employment. All these differences are statistically significant based 
on Tukey’s HSD test procedure (Toothacker, 1993). 
The percentages of agreement to the first policy proposal of both 
teachers and journalists were rather close to the economists 
(Table 5). Consequently, they both differed considerably from the 
laypeople’s answer pattern. Neither the acceptance ratings nor the 
fairness perceptions, the assumed effects on economic growth or the 
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assumed effects on the federal budget significantly differed from the 
economists' judgments. However, fewer teachers (64%) and 
journalists (76%) than economists (92%) counted on positive 
employment effects. 
Table 5: Percentages of agreement across all respondent groups to policy 
proposal 1: "Highly qualified foreigners should be explicitly attracted to 
Germany" 
 
Economists 
Laypeople 
with low 
level of 
education 
Laypeople 
with high 
level of 
education Teachers Journalists 
Acceptance (yes) 87a 34b 46b 72a 88a 
Unemployment (positive 
consequences) 92a 51b 49b 64b,c 76a,c 
Economic growth (positive 
consequences) 95a 56b 63b 92a 94a 
Federal budget deficit 
(positive consequences) 88a 58b 62b 88a 89a 
Fairness (yes) 81a 53b 55b,c 74a,c 85a 
Self-interest (positive 
consequences) 30a,c 12b 21a,b,c 14a,b,c 31a,c 
Sample size N=80 N=122 N=68 N=97 N=90 
Note. Percentages of agreement that do not share a common subscript differ at p<.01 according to the q-statistics 
of Tukey's Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) test procedure (Toothacker, 1993).  
Degrees of freedom for acceptance, unemployment, economic growth, federal budget, justice: df = 1. Degrees of 
freedom for self-interest: df = 2 
Table 6: Percentages of agreement across all respondent groups to policy 
proposal 2: "The government should financially support businesses that 
produce exclusively in Germany and not abroad" 
 
Economists 
Laypeople 
with low 
level of 
education 
Laypeople 
with high 
level of 
education Teachers Journalists 
Acceptance (yes)   8a 80b 78b 62b 32c 
Unemployment (positive 
consequences) 17a 79b 84b 77b 54c 
Economic growth (positive 
consequences) 10a 84b 81b 70b,c 51c 
Federal budget deficit 
(positive consequences)   8a 73b 73b 56b,c 36c 
Fairness (yes)   6a 83b 73b,c 63c 36d 
Self-interest (positive 
consequences)   4a 40b 36b,c 14c,d 17a,d 
Sample size N=80 N=124 N=64 N=97 N=90 
Note. Percentages of agreement that do not share a common subscript differ at p<.01 according to the q-statistics 
of Tukey's Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) test procedure (Toothacker, 1993). 
Degrees of freedom for acceptance, unemployment, economic growth, federal budget, justice: df = 1. Degrees of 
freedom for self-interest: df = 2 
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In the second policy proposal, the gap between professional 
economists and laypeople is even more remarkable than in the first 
one (Table 6). Only 7% of the economists would financially support 
businesses that produce exclusively in Germany, but 80% of the 
laypeople with a lower level of education endorsed this proposal. This 
wide and highly significant gap persisted in the respective judgments 
on unemployment, economic growth, and the federal budget deficit as 
well as on the fairness and the self-interest dimensions.  
In contrast to the first policy proposal, the answers of teachers and 
journalists to the second policy question clearly differed from those of 
the economists (Table 6). The teachers matched the laypeople's 
answer patterns quite closely. The agreement rates of teachers and 
laypeople were similar in most answer categories. In contrast, the 
difference between the teachers and the economists is large and 
statistically significant across all six answer categories. For example, 
a majority of the teachers (62%) agreed that businesses producing 
exclusively in Germany should be financially supported while only 8% 
of the economists argued the same way. For the journalists a less 
clear picture emerges. As for the teachers, their percentages of 
agreement differed significantly from the economists—across all the 
answer categories except self-interest. However, in contrast to the 
teachers’ answers, they also clearly differed from the laypeople’s 
percentages of agreement. 
The level of education did not seem to play an important role in 
determining the judgments of the proposed policies. Thus, it cannot 
explain the observed differences between laypeople, teachers and 
journalists. There was no significant difference between laypeople 
with a higher versus lower level of education in any of the six 
questions of the two policy proposals. Besides, the differences 
between laypeople, teachers and journalists cannot be attributed to 
gender or to West vs. East German background. Adding these two 
demographic factors as control variables did not significantly change 
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the magnitude of the effects that the affiliation to the professional 
groups (economist, teacher or journalist) exerted on the acceptance 
ratings of the policy proposals.  
To summarize, our initial hypothesis of considerable differences 
between economists and laypeople in judging trade and immigration 
policy proposals received clear empirical support. The judgments of 
the second policy proposal (support businesses that produce 
exclusively in Germany) diverged even more that the judgments of the 
first policy (attract highly qualified foreigners to Germany). Higher 
education did not significantly influence the agreement rates. 
Comparing the answer patterns of teachers and journalists to those 
of economists and laypeople gave a mixed picture. Teachers and 
journalists judged the first policy proposal similarly to the 
economists. However, they clearly differed from the economists on the 
second policy proposal. While the teachers’ answer pattern strongly 
resembled that of the laypeople, the answers of the journalists lay 
somewhere in between economists and laypeople.  
3.3.2. Relative importance of economic efficiency, fairness, and 
self-interest as judgment criteria for policy acceptance 
As shown in the previous subchapter, teachers and journalists judge 
economic policies like neither economists nor laypeople. But what 
about the judgment criteria teachers and journalists apply? Do they 
more follow a lay or an expert way of forming their judgments of 
economic policies? 
We performed a linear regression with the aggregated acceptance 
rating as the dependent variable and aggregated economic efficiency, 
fairness and self-interest ratings as independent variables. The 
regression coefficients were calculated separately for the four 
respondent groups of economists, laypeople, teachers, and 
journalists. We merged the two laypeople subgroups with a higher 
and lower level of education into one group, because the results in 
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chapter 3.3.1 indicated that answers did not strongly depend on level 
of education. 
To shed some light on the interaction between the independent 
variables, we carried out the regression analysis in three steps. In the 
first step, we used the efficiency rating as the sole regressor. In the 
second step, the fairness variable was added to the model. Finally, 
self-interest was included. We hypothesized that, for laypeople, 
efficiency would only play a role as long as fairness is not included in 
the model. For economists, on the other hand, we hypothesized that 
they base their judgments on economic efficiency. Consequently, 
adding fairness should not change the efficiency parameter.  
For the economists, the regression analysis reveals economic 
efficiency as the most important judgment criterion as we had 
expected (Table 7). The efficiency coefficient for the economists 
remains stable and highly significant (β=0.70; p<0.01) when fairness 
is added in the second step. Also, it is much larger in size than the 
fairness coefficient, which proves only marginally significant (β=0.16; 
p=0.05).  
For laypeople, economic efficiency also appears to be a strong, 
significant predictor for the policy acceptance in the first step of the 
regression (β=0.72; p<0.01). However, the picture changes if fairness 
is added in the second step. The effect of economic efficiency virtually 
disappears (β=0.15; p=0.11) while the influence of fairness is strong 
and significant (β=0.64; p<0.01). These results suggest that 
laypeople’s efficiency assessment is mediated by fairness perception, 
which is the most important predictor for policy acceptance. 
Concerning teachers and journalists, do they rely more on an 
assessment of economic efficiency, as we expect from economists, or 
on perceived fairness, as we expect from laypeople? Teachers and 
journalists basically follow the same pattern as laypeople. The effect 
of economic efficiency in the first regression step turns insignificant 
in the second step (teachers: β=0.09; p=0.56; journalists: β=-0.09; 
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p=0.34). Fairness, however, strongly affects the acceptance rating 
(teachers: β=0.73; p<0.01; journalists: β=0.86; p<0.01). The 
respective parameters for laypeople, teachers, and journalists display 
similar effect sizes and confidence levels in all regression steps. This 
is a surprise, in that the percentages of agreement presented in 
chapter 3.3.1 revealed considerable differences between laypeople, 
teachers, and journalists. We will come back to this puzzling point in 
the Discussion. 
Table 7: Results of linear regression of aggregated efficiency, fairness and self-
interest ratings on aggregated acceptance rating for the four respondent 
groups 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Acceptance 
Coefficients 
(Standard Errors) 
 
Independent Variables Economists Laypeople Teachers Journalists 
       Step 1 Efficiency 0.80*** 0.72*** 0.81*** 0.59*** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) 
      Constant 0.03 0.55*** 0.12 0.08 
  
(0.13) (0.04) (0.15) (0.09) 
            
        Step 2 Efficiency 0.70*** 0.15 0.09 -0.09 
  
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.10) 
      Fairness 0.16* 0.64*** 0.73*** 0.86*** 
  
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) 
      Constant 0.01 0.44*** 0.14 0.06 
  
(0.04) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) 
            
        Step 3 Efficiency 0.69*** 0.17 0.09 -0.09 
  
(0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.10) 
      Fairness 0.16* 0.66*** 0.73*** 0.85*** 
  
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) 
      Self-Interest 0.02 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 
  
(0.09) (0.14) (0.16) (0.10) 
      Constant -0.05 0.49*** 0.15 0.04 
  
(0.08) (0.15) (0.17) (0.09) 
            
       
 Step 1: R2 0.50*** 0.38*** 0.34*** 0.28*** 
 Step 2: ∆ R2 0.03* 0.23*** 0.29*** 0.43*** 
 Step 3: ∆ R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
Sample size N=67 N=90 N=63 N=72 
   *p<.10;  **p<.05;  ***p<.01 
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Consistent with existing evidence, self-interest appears to be a 
subordinate judgment criterion compared to fairness and economic 
efficiency for all respondent groups. In the third regression step, 
where self-interest is included in the model, the R2 values do not 
improve compared to the second step. Across the groups, the self-
interest coefficients are clearly smaller in size than the efficiency and 
fairness parameters and are not significant at any conventional 
confidence level.  
3.4. Discussion 
The major aim of this study was to analyze how teachers and 
journalists judge economic policies and whether they appear closer to 
an expert or lay way of thinking. For the first time, economists, 
laypeople, teachers, and journalists were asked to judge economic 
policies in four parallel surveys. Our results clearly showed that 
economists and non-economists think differently about economic 
policies and apply different judgment criteria. We could confirm what 
previous research had suggested: Economists favor free transnational 
markets and oppose subsidies. Non-economists endorse protectionist 
policies walling off the national labor market and supporting 
production within the home country.  
Regarding teachers and journalists, their acceptance ratings as well 
as their respective fairness and economic efficiency judgments lay in 
between the laypeople's and the economists' answer patterns. 
Journalists tended more to economists, teachers more to laypeople. 
However, regression analyses revealed that teachers and journalists 
applied the same judgment logic as laypeople. For all three groups, 
the acceptance of a policy proposal depended predominantly on 
fairness considerations. Economists, on the other hand, relied 
primarily on efficiency as a judgment criterion.  
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We did not observe any significant influence of self-interest for any of 
the four respondent groups. This corresponds well with most of the 
literature on the topic (e.g., Haferkamp et al., 2009; Kinder & Kiewit, 
1979; Sears & Funk, 1990), including a study by Citrin et al. (1997), 
which particularly dealt with immigration policy reform. In a political 
context, altruistic or parochialistic considerations seem to be more 
important than pure self-interest. 
How can the systematic differences in judgments of economic policies 
between economists and non-economists be explained? Although we 
did not directly observe and test for them, it is likely that cognitive 
biases played a role that literature suggests as explanations for the 
diverging judgments of economic efficiency. For example, the present 
results for non-economists could be partly attributed to a 
parochialistic bias toward one’s own nation's workers and businesses 
(Baron et al., 2006). In the first policy proposal, people could have 
assumed that foreigners would take jobs away from a presumably 
fixed pie of jobs currently held by Germans, who would then be 
harmed by unemployment. This relates to fixed-pie myth and the do-
no-harm heuristic (Baron et al., 2006; Kemp, 2007).  
What do the results of the regression analyses tell us about the 
interdependencies between acceptance, economic efficiency, and 
fairness? Definite causal inference is difficult, but the following 
hypotheses seem plausible. It is unlikely that economists derive their 
efficiency judgments from fairness perception, given that economic 
efficiency can be, at least from an economist's point of view, 
objectified by economic science. Moreover, the economists' fairness 
judgments substantially differ from those of the laypeople. Thus, 
economists clearly do not use the same intuitive heuristics as 
laypeople when it comes to judging fairness. Rather, economic 
efficiency, or enlarging the societal pie of economic wealth, may serve 
as a basis for what is considered to be fair and just by economists 
(Baron, 2004; Kirchgässner, 2005). For laypeople, teachers and 
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journalists, the opposite can be assumed. They may use fairness 
considerations as a heuristic for judging economic efficiency. 
Fairness judgments do not require much cognitive effort (Haidt, 2001) 
and most non-economists lack the expertise to comprehensively 
assess a policy’s economic efficiency.  
Economic journalists and social studies teachers have not adapted 
an economist's way of thinking, but apply a lay judgment logic, using 
fairness as the preponderant judgment criterion. On the other hand, 
their agreement rates as well as their efficiency and fairness 
judgments differ significantly from those of the laypeople and partly 
appear closer to the answers of the economists. How can this 
puzzling point be explained? From their daily experience, journalists 
might be more aware of actual implementation issues of the policies, 
particularly in the second proposal. What is more, teachers and 
journalists probably have a different understanding of fairness in the 
context of trade and immigration policies. They might be less prone to 
parochialism, because they might perceive themselves as more open-
minded or cosmopolitan. Thus, they judge pro-immigration or non-
protectionist policies as fairer than the average citizen. This also 
corresponds with their political preferences. The majority of 
journalists, for example, support moderate left-wing or ecologist 
parties (Weischenberg et al., 2006) that usually endorse more liberal 
immigration policies. 
We found it important to have a closer look at teachers and 
journalists because they act as promoters for economic literacy and 
attitudes towards economic policies. Our results show that teachers, 
journalists, and laypeople apply a similar judgment logic, which 
significantly differs from the economist’s way of thinking. This 
suggests that teachers and journalists shape the lay way of reasoning 
regarding economic policies. The magnitude of their promoter role 
remains unclear, but some anecdotal evidence from one author’s 
family life may highlight its significance. At the dinner table, one of 
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the two teenage sons argued that one should not buy clothes if their 
manufacturing in developing countries involved bad working 
conditions. His brother objected that many people in the developing 
world might prefer bad working conditions over no work at all. 
Interestingly, both brothers founded their opinion on what they had 
learned in school. 
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4. Do Economists Have a Fatherland? How 
Global and National Efficiency 
Considerations Influence Economists’ Policy 
Judgments 
4.1. Introduction 
Economists play an important role as policy advisors in modern 
society, shaping public policy through their work for governments, 
central banks, and transnational organizations. Policy advisory is not 
only about applying the findings of economic science to real-world 
situations, but it requires relating those findings to normative goals—
what Colander (1992) describes as “the art of economics”. Giving 
objective policy advice and discerning various normative goals remain 
a challenge. This challenge has become salient, for example, in the 
enduring debt crisis in the Eurozone. In July 2012, more than 150 
German economists publicized an open letter that criticized political 
decisions to manage the debt crisis (FAZ, 2012). The letter was vividly 
discussed in the public and among German economists 
(e.g., Handelsblatt, 2012), also because economic analysis and 
normative goals in the letter were difficult to discern. One normative 
aspect is particularly important in this context: Do economists’ views 
on economic policy imply a norm that favors their home country? Or 
more figuratively: Do economists have a fatherland? 
On the one hand, modern economics develops and tests universally 
valid theories that are not limited to one country. There is a global 
research community in economics with a common methodological 
ground. On the other hand, economics as a discipline evolved as 
national economics (Greenfeld, 1995; Nakano, 2004), and the first 
magnum opus of economics explicitly addressed the “wealth of 
nations” (Smith, 1789). Moreover, even in these days of European 
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integration and global treaties on free trade or climate protection, 
most economic policy has basically remained national economic 
policy. Thus, an important question for economists, the general 
public, and political actors is whether economists are biased toward 
their home country when judging economic policy, albeit implicitly. 
In the present study, we analyzed the extent to which economists’ 
policy judgments were based on national or global economic efficiency 
considerations. In a telephone survey, 100 German economists were 
asked to decide how strongly they supported four selected policy 
proposals and what the economic consequences were for Germany 
and the world. Our main finding is that economists indeed have a 
fatherland. National economic efficiency was far more important than 
global economic efficiency as a judgment criterion. Overall, the 
national efficiency judgments significantly influenced the acceptance 
of the policy proposals, but the global efficiency judgments did not. In 
addition, the important role of national efficiency for a policy 
proposal’s acceptance did not strongly depend on economists’ self-
assessments of being globally or nationally oriented. This result 
suggests that economists take a national perspective when judging 
economic policy, even if they might not be aware of doing so. 
4.1.1. How economists judge economic policies  
There is a long-standing joke, probably attributable to Paul 
Samuelson, that one would obtain seven answers when asking six 
economists for their opinion on an economic policy issue. Although 
economists regularly disagree on economic policy issues, they tacitly 
agree on the methodological core of economics. One of its important 
aspects is that economists generally adhere to consequentialist or 
utilitarian ethics (Baron, 2004; Sen, 1987). This ethics implies that 
economic policy measures should be judged based on their economic 
consequences. Therefore, economists generally support a policy 
proposal if it fosters economic growth, or more broadly defined, if it 
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increases the aggregated welfare of individuals (e.g., Kirchgässner, 
2005; Stiglitz, 1998). Not surprisingly, studies by Haferkamp et al. 
(2009) and Jacob et al. (2011b) found that economists base their 
economic policy judgments mainly on economic efficiency 
considerations. German economists had been asked to judge various 
policy interventions, for example, a general minimum wage, a salary 
cap, or subsidies for businesses exclusively producing in Germany, 
along different dimensions, such as economic efficiency or fairness. 
However, economists do not exclusively focus on economic efficiency 
when judging different policies. Friedman (1953) suggested that 
different political views on economic policies can be explained by 
different positive views, that is, descriptive judgments about 
economic phenomena and parameters. However, several surveys of 
economists showed that ideology and different ethical views also play 
an important role (e.g., de Benedictis & di Maio, 2011; Fuchs, 
Krueger & Poterba, 1998; Mayer, 2001; Ricketts & Shoesmith, 1992). 
This is not surprising, given that most policy judgments extend to 
topics outside the realm of economics, such as disaster aid or organ 
trade. According to the previously mentioned studies by Haferkamp 
et al. (2009) and Jacob et al. (2011b), economists additionally 
consider fairness when judging economic policies, although fairness 
proves less important than economic efficiency. 
In taking the homo oeconomicus seriously, economic self-interest 
should drive economists’ policy judgments. General evidence on the 
selfishness of economists is mixed. Some studies have detected more 
selfish behavior by economists (e.g., Frank et al., 1993; Frank & 
Schulze, 2000; Marwell & Ames, 1981). Other scholars could not 
confirm this conclusion and even observed less selfish behavior 
(Frey & Meier, 2005; Laband & Beil, 1999; Yezer et al., 1996). In the 
political context, Caplan (2002) found no evidence for a self-serving 
bias. Economists did not hold different beliefs on the economy and 
economic policy because it would increase their material wealth. This 
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additionally makes sense from a public choice perspective. A single 
economist does not strongly influence political decisions with her 
democratic voting decision, nor is the average economist an 
influential policy advisor. Hence, there is little incentive to have 
material self-interest drive policy judgments.  
In our empirical study, we tested how the three major judgment 
criteria, economic efficiency, fairness, and self-interest, influenced 
the acceptance of selected policy proposals. However, it is unclear 
how broadly economists define who is part of their social welfare 
maximization calculus, whether just their own country or the whole 
world. We will turn to this issue in the following subchapter. 
4.1.2. Economics and economists: cosmopolitan or nationally 
oriented? 
Economists usually support free trade and liberal immigration 
policies, most likely because of their positive economic effects 
(e.g., Alston et al., 1992; Jacob et al., 2011a; Whaples, 2009). 
According to established economic theory, free exchange generally 
benefits both countries involved in the exchange, although the 
benefits may not be equally distributed between the countries or 
among the individuals within the countries. Hence, economists may 
approve of free trade and liberal immigration policies in their home 
country either because of the global economic blessings (cosmopolitan 
hypothesis) or the benefits for the home country (fatherland 
hypothesis). What has previous research found in support of these 
two competing hypotheses?  
When economists have a clear mandate, for example, as economic 
advisors of a national government or a global organization, their 
policy recommendations are likely to follow a respective national or 
global perspective. Following a national perspective may even be 
codified as a duty of national economic advisors (e.g., CEA, 2012).  
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There has been no research on economists’ perspectives when they 
do not have an explicit advisory mandate. However, in their self-
understanding as independent and objective scientists, economists 
should not be guided by any particular interest. This suggests that 
they follow a global perspective when thinking about economic policy, 
which would be consistent with the cosmopolitan hypothesis. 
Approaching the question more indirectly, economists’ personal 
values and beliefs might play a role in judging economic policy, as 
mentioned in the previous subchapter. For example, economists with 
cosmopolitan attitudes may take a more cosmopolitan perspective 
when judging economic policy. Unfortunately, there are, to the best of 
our knowledge, no studies surveying these attitudes among 
economists. To explore cosmopolitanism in the general public, several 
studies used data from the International Social Survey Programme 
(Olofsson & Öhman, 2007; Schrock-Jacobson, 2009) or the European 
Value Survey (Pichler, 2009). These studies identified several 
sociodemographic factors related to weaker nationalist, stronger 
cosmopolitan and less protectionist attitudes, including higher 
education, higher income, residence in urban communities, and some 
time spent abroad. These attributes are, by and large, typical 
characteristics of economists. Thus, economists are likely to have a 
relatively cosmopolitan orientation compared to the general public. 
A different indirect approach to our research question lends support 
to the fatherland hypothesis. Classical economics developed as 
“national economics”.  Historically, one motivation for pursuing 
economic science was to augment national power (Greenfeld, 1995; 
Helleiner, 2002; Nakano, 2004). Several economic thinkers of the 19th 
century, such as Friedrich List or Alexander Hamilton, explicitly 
defined economics as a science aiming to obtain the prosperity of a 
given nation (Helleiner, 2002; Preparata & Elliot, 1996). According to 
Greenfeld (1995, p. 581), "nationalism should be seen as, to some 
extent, an explanation of the emergence of economics". Today, the 
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traditionally strong role of national states persists and, in most 
instances, economic policy is still understood as national economic 
policy. Economists may adapt to this environment by generally 
supporting policies that increase national economic wealth.  
Overall, there are indications for the cosmopolitan hypothesis and the 
fatherland hypothesis. Beyond those indications, any advanced 
theory and empirical research on the subject are lacking. The 
following empirical study is a first step to close this gap because it 
will allow us to discriminate between the two hypotheses. 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants 
We conducted a telephone survey of randomly selected German 
economists between September and November 2011. A telephone 
survey was preferred to an online survey because response rates are 
usually higher. In addition, the direct interaction with the interviewee 
helped to avoid misunderstandings. All interviews were conducted by 
the same interviewer.  
Each potential participant was selected by a three-step process. First, 
a German university’s department of economics or economic research 
institute was chosen by a weighted sampling procedure: a member of 
the “Verein für Socialpolitik”, Germany’s association of economists, 
was randomly drawn from the member index and the member’s 
academic institution was selected. Second, we decided randomly 
whether a full professor, a post-doctoral researcher or assistant 
professor, or a Ph.D. candidate should be interviewed at the selected 
academic institution. Third, a potential interviewee in the chosen 
academic position (e.g., a full professor) was randomly selected from 
all of the individuals with the chosen position (e.g., all full professors) 
at the selected academic institution. 
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The potential participants were then contacted via letter or email to 
schedule an interview. Out of the 149 economists contacted, 100 
were available for the interview. We interviewed 34 full professors, 30 
post-doctoral researchers or assistant professors, and 36 Ph.D. 
candidates. The mean age was 37.4 (SD=9.3). Our sample contained 
more male than female economists (female: 19), 68 economists had 
spent at least one year abroad, and 95 held German citizenship. 
Because our research design explicitly treats national economic policy 
as German economic policy, we removed the 5 participants from the 
sample that did not hold German citizenship. 
4.2.2. Survey design 
To determine whether economists support certain policies because of 
the policies’ national or global economic effects, we developed 
hypothetical policy proposals for the survey that met two criteria.  
First, the policy proposals had relevant national and global economic 
effects. Second, these effects differed at the national and global level. 
Developing proposals with these restrictions might sound easier than 
it is. Many national policy interventions do not induce relevant 
international effects. Even if national policy interventions have 
international relevance, national and global economic consequences 
are often similar or at least not antipodal. For example, the abolition 
of tariffs usually benefits both the national and the foreign trade 
partners’ economies. This type of policy would not allow us to 
determine statistically whether economists supported the respective 
policy because of its national or global economic effects.  
We drafted 15 policy proposals and tested them with 40 German 
economists from two German universities. We ranked the proposals 
based on the two criteria described above. For the following four 
proposals, we observed strong assessments of national and global 
economic effects that differed significantly. The proposals were 
therefore selected for the main study:  
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(1) All foreigners who want to immigrate to Germany should be 
allowed to do so.  
(2) Germany should actively attract highly qualified foreigners.  
(3) Germany should not export any military equipment to other 
countries.  
(4) Germany should significantly reduce its CO2 emissions even if 
other countries do not reduce their emissions. 
In the main study, we briefly introduced the telephone interviews as a 
study on general attitudes toward economic policy. Details on the 
intended comparison of national and global judgments were not given 
beforehand. 
During the interviews, participants first said whether they supported 
the four selected policy proposals or not. We used a 5-point Likert 
scale (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree with the mean value 
3=Neither disagree nor agree). To avoid consistency effects, the policy 
proposals (1) and (2), which both focus on immigration, were not 
presented consecutively. Instead, proposal (1) was followed by 
proposal (3) dealing with the export ban on military equipment, 
followed by proposals (2) and (4). 
Subsequently, the respondents were presented the four proposals a 
second time. They rated the proposals along the dimensions of 
economic efficiency, fairness, and self-interest, which we had 
introduced as the most relevant judgment criteria for economic policy 
in chapter 4.1.1. Again, a 5-point Likert scale was used for all items. 
Thus, a mean value of M=3.00 in the sample would represent, on 
average, a neutral assessment. Table 8 gives the exact wording of the 
questions and scales. Respondents indicated whether they expected 
positive or negative effects for economic growth and for employment 
in Germany from the proposed policy. They then assessed the effects 
on growth and employment worldwide, our measures of economic 
efficiency. Given that German economic policy may trigger small 
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effects in the global economy in absolute terms, we specified during 
the interviews that we were interested in marginal effects. Finally, the 
respondents were asked to decide whether the policy proposal was 
fair or unfair and to judge the material consequences for themselves. 
Table 8: Phrasing of the items of the policy proposal questions 
 
  
Dimension Phrasing of item Phrasing of scale 
1 2 3 4 5 
Accep-
tance  
How strongly would 
you agree with this 
policy? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Tend to 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Tend to 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
National 
economic 
efficiency 
Would this policy, 
in the long run, be 
positive or negative 
for employment in 
Germany? 
Clearly 
negative 
Rather 
negative 
Neither 
negative 
nor 
positive 
Rather 
positive 
Clearly 
positive 
Would this policy, 
in the long run, be 
positive or negative 
for economic growth 
in Germany? 
Clearly 
negative 
Rather 
negative 
Neither 
negative 
nor 
positive 
Rather 
positive 
Clearly 
positive 
Global 
economic 
efficiency 
Would this policy, 
in the long run, be 
positive or negative 
for employment 
worldwide? 
Clearly 
negative 
Rather 
negative 
Neither 
negative 
nor 
positive 
Rather 
positive 
Clearly 
positive 
Would this policy, 
in the long run, be 
positive or negative 
for economic growth 
worldwide? 
Clearly 
negative 
Rather 
negative 
Neither 
negative 
nor 
positive 
Rather 
positive 
Clearly 
positive 
Fairness Would you consider 
this policy fair or 
unfair? 
Clearly 
unfair 
Rather 
unfair 
Neither 
fair nor 
unfair 
Rather 
positive 
Clearly 
fair 
Self-
Interest 
How would you 
judge the 
consequences of 
this policy for 
yourself or people 
you feel close to? 
Clearly 
negative 
Rather 
negative 
Neither 
negative 
nor 
positive 
Rather 
positive 
Clearly 
positive 
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At the end of the interview, we included the following self-assessment 
question in the questionnaire: “Have you answered the questions on 
the policy proposals from a national German or global perspective?” We 
hypothesized that the economists’ subjective answers might be 
associated with how they judge the different policy proposals and 
their judgment criteria. The questions were again answered on a five-
point scale, ranging from 1=clearly German perspective to 5=clearly 
global perspective, with 3=Does not make a difference. 
Additionally, we collected several sociodemographic characteristics. 
We asked for each respondent’s age in years, and we created an 
ordinal variable for position in the academic hierarchy (full 
professor=3, assistant professor=2, Ph.D. candidate=1) as well as 
dummies for gender (1=male), East or West German origin (1=West 
German origin), and whether the respondent had spent time abroad 
(1=at least one year spent abroad).  
4.2.3. Data aggregation for statistical analysis  
Survey participants were asked to judge the effects of the policy 
proposals on economic growth and employment in Germany and 
globally. Because both dimensions refer to economic effects, we 
integrated the answers to those two questions into one economic 
efficiency scale by calculating their mean. Integrating the two into 
one scale was feasible because the answers to the two questions on 
economic effects were highly consistent. The Pearson coefficients of 
the two items across all policy proposals ranged between ρ=0.66 and 
ρ=0.87. The Cronbach’s Alphas, regularly used to assess the 
reliability of a psychometric scale, ranged from α=0.79 to α=0.93. 
Thus, we created one national economic efficiency variable and one 
global economic efficiency variable for each of the four policy 
proposals. 
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4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Judgments of the policy proposals: descriptive results 
Our results show that economists do not hold homogeneous views on 
the selected policy proposals (see Table 9). However, some general 
patterns can be identified.  
Economists were skeptical about allowing the unrestricted 
immigration of foreigners into Germany (mean acceptance rating 
M=2.33; SD=1.08). In addition, most economists expected negative 
effects for the German economy from this policy measure (M=2.68; 
SD=0.96). The potential effects for the global economy, however, were 
estimated more positively (M=3.53; SD=0.74). The difference between 
the mean ratings of national and global economic effects proved 
highly significant (t=8.16; p<0.01). Regarding the fairness dimension, 
respondents perceived the unrestricted immigration of foreigners as 
slightly more fair than unfair (M=3.33; SD=0.93). Personal 
consequences for own well-being were assessed neutrally on average 
(M=2.99; SD=0.75). 
The patterns are different for policy proposal (2), which likewise 
focuses on immigration. The proposal to actively attract highly 
qualified foreigners to Germany reflects a shortage of skilled labor, 
which several economists forecast for Germany in the near future. 
The economists strongly supported this proposal (M=4.32; SD=0.83). 
In contrast to policy proposal (1) (all foreigners are allowed to 
immigrate), a majority of the economists expected positive 
consequences for the German economy (M=4.41; SD=0.65) if highly 
qualified foreigners were actively attracted to Germany, but 
significantly less so for the global economy (M=3.44; SD=0.68, with 
t=11.24; p<0.01, when comparing the means). Fairness was 
evaluated positively on average (M=3.61; SD=0.97), as were the 
consequences for own material well-being (M=3.38; SD=0.76). 
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics of acceptance ratings and all judgment criteria 
Now, we turn to the remaining policy proposals (3) and (4). A minority 
of the economists felt that a complete export ban on military 
equipment would be appropriate (M=2.66; SD=1.23). With Germany 
being the third largest exporter of military goods worldwide (SIPRI, 
2012), the German defense industry is not negligible. Consequently, 
the economic consequences of an export ban for Germany were 
assessed negatively (M=2.21; SD=0.74). Global economic effects, on 
the contrary, were seen positively on average (M=3.53; SD=0.74). This 
difference between national and global economic efficiency judgments 
was clearly significant (t=12.16; p<0.01). The policy proposal was 
perceived as slightly more fair than unfair (M=3.24; SD=1.13), but the 
relatively high standard deviation indicates that the policy proposal 
was controversial from a normative point of view. On the self-interest 
dimension, there were no clear indications for strong positive or 
negative effects (M=3.15; SD=0.58). 
Germany has traditionally taken a leading role in global climate 
policy and pursues more ambitious CO2 emission reduction targets 
than most other large countries (WWF European Policy Programme, 
2012). Economists generally endorsed a policy to unilaterally reduce 
CO2 emissions in Germany (M=3.75; SD=1.02). The economic 
consequences for Germany, however, are evaluated ambiguously 
(M=3.04; SD=0.95). Alternatively, the economists estimated the global 
Sample size N=95 Means 
(Standard Deviations) 
Policy Proposal Acceptance National 
efficiency 
Global 
efficiency 
Fairness Self-
interest 
            (1) All foreigners allowed to 
immigrate 
2.33 2.68 3.53 3.33 2.99 
(1.08) (0.96) (0.74) (0.93) (0.75) 
           (2) Attract highly qualified 
foreigners 
4.32 4.41 3.44 3.61 3.38 
(0.83) (0.65) (0.68) (0.97) (0.76) 
           (3) An export ban on 
military equipment 
2.66 2.21 3.53 3.24 3.15 
(1.23) (0.74) (0.74) (1.13) (0.58) 
      (4) A unilateral CO2 
emissions reduction 
3.75 3.04 3.31 3.45 3.40 
(1.02) (0.95) (0.68) (1.05) (0.76) 
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economic effects of a unilateral German emissions reductions slightly 
more positively (M=3.31; SD=0.68 with t=3.32; p<0.01, when 
comparing the means). They perceived the policy proposal to be fair 
(M=3.45; SD=1.05) and positive for their well-being (M=3.40; 
SD=0.76). 
It is noteworthy that the average acceptance and national efficiency 
ratings for each policy proposal are very similar. The patterns for 
global efficiency, fairness, and self-interest, however, are less clear. In 
the following subchapter, we analyze to what extent the different 
judgment dimensions can explain the variation in the economists’ 
acceptance ratings. 
4.3.2. National or global efficiency? An explanatory model  
We explored whether economists base their policy judgments on 
assumed national or global economic effects. We therefore developed 
the following model explaining how economist i derives the 
acceptance rating of a selected policy proposal: 
;43
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We assumed that an economist i reverts to four major judgment 
criteria when evaluating a policy proposal: national economic 
consequences (national efficiency), global economic efficiency (global 
efficiency), perceived fairness, and self-interest. Large national 
efficiency coefficients would be consistent with the fatherland 
hypothesis, while large global efficiency coefficients would support the 
cosmopolitan hypothesis.  
In model version M1, we added a vector x'i of sociodemographic 
characteristics: 
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Given that we were primarily interested in the general magnitude of 
the effects, the simple linear model with OLS was appropriate. The 
usual assumptions regarding the properties of the error term ui 
apply.  
As the answers to the four different policy proposals could not be 
integrated into one scale, we conducted four separate linear 
regressions for each of the four policy proposals. We checked for 
multicollinearity in advance based on Variance Inflation Factor and 
Condition Number. Bivariate correlations between the independent 
variables were moderate. Moreover, the relatively moderate 
correlations between the national and the global efficiency variables 
(between .0 and .5) suggest that the national and global 
consequences of the four policy proposals were not judged 
congruently. Independent judgments of national and global economic 
effects allow us to differentiate between the fatherland and the 
cosmopolitan hypotheses and therefore represent a precondition for a 
meaningful interpretation of the estimation results.  
4.3.3. National or global efficiency? Estimation results  
One clear pattern emerges across all four policy proposals: national 
economic effects are more important than global economic effects for 
the acceptance of a policy proposal (see Table 10 for complete 
results). This clearly supports the fatherland hypothesis implying that 
economists support a certain policy because of its positive economic 
effects for the home country. Although the parameter estimates differ 
between the policy proposals in absolute size, the regression 
coefficients of national efficiency are consistently larger than those of 
global efficiency. The global efficiency parameter is close to zero and is 
not statistically significant in three of the four regressions. For policy 
proposal (2) (attract highly qualified foreigners), the global efficiency 
parameter even reaches a significant negative value (β2=-0.278; 
p<.01). However, given the non-existent bivariate correlation between 
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acceptance and global efficiency (ρ=-.117; p=.24), this value should be 
interpreted carefully. 
Table 10: Results of linear regressions of judgment criteria on acceptance 
ratings 
Sample 
size N=93 
Coefficients 
(Standard errors) 
(1) All 
foreigners 
allowed to 
immigrate 
(2) Attract 
highly 
qualified 
foreigners 
(3) An 
export ban 
on military 
equipment 
(4) A uni-
lateral CO2 
emissions 
reduction  
            M0 constant -0.208 1.359* -0.479 0.665 
  (0.574) (0.561) (0.856) (0.513) 
      NationalEfficiency 0.394** 0.613** 0.176 0.340** 
  (0.116) (0.112) (0.144) (0.113) 
      GlobalEfficiency -0.048 -0.278** -0.020 0.119 
  (0.132) (0.101) (0.141) (0.163) 
      Fairness 0.382** 0.298** 0.554** 0.202* 
  (0.106) (0.073) (0.103) (0.099) 
      SelfInterest 0.121 0.036 0.327 0.280* 
  (0.140) (0.094) (0.201) (0.126) 
          Adj. R2 .332** .396** .366** .356** 
            M1 constant 0.745 1.062 0.419 1.128 
  (0.787) (0.673) (1.016) (0.666) 
      NationalEfficiency 0.387** 0.645** 0.165 0.320** 
  (0.120) (0.127) (0.153) (0.119) 
      GlobalEfficiency -0.054 -0.314** -0.027 0.162 
  (0.130) (0.103) (0.143) (0.166) 
      Fairness 0.392** 0.308** 0.530** 0.207* 
  (0.106) (0.072) (0.109) (0.102) 
      SelfInterest 0.074 0.053 0.383 0.254 
  (0.140) (0.094) (0.208) (0.133) 
          Age -0.019 0.018 -0.011 -0.011 
  (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013) 
      AcademicPos -0.064 -0.144 0.042 0.079 
  (0.160) (0.115) (0.181) (0.147) 
      Gender 0.014 -0.196 -0.415 -0.351 
  (0.245) (0.185) (0.290) (0.234) 
      EastWest 0.212 -0.227 -0.110 0.285 
  (0.307) (0.240) (0.359) (0.299) 
      TimeAbroad -0.315 0.283* -0.280 -0.137 
  (0.192) (0.147) (0.225) (0.191) 
          
∆ R2 to M1 .057 .055 .033 .034 
   *p<.05;  **p<.01 
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In contrast, national efficiency is the most important and a 
statistically highly significant predictor of the acceptance rating for 
three of the four policy proposals. The coefficients reach values of 
β1=0.394 (p<.01) for policy proposal (1) (all foreigners allowed to 
immigrate), β1=0.613 (p<.01) for proposal (2) (attract highly qualified 
foreigners) and β1=0.340 (p<.01) for proposal (4) (a unilateral CO2 
emissions reduction). If, for example, economists’ national efficiency 
judgments of attracting highly qualified foreigners to Germany vary 
by one point on the 5-point Likert scale, their acceptance ratings 
should, on average, differ by approximately 0.6 points. Only in 
explaining the acceptance of an export ban on military equipment 
(policy proposal (3)) does national efficiency not play a significant role 
(β1=0.176; p=0.22). 
From past research, we expected that economists primarily focused 
on economic efficiency considerations, but fairness should represent 
an important secondary factor. In fact, perceived fairness is a 
significant predictor of the acceptance rating in all four regressions. 
The fairness parameter is particularly important for policy proposal 
(3), suggesting an export ban on military equipment (β3=0.554; 
p<0.01). In the other policy proposals, fairness coefficients are 
smaller in size than the national efficiency coefficients, but the 
fairness coefficients are still highly significant in policy proposals (1) 
and (2) that focus on immigration policy (β3=0.382; p<0.01 and 
β3=0.298; p<0.01) and in policy (4), which proposes unilateral CO2 
emissions reductions (β3=0.202; p=0.04).  
As expected, self-interest did not represent a major judgment criterion 
in our survey. The self-interest coefficients are, on average, smaller 
than the national efficiency or fairness coefficients and are not 
statistically significant in three of the four regressions. The only 
exception was policy proposal (4), the unilateral reduction of CO2 
emissions (β4=0.280; p=0.03). 
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The statistical patterns of national efficiency, global efficiency, 
fairness, and self-interest did not change when sociodemographic 
characteristics were included in the regressions (model M1). The level 
of determination R2 did not significantly increase from M0 to M1, and 
the regression coefficients for age, academic position, gender, West 
vs. East German origin, and time spent abroad did not add 
significant explanatory value to the model. 
4.3.4. The role of the globally or nationally oriented self-
assessment 
At the end of the survey, we asked German economists whether they 
had taken a German or a global perspective when judging the policy 
proposals. While 24% of the respondents indicated a German 
perspective, 19% held a global perspective in the survey. More than 
half of the economists, however, responded that this self-
categorization would not make any difference for their policy 
judgments.  
We hypothesized that taking a national or global perspective (variable 
PerspGlobal) may interact with the economic efficiency judgments in 
explaining the acceptance of the policy proposals. The economists 
with a national perspective might place a stronger emphasis on the 
national economic effects than the economists with a global 
perspective. The globally oriented economists might focus on global 
economic effects. Hence, the national efficiency parameter should be 
larger for nationally oriented economists, which should be indicated 
by a significant and relevant interaction term in the regression 
analysis. In the first step (model M2), the self-assessment variable 
PerspGlobal was introduced to the basic explanatory model. In the 
second step, interactions of PerspGlobal with either the global 
efficiency variable (model M3a) or national efficiency (model M3b) 
were added: 
67 
 
 
;*654
3210
iiiii
iiii
uciencyGlobalEffilPerspGlobalPerspGlobastSelfIntere
FairnessciencyGlobalEffificiencyNationalEfcceptanceA
++++
++++=
βββ
ββββ
  
 ni ,...,1=  (M3a) 
;*654
3210
iiiii
iiii
uficiencyNationalEflPerspGlobalPerspGlobastSelfIntere
FairnessciencyGlobalEffificiencyNationalEfcceptanceA
++++
++++=
βββ
ββββ
 
 ni ,...,1=  (M3b) 
As suggested by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), all 
independent variables were centered on their means to avoid 
multicollinearity in the interaction terms. The centering procedure 
changed the constant terms β0, (cf. Tables 10 and 11) but did not 
bias the parameter estimates. Again, each of the four policy proposals 
was analyzed separately.  
Overall, economists’ self-assessments are of little importance in the 
judgments of the policy proposals. Taking a national or a global 
perspective did not considerably change the acceptance ratings 
(Table 11, M2). None of the four regression coefficients of PerspGlobal, 
ranging from β5=0.008 (p=0.94) for proposal (4) (a unilateral CO2 
emissions reduction) to β5=0.216 (p=0.08) for proposal (1) (all 
foreigners allowed to immigrate), proved highly significant. The same 
is true for the interaction parameters of PerspGlobal with global 
efficiency (M3a). Apparently, the economists’ self-assessments as 
nationally or globally oriented did not significantly influence the 
importance that economists attached to the global efficiency 
judgment. The role of the self-assessments for explaining the 
acceptance of the different policy proposals remained very limited. 
For the national efficiency judgment, the results are similar, although 
less clear. For three out of four policy proposals, PerspGlobal did not 
significantly change the importance of national efficiency for the 
acceptance of the policy proposals (M3b).  
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Table 11: Results of linear regressions including interaction effects 
Sample size 
N=94 
Coefficients 
(Standard errors) 
1. All 
foreigners 
allowed to 
immigrate 
2. Attract 
highly 
qualified 
foreigners 
3. An export 
ban on 
military 
equipment 
4. A uni-
lateral CO2 
emissions 
reduction  
         M2 –  
Base model 
with main 
effect national 
vs. global 
perspective 
constant 2.337** 4.318** 2.676** 3.731** 
  
(0.089) (0.068) (0.101) (0.084) 
       NationalEfficiency 0.346** 0.617** 0.176 0.344** 
  
(0.117) (0.115) (0.143) (0.113) 
       GlobalEfficiency -0.061 -0.271* -0.046 0.108 
  
(0.131) (0.104) (0.143) (0.165) 
       Fairness 0.366** 0.275** 0.542** 0.202* 
  
(0.106) (0.074) (0.103) (0.099) 
       SelfInterest 0.176 0.003 0.350 0.275* 
  
(0.139) (0.096) (0.197) (0.125) 
       PerspGlobal 0.216 0.032 0.123 0.008 
  
(0.122) (0.089) (0.136) (0.114) 
 
    Adj. R2 .351** .360** .367** .352** 
            M3a – Model 
with global 
efficiency 
interaction 
constant 2.326** 4.319** 2.698** 3.742** 
  
(0.091) (0.068) (0.102) (0.086) 
       NationalEfficiency 0.334** 0.620** 0.136 0.339** 
  
(0.119) (0.116) (0.147) (0.114) 
       GlobalEfficiency -0.066 -0.295** -0.018 0.113 
  
(0.132) (0.112) (0.144) (0.165) 
       Fairness 0.366** 0.276** 0.553** 0.204* 
  
(0.107) (0.075) (0.103) (0.099) 
       SelfInterest 0.179 0.011 0.393 0.269* 
  
(0.140) (0.097) (0.199) (0.126) 
       PerspGlobal 0.227 0.035 0.106 -0.009 
  
(0.124) (0.090) (0.137) (0.116) 
       PerspGlobal * 
GlobalEfficiency 
0.094 -0.082 -0.204 -0.128 
(0.144) (0.143) (0.167) (0.169) 
 
    
∆ R2 to M2 .003 .002 .010 .004 
      M3b – Model 
with national 
efficiency 
interaction 
constant 2.341** 4.308** 2.675** 3.731** 
  (0.092) (0.062) (0.100) (0.085) 
       NationalEfficiency 0.343** 0.603** 0.160 0.334** 
  (0.118) (0.105) (0.142) (0.115) 
       GlobalEfficiency -0.055 -0.240** -0.005 0.113 
  (0.135) (0.095) (0.142) (0.166) 
       Fairness 0.366** 0.192** 0.549** 0.203* 
  (0.107) (0.070) (0.102) (0.099) 
       SelfInterest 0.179 -0.084 0.313 0.273* 
  (0.141) (0.090) (0.195) (0.126) 
       PerspGlobal 0.218 0.006 0.166 0.002 
  (0.123) (0.082) (0.136) (0.115) 
       PerspGlobal * 
NationalEfficiency 
-0.027 -0.543** 0.366 -0.063 
(0.137) (0.124) (0.197) (0.104) 
     
∆ R2 to M2 .000 .108** .023 .003 
   *p<.05;  **p<.01 
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Whether economists held a national or a global perspective, the 
national efficiency rating remained a robust and important judgment 
criterion for a policy proposal’s acceptance.  
Only for policy proposal (2) are the results different. When thinking 
about actively attracting highly qualified foreigners to Germany, 
national economic effects were clearly less important for economists 
with a global perspective than for nationally oriented economists. 
This difference was indicated by a significant increase of R2 (p<0.01) 
from M2 to M3b and by the highly significant and sizeable interaction 
coefficient in the regression (β6=-0.543; p<0.01). However, this result 
did not, in return, lead to a stronger role for the global efficiency 
judgment for globally oriented economists (cf. M3a). 
4.4. Discussion  
Our study explored if economists base their views on economic policy 
on global economic effects (cosmopolitan hypothesis) or on national 
economic effects (fatherland hypothesis). Therefore, we conducted a 
telephone survey with 100 economists from German academia and 
asked them to judge four hypothetical policy proposals along different 
dimensions. 
Overall, the fatherland hypothesis received strong empirical support. 
Judgments of national economic effects were, by and large, the most 
important predictor for the acceptance of the policy proposals. Global 
economic efficiency considerations, in contrast, did not exert a 
significant positive effect on the acceptance ratings. In addition, in 
three out of four policy proposals, the importance of the national and 
global economic efficiency judgments for the policies’ acceptance did 
not depend on the economists’ self-assessments as nationally or 
globally oriented.  
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Our results suggest that economists implicitly take a national 
perspective when they are asked to evaluate national economic 
policy. This bias appears natural when economists have a clear 
mandate, for example, as national economic advisors. However, this 
finding is robust in our study, where there was no explicit national 
framing. Economists were asked to disclose their personal opinion 
and had been free to choose a national, European, or global 
perspective on the policy proposals. The bias toward the home 
country in the policy judgments seems to be rather implicit, however, 
and economists may not be fully aware of it. Even economists who 
reported that they had taken a global perspective in the survey based 
their policy judgments primarily on national, and not on global, 
efficiency considerations. Their answer patterns did not strongly 
differ from those of the respondents who had reported a national 
perspective. The partly implicit bias toward the home country may be 
explained by a “national priming” that economists experience 
throughout their lives. They may feel attached to their home country, 
which influences political attitudes. 
We additionally asked the survey participants whether they perceived 
the different policy proposals as positive or negative for themselves 
and as generally fair or unfair. Self-interest did not exert a strong 
effect on the acceptance of the policy proposals, as we had expected 
based on past research. The direct economic consequences of the 
policy proposals for a single economist are rather limited anyway. 
Perceived fairness, on the other hand, emerged as a significant and 
important judgment criterion in three of the four policy proposals. At 
first, this finding is surprising. Economists usually are at odds with 
the concept of fairness because it is not analytically precise. Fairness 
norms are hard to operationalize and including them in economic 
models makes models more complex and less parsimonious (Akerlof, 
2007). Past studies with economists showed that fairness is only of 
minor importance as a judgment criterion for economic policy but 
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highlighted that fairness is not completely neglected (Haferkamp et 
al., 2009; Jacob et al., 2011b; Rubinstein, 2006). One explanation for 
the more important role of fairness in our study is that, in contrast to 
previous studies, we selected policy proposals that did not exclusively 
relate to economic phenomena. The policies evoked more general 
considerations, including ethical ones. Even very rigorous economists 
likely do not judge an export ban on military equipment from a purely 
economic efficiency perspective. Correspondingly, the national and 
global efficiency parameters for the respective policy proposals did 
not prove significant.  
What qualifications should be made regarding the validity of our 
results? One important methodological challenge is that the economic 
consequences of the selected policy proposals might have been 
difficult to evaluate, particularly the global consequences. The 
potential implications of the policies were rather complex and 
additional assumptions had to be made to derive clear conclusions. 
What is more, unilateral changes in German economic policy might 
have little effect on the global economy. To address this point, we 
specified during the interviews that we were interested in marginal 
effects. Besides, economic effects are not necessarily negligible. For 
example, Germany is the world’s third largest exporter of military 
goods. Regarding climate policy, Germany maintains an important 
position in energy generation from renewable sources as well as in 
climate policy debates and may serve as a role model for other 
countries. Nevertheless, the global economic effects of the policy 
proposals might have been difficult to predict and might be less 
cognitively available. However, these difficulties do not corrupt our 
main conclusion. If economists with clearly cosmopolitan views were 
confronted with policy proposals whose global economic effects they 
evaluated ambiguously or negligibly, they should have shied away 
from a clear decision to agree or not to agree with the policy proposal. 
However, most economists pronounced a clear opinion. The share of 
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economists choosing the middle option “neither agree nor disagree” 
ranged from only 7 to 26% across the four policy proposals.  
Another qualification concerns the generalizability of our results. Our 
study focused on German economists and does not allow for 
conclusions for the entire economic profession. Data from the 
European Social Survey suggest that economists’ personal values are 
more homogeneous than personal values in the general population 
(Lucey & Delaney, 2007), but their sample size (N=67 for all 
countries) does not allow cross-country comparisons. The few 
existing cross-country surveys of economists compare views on 
issues of primary economic interest (e.g., Frey, Pommerehne, 
Schneider & Gilbert, 1984), but not on national attachment or 
patriotism. In general, national attachment and a focus on the 
interests of own country is not limited to Germany and German 
economists. From surveys in the general population, we know that 
Germans feel less attached to their nation and have less nationalist 
attitudes than citizens of most other developed countries (Shulman, 
2002). Whether economists from other countries show a weaker or a 
stronger bias toward their home country when judging economic 
policy remains speculative, however.  
To further substantiate our findings, future research should not 
exclusively focus on national economic policy proposals and their 
effects in one country. Instead, European or global policy 
arrangements could be selected. Alternatively, the effects of a certain 
policy’s implementation in the home country and its neighboring 
country could be contrasted. Cross-country comparisons would also 
be desirable. 
The economist bias toward home country that we detected may be 
comforting for national politicians seeking economic advice. In 
international contexts, more prudence regarding the objectivity of 
economists may be well advised. Certainly, our results do not suggest 
that economists are nationally biased in every context. Economists 
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may be able to switch to an international perspective if they, for 
example, act as policy advisors for an international organization. 
However, there remains some doubt whether a German economist 
and a Greek economist would come to the same conclusions when 
analyzing the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone and 
developing appropriate policy recommendations. They might disagree 
for positive reasons, for example, because they have access to 
different information or use different assumptions in their models. 
Alternatively, their conclusions might differ because they just have 
different fatherlands. 
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5. Economists Are Human, Too. How Economic 
Experts and Laypeople Think about 
Immigration Policies, CO2 Emissions 
Reduction, and Military Exports 
5.1. Introduction 
If you ask a random person on the street in Germany whether he or 
she supports a minimum wage, the most frequent answer will be, 
“Yes, I do, because everyone should be able to make a decent living 
from what he earns.” If you ask an economist the same question, you 
will most likely hear the answer, “No, I don’t, because it will reduce 
labor supply, employment, and economic wealth.” (German Council of 
Economic Experts, 2008, p. 334ff; Haferkamp et al., 2009). Apart 
from the empirical question of whether the economist’s argument is 
actually true, the two answers reveal two different ways of reasoning 
about economic policy. Economic laypeople base their decisions on a 
general justice principle or on what they deem to be fair. Economic 
experts consider the potential economic consequences of the policy 
or, more simply, economic efficiency. Studies by Haferkamp et al. 
(2009) and Jacob et al. (2011b) have shown this dichotomy in 
judgments about various labor market, trade and immigration policy 
proposals. Further evidence about the differences between 
economists and laypeople is manifold (e.g., Blendon et al., 1997; 
Caplan, 2002; Frey, 1986; Henderson, 1986).  
However, things are not always as clear as in the minimum wage 
example, where economists voice a firm opinion based on efficiency 
considerations, which clearly conflicts with the lay perspective. What 
about relevant political issues that involve strong non-economic or 
ethical considerations, such as immigration policy, CO2 emissions 
reduction, or military exports? From surveys conducted with 
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economists, we know that economists’ political views are influenced 
by different value judgments and that the variance in their answers 
increases if the political issues discussed involve ethical concerns 
(Fuchs et al., 1998; Ricketts & Shoesmith, 1992). In the end, 
economists are still human, not purely utilitarian materialists. 
In our study, we aim to discover how economists judge three national 
policy proposals dealing with the immigration of highly qualified 
foreigners, CO2 emissions reduction, and an export ban on military 
equipment. Does the typical consequentialist way of reasoning about 
economic policy issues persist among economists, or do they apply 
judgment logic that is similar to the logic laypeople apply? How do 
economists judge policies if a recommendation based on economic 
analysis is either unavailable because of the novelty of the issue or 
inappropriate because of ethical concerns?  
Based on two telephone surveys, we contrasted the views of 
economists and laypeople on the selected policy proposals. Survey 
participants had to reveal whether they accepted the policy proposals 
and whether they judged the proposals to be economically efficient, 
fair, and good for their self-interests. We start with a brief review of 
the research on the general differences between the economic policy 
judgments of economic experts and laypeople. Subsequently, we 
present what economic research says about the immigration of highly 
qualified foreigners, CO2 emissions reduction, and exports of military 
equipment. This introduction into the topic is followed by the 
empirical part of the article. 
5.1.1. Why economists and non-economists are different 
Numerous studies show that professional economists and non-
economists, or economic laypeople, think differently about economic 
phenomena and economic policy (e.g., Baron & Kemp, 2004; Blendon 
et al., 1997; Caplan, 2002; Frey, 1986; Haferkamp et al., 2009; 
Henderson, 1986; Jacob et al., 2011b). For example, in a study on 
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labor market interventions in Germany by Haferkamp et al. (2009), 
74% of laypeople supported a nationwide minimum wage and 75% 
supported a legal salary cap, but only 15% and 6%, respectively, of 
the economists did.  
Several reasons for these differences can be identified.  
First, laypeople do not possess expert knowledge about economic 
facts and basic economic principles (Caplan, 2003; Walstad & 
Larsen, 1993; Walstad, 1997). They misjudge basic economic 
mechanisms, such as the long-term effects of economic growth 
(Christandl & Fetchenhauer, 2009) or the macroeconomic 
consequences of economically relevant and irrelevant events (Roos, 
2007b).  
Second, the perception of economic phenomena is affected by 
cognitive heuristics and biases. Heuristics and simple psychological 
algorithms often lead to surprisingly accurate inferences and 
decisions (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003). 
In the context of judgments about economic policy, however, they are 
also prone to systematic biases (for overviews, see Baron et al., 2006; 
Caplan, 2007; Rubin, 2003). For example, people tend to follow the 
fixed-pie myth (Baron et al., 2006), believing that the economy is a 
zero-sum game. They assume, for example, that immigrants take jobs 
away from locals, assuming that the total number of jobs in a country 
is fixed. This conclusion is generally refuted by economic science.  
Third, economists and laypeople apply different criteria when 
evaluating economic policies. On the one hand, fairness plays a 
preponderant role for laypeople. Policy measures are judged in light of 
general principles and norms, such as procedural and distributive 
justice (Tyler, 1994). In the economic policy context, Haferkamp et al. 
(2009) showed the high importance of fairness considerations in the 
approval of labor market policies, such as a minimum wage or a legal 
salary cap. Professional economists, on the other hand, focus on 
economic efficiency considerations (Haferkamp et al., 2009; Jacob et 
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al., 2011b, Kirchgässner, 2005; Stiglitz, 1998). They primarily judge 
economic policy measures based on their economic consequences, for 
example, the additional national economic wealth created by jobs, 
even low-paying jobs.  
Overall, many of the differences between economists and laypeople 
can be explained by the specific way of thinking that economists 
apply. They use their scientific expertise to assess the expected 
material consequences of a certain policy proposal and decide 
accordingly.  
However, the literature does not suggest that economists are homines 
oeconomici in the strict sense of their own models. Several surveys of 
economists have shown that ideology and different ethical views also 
play an important role in the judgment of economic policies (e.g., de 
Benedictis & di Maio, 2011; Fuchs et al., 1998; Mayer, 2001; Ricketts 
& Shoesmith, 1992). According to studies by Haferkamp et al. (2009) 
and Jacob et al. (2011b), economists consider fairness when they 
judge economic policies, although fairness was clearly a less 
important judgment criterion than economic efficiency. 
Furthermore, economists do not appear to be more selfish than 
laypeople. Although some studies have detected more selfish behavior 
by economists (e.g., Carter & Irons, 1991, Frank et al., 1993; Frank & 
Schulze, 2000; Marwell & Ames, 1981), other scholars observed less 
selfish behavior in various situations (Frey & Meier, 2005; Laband & 
Beil, 1999; Yezer et al., 1996). The studies by Haferkamp et al. (2009) 
and Jacob et al. (2011b) did not detect an important influence of self-
interest as a judgment criterion for economic policy for economists or 
laypeople.  
Finally, the personal values (cf. Schwartz, 1994) of economists differ 
only slightly from the values shared by the average population, as 
studies by Lucey and Delaney (2007) and Gandal, Roccas, Sagiv, and 
Wrzesniewski (2005) have shown. 
78 
 
 
Do the similarities between economists and laypeople result in more 
similar policy judgments if the policy proposals are less related to 
mainstream academic economics and involve ethical considerations? 
Before answering this research question, we will discuss how 
economists generally think about the three policy proposals we 
selected for our study. 
5.1.2. What economic research says about immigration, CO2 
emissions reduction, and military exports 
The aim of our survey was to confront economists with policy 
proposals that involve ethical considerations and that are difficult to 
judge by simply relying on textbook knowledge of economics. 
Therefore, we selected three hypothetical policy proposals from the 
domains of immigration, climate policy, and security policy: 
(1) Germany should actively attract highly qualified foreigners. 
(2) Germany should significantly reduce its CO2 emissions even if 
other countries do not reduce their emissions. 
(3) Germany should not export any military equipment to other 
countries. 
To what extent are these issues covered by economic science and 
economic policy analysis? What do economists recommend regarding 
these issues? 
To answer these questions, we searched the leading economics 
research database “Econlit” and the annual reports of the 
“Sachverständigenrat”, the German Council of Economic Experts 
(GCEE), from the past 10 years for references to immigration of 
skilled labor, climate policy, and exports of military equipment 
(reflecting the three selected policy proposals). 
With the general keyword “immigration,” Econlit produced more than 
4,000 results. For “immigration policy,” there were 587 hits, and the 
combined search of “immigration” and “skilled labor” still yielded 409 
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results. These results indicate that immigration is recognized as a 
relevant issue and is well-covered in the economics literature. The 
GCEE discussed immigration policy or the shortage of skilled labor in 
3 out of 10 recent annual reports. The members of the GCEE 
recommend the immigration of highly qualified foreigners to remedy 
the shortage of skilled labor, which experts have diagnosed in certain 
industries in Germany (GCEE 2007, p.359; GCEE 2001, p.104ff). 
Generally, there is a consensus among economists that the 
immigration of highly qualified workers has positive economic effects 
for the receiving country (e.g., OECD 2002, Storesletten, 2000). 
CO2 abatement is a relatively new research topic, at least in the field 
of economics, but its importance is rising quickly. The keyword 
“emissions reduction” was associated with 684 entries, and the 
combination of “emissions reduction” and “economic growth” yielded 
128 results. The GCEE covered energy policy and CO2 emissions 
reduction in only 1 of 10 recent annual reports. The authors of the 
report are skeptical that Germany or the European Union should play 
a pioneering role in climate protection, which would imply ambitious 
unilateral targets to reduce CO2 emissions (GCEE 2011, p.241ff). 
There might be some efficiency gains from investing in more CO2-
efficient technologies, and a study by Tiwari (2011) even detected that 
having a higher share of renewable energy sources had a positive 
effect on economic growth. However, the significant cost burden for 
energy-intensive industries is believed to result in negative economic 
effects. In addition, in the view of economic theory, unilateral 
emissions reductions lead to a “crowding-out”. They reduce the 
reduction efforts of other countries, diminishing the positive effects 
for the global climate (Feld, Konrad & Thum, 2011; Sinn, 2008). 
Therefore, economists do not recommend unilateral emissions 
reductions, at least not in the long-term. 
The economic consequences of export restrictions on military 
equipment do not receive substantial attention in economic research. 
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Of the various search terms we used, the combined keywords 
“military” and “export” yielded the highest number of results: 117. In 
the last 10 GCEE reports, arms exports and the role of the defense 
industry have not been mentioned. Two reasons for this lack of 
attention can be identified. First, the overall importance of the 
defense industry for the national economy might be considered 
negligible. This is only partly true. Military exports amounted to 
approximately 1% of the German gross domestic product in 2010 
(Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 2011). However, 
Germany is the third-largest exporter of military equipment in the 
world, with a market share of approximately 10% (SIPRI, 2012). A 
second reason is put forward in one of the few economic papers on 
the arms trade itself. Trading in military equipment is considered 
controversial because of its moral, military, and political dimensions 
(Levine & Smith, 1997). Most likely, economists are aware of these 
considerations when evaluating exports of military equipment. 
Overall, the intensity of coverage of these issues in the economic 
literature declines from the first to the third policy proposal. In 
parallel, the need for ethical considerations increases. For these two 
reasons, we expect that economists’ policy judgments will become 
more similar to laypeople’s judgments from the first to the third 
policy proposal. 
Regarding the first reason, the less a topic is covered by mainstream 
economics, the less likely it is that economists will be able to apply 
economic expertise. Reasons for sparse coverage in the economics 
literature could be the sheer complexity of the issue, which makes 
clear and reliable recommendations difficult, or the novelty of the 
research topic. For example, labor economics has a longer history 
and offers a wider array of theories and empirical studies than 
climate economics. Therefore, on average, labor market issues should 
be more routinely judged based on findings from economics than 
climate policy issues.  
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Regarding the second reason, the more a policy issue involves ethical 
considerations, the less economists will judge it purely on its 
economic effects. Politics always has a moral dimension, although its 
importance differs for each case and may be debatable. Even if a 
clear-cut economic analysis is available, an issue such as emergency 
relief after an earthquake in a developing country will not be decided 
based purely on economic considerations.  
To summarize, we hypothesize that the less policy issues are 
analyzed and discussed based on the findings of economic science, 
the less economists’ views on those policy issues will differ from the 
views of laypeople.  
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Participants 
To compare the views of economists and laypeople, we conducted two 
parallel telephone surveys between September and November 2011. 
Telephone surveys were chosen instead of online surveys because 
their response rates are usually higher, and a representative sample 
is easier to achieve. In addition, direct interaction with the 
interviewees helps to avoid misunderstandings.  
In the first survey (economists), we interviewed academics from 
German university departments of economics or economics research 
institutes (N=100). The participants were randomly selected in a 
three-step process. First, a German university’s department of 
economics or economic research institute was chosen by a weighted 
sampling procedure: a member of the “Verein für Socialpolitik”, 
Germany’s association of economists, was randomly drawn from the 
member index, and the member’s academic institution was selected. 
Second, we decided randomly whether a full professor, a post-
doctoral researcher or assistant professor, or a Ph.D. candidate 
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would be interviewed at the selected academic institution. Third, a 
potential interviewee in the chosen academic position (e.g., a full 
professor) was randomly selected from all of the individuals with the 
chosen position (e.g., all full professors) at the selected academic 
institution. The potential participants were then contacted via letter 
or email to schedule an interview. Out of the 149 economists 
contacted, 100 were available for the interview. We interviewed 34 full 
professors, 30 post-doctoral researchers or assistant professors, and 
36 Ph.D. candidates. Most participants were German citizens (N=95); 
19 were female; the mean age was 37.4 (SD=9.3). 
In the second survey (laypeople), we interviewed randomly selected 
adults over the age of 18 (N=100). The potential participants were 
selected based on randomly generated German telephone numbers. 
Out of the 620 candidates contacted by phone, 100 were available for 
the interview. The vast majority of the participants were German 
citizens (N=91); 51 were female; the mean age was 45.3 years 
(SD=17.9). More than a third of the participants (N=38) had 
successfully completed a college or university education. No 
professional economists were included in the sample of laypeople. 
5.2.2. Survey procedure and data aggregation for statistical 
analysis  
Both respondent groups were presented the same three policy 
proposals that addressed the immigration of highly qualified 
foreigners, CO2 emissions reduction, and military exports, as stated 
in the introductory section. During the telephone interviews, 
participants first had to disclose whether they supported the three 
policy proposals or not. We used a 5-point Likert scale (1=strongly 
disagree to 5=strongly agree with the mean value 3=Neither disagree 
nor agree). Subsequently, the respondents were presented the three 
proposals a second time. They rated the proposals on the dimensions 
of economic efficiency, fairness, and self-interest. Again, a 5-point 
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Likert scale was used for all items. Thus, a mean value of M=3.00 in 
the sample would represent, on average, a neutral assessment. Table 
12 gives the exact wording of the questions and scales. The 
respondents indicated whether they expected the proposed policy to 
have positive or negative effects on economic growth and on 
employment in Germany. Finally, the respondents were asked to 
decide whether the policy proposal was fair or unfair and to judge the 
direct consequences for themselves. 
The participants in both surveys were asked to judge the effects of 
the policy proposals on economic growth and employment in 
Germany. As both dimensions refer to economic effects, we integrated 
these two questions into one economic efficiency scale by calculating 
the mean of the answers. Integrating the two into one scale was 
feasible because the answers to the two questions about economic 
effects were highly consistent in both respondent groups. The 
Pearson coefficients of the two items across all policy proposals 
ranged from ρ=0.66 and ρ=0.87 for economists and from ρ=0.68 and 
ρ=0.93 for laypeople. Cronbach’s Alpha ranged from α=0.79 to α=0.93 
for economists and from α=0.81 to α=0.96 for laypeople. Thus, we 
created one national economic efficiency variable and one global 
economic efficiency variable for each of the three policy proposals. 
Although we had collected sociodemographic information, including 
age, gender, and level of education, we did not include these variables 
in the presentation of the results. By and large, the effects of 
sociodemographic variables were rather inconclusive and not 
significant. This is particularly remarkable for education level, which 
explained part of the gap between economists and laypeople in former 
studies (Caplan, 2002; Jacob et al., 2011b; Walstad & Rebeck, 2002). 
  
84 
 
 
Table 12: Phrasing of the items of the policy proposal questions 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Judgments of the policy proposals: descriptive results 
We will first present the mean ratings of the three policy proposals 
provided by economists and laypeople in the dimensions of 
acceptance, economic efficiency, fairness, and self-interest (Table 13). 
For some selected cases, we will also present relative frequencies 
because the percentages of agreement may be more tangible than the 
arithmetic means alone. Overall, we observed considerable differences 
between the answers of economists and laypeople. The differences 
tended to be smaller, however, on the second and third policy 
proposals (unilateral reduction of CO2 emissions and an export ban 
on military equipment).  
Dimension Phrasing of item Phrasing of scale 
1 2 3 4 5 
Accep-
tance  
How strongly would 
you agree with this 
policy? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Tend to 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Tend to 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Economic 
efficiency 
Would this policy, 
in the long run, be 
positive or negative 
for employment in 
Germany? 
Clearly 
negative 
Rather 
negative 
Neither 
negative 
nor 
positive 
Rather 
positive 
Clearly 
positive 
Would this policy, 
in the long run, be 
positive or negative 
for economic growth 
in Germany? 
Clearly 
negative 
Rather 
negative 
Neither 
negative 
nor 
positive 
Rather 
positive 
Clearly 
positive 
Fairness Would you consider 
this policy fair or 
unfair? 
Clearly 
unfair 
Rather 
unfair 
Neither 
fair nor 
unfair 
Rather 
positive 
Clearly 
fair 
Self-
Interest 
How would you 
judge the 
consequences of 
this policy for 
yourself or people 
you feel close to? 
Clearly 
negative 
Rather 
negative 
Neither 
negative 
nor 
positive 
Rather 
positive 
Clearly 
positive 
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Table 13: Descriptive statistics of the judgments of the three policy proposals 
by economists and laypeople 
Mean ratings 
(Standard deviations) 
Respondent 
Group 
Acceptance 
  
Economic 
Efficiency 
Fairness 
 
Self-interest 
 
      1. Attract highly 
qualified foreigners 
Economists 4.33** 4.41** 3.61 3.40** 
 
(0.82) (0.65) (0.98) (0.75) 
    Laypeople 3.38 3.37 3.36 3.01 
 
(1.46) (1.15) (1.34) (0.81) 
    
        
2. Reduce CO2 
emissions unilaterally 
Economists 3.73** 3.02** 3.45** 3.37* 
(1.03) (0.95) (1.05) (0.77) 
Laypeople 4.19 3.53 3.94 3.61 
 
(1.05) (1.02) (1.35) (1.06) 
    
        
      3. Export ban on 
military equipment 
Economists 2.67** 2.22 3.26* 3.14* 
 
(1.21) (0.73) (1.12) (0.57) 
    Laypeople 3.52 2.22 3.74 2.94 
 
(1.35) (0.94) (1.35) (0.81) 
    
        
Note. Asterisks behind the mean ratings of the economists indicate a significant difference between these ratings 
and the respective mean ratings of laypeople according to the t-statistic;  *p<.05;  **p<.01 
On the first policy proposal, the differences between economists and 
laypeople were large. Economists strongly favored the immigration of 
highly qualified foreigners. The mean acceptance rating was M=4.33 
(SD=0.82), which reflects that 89% of the economists fully agreed or 
tended to agree with the policy proposal. Laypeople were far more 
skeptical (M=3.38; SD=1.46), showing an approval rate (agree + tend 
to agree) of 52%. The difference in the mean ratings between 
economists and laypeople was highly significant (t=5.67; p<.01). 
Similarly, most economists expected positive economic effects from 
attracting highly qualified foreigners (M=4.41; SD=0.65), while 
laypeople were rather undecided, with an average rating closer to the 
mean value of the 5-point scale (M=3.37; SD=1.15; t=7.82; p<.01, 
when comparing the means). The differences were less pronounced in 
the fairness judgments. Economists (M=3.62; SD=0.98) did not feel 
that the proposal was significantly more fair than the laypeople felt it 
was (M=3.36; SD=1.34; t=1.50; p=.14). Finally, economists (M=3.40; 
SD=0.75) were significantly more likely than laypeople (M=3.01; 
SD=0.81; t=3.53; p<.01) to agree that qualified immigration would 
serve their own interests. One among various possible explanations 
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may be that laypeople fear, more than economists do, that they would 
have to compete with immigrants for the same jobs. 
A unilateral reduction of German CO2 emissions found support 
among 64% of the economists, with a mean acceptance rating of 
M=3.73; SD=1.03. This approval rate appeared surprisingly high, 
given that the economic literature remains skeptical about unilateral 
emissions reductions (see Introduction). Laypeople expressed even 
stronger approval of climate protection, with 74% supporting the 
policy proposal and a significantly higher mean acceptance rating 
than the economists (M=4.19; SD=1.05; t=3.12; p<.01). Likewise, the 
lay judgments of economic efficiency (M=3.53; SD=1.03) and fairness 
(M=3.94; SD=1.35) were significantly more positive than the 
economists’ judgments of efficiency (M=3.02; SD=0.95, t=3.63; p<.01) 
and fairness (M=3.45; SD=1.05; t=2.87; p=.01). Regarding self-
interest, both respondent groups expected more positive 
consequences than negative consequences for themselves from CO2 
emissions reductions. 
On average, the economists disapproved of a complete export ban on 
military equipment (M=2.67; SD=1.21). Still, the relatively high 
standard deviation suggests that there was no consensus among the 
economic experts. Approval of an export ban among the laypeople 
was significantly higher (M=3.52; SD=1.35; t=4.68; p<.01). Neither of 
the two respondent groups, however, had a clear majority (i.e., more 
than 50%) for or against the policy proposal. Both respondent groups 
agreed that an export ban on military equipment would have negative 
economic effects for Germany. On the fairness dimension, a 
significant gap between economists and laypeople reappeared. A 
lower proportion of economists (M=3.26; SD=1.12) than laypeople 
(M=3.74; SD=1.35; t=2.73; p=.01) found it fair to stop all exports of 
military equipment. Apparently, economists and laypeople have a 
different understanding of what is fair in this context. On the self-
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interest question, neither economists nor laypeople saw, on average, 
considerable positive or negative consequences for their well-being. 
Overall, the judgments of economists and laypeople differed across all 
three policy proposals. The differences appear largest for the first 
policy proposal (attract highly qualified foreigners to Germany). For 
this proposal, the economists’ policy judgments seem to be driven by 
an assessment of economic efficiency, indicated by the congruent 
mean ratings of acceptance and economic efficiency. For the 
remaining two policy proposals, the link between economic efficiency 
and acceptance is less apparent from the descriptive results. This 
result suggests that ethical considerations or other considerations 
could have been more important. The regression analysis in the 
following subchapter will help to verify these observations. 
5.3.2. Economic efficiency or fairness? Regression analysis  
We carried out a separate regression analysis for each of the three 
policy proposals and each respondent group. The aim was to quantify 
the roles that judgments about economic efficiency, fairness, and 
self-interest play in the acceptance of the policy proposals. We 
hypothesized that economists would primarily base their policy 
judgment on economic efficiency. However, for the unilateral 
reduction of CO2 emissions and the export ban on military 
equipment, issues with less coverage in the economic literature and a 
higher demand for ethical considerations, we expected that fairness 
would be an important judgment criterion for economists, maybe 
even more important than economic efficiency. For laypeople, we 
expected fairness to be the major predictor of acceptance across the 
three policy proposals. 
The regression results for the first policy proposal confirmed our 
basic hypothesis about the judgment criteria used by the economists 
(Table 14). Economists approved of the immigration of highly 
qualified foreigners mainly because they expected positive effects for 
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the German economy (regression coefficient β=0.56; p<0.01). The 
effect of fairness was clearly smaller, albeit significant (β=0.24; 
p<0.01). Self-interest had no statistically significant influence 
(β=0.02; p=0.80). The regression coefficients can be interpreted as 
follows. If, for example, economists’ economic efficiency judgments 
about attracting highly qualified foreigners to Germany vary by one 
point on the 5-point Likert scale, their acceptance ratings should, on 
average, differ by 0.56 points.  
For laypeople, fairness was the most important judgment criterion, as 
we had hypothesized (β=0.58; p<0.01). However, the economic effects 
of attracting highly qualified foreigners to Germany played an 
important role as well (β=0.50; p<0.01). Surprisingly, material self-
interest had a negative effect on the acceptance of the policy proposal 
(β=-0.39; p=0.01). However, the bivariate correlation between 
acceptance and self-interest (ρ=.167) suggests that this coefficient 
should not be overemphasized. The negative effect only appears if the 
fairness variable is included in the regression model. Thus, it can be 
explained by a mediation effect, which we will briefly revisit in the 
Discussion section. 
Table 14: Results of the linear regression of efficiency, fairness and self-
interest ratings on acceptance ratings for economists and laypeople  
Coefficients 
(Standard 
Errors) 
1. Attract highly 
qualified foreigners 
3. Reduce CO2 
emissions unilaterally 
3. Export ban on military 
equipment 
Economists Laypeople Economists Laypeople Economists Laypeople 
Constant 0.92 0.94* 0.76 2.41** -0.60 1.92** 
(0.50) (0.41) (0.40) (0.42) (0.58) (0.56) 
Efficiency 0.56** 0.50** 0.39** 0.13 0.20** -0.17 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) 
Fairness 0.24** 0.58** 0.20* 0.27** 0.53 0.39** 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
Self-interest 0.02 -0.39* 0.32** 0.07 0.35 0.16 
  
(0.09) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) (0.16) 
R2 0.56** 0.36** 0.41** 0.21** 0.38** 0.18** 
Sample Size N=99 N=98 N=99 N=96 N=99 N=97 
   *p<.05;  **p<.01 
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Again, when judging unilateral CO2 emissions reductions, the 
potential effects for the German economy were the most important 
factor for economists (β=0.39; p<0.01), although with lower 
magnitude than for the first policy proposal. The fairness coefficient 
was smaller in size (β=0.20; p=0.03). The consequences for one’s own 
well-being also played a significant role in the acceptance of CO2 
emissions reductions (β=0.32; p<0.01). Laypeople primarily based 
their judgments about a unilateral CO2 emissions reduction on 
perceived fairness (β=0.27; p<0.01). However, the effect size of the 
fairness coefficient and the overall explanatory power of the 
regression model (R2=.21) for the laypeople group were only moderate. 
Economic efficiency (β=0.13; p=0.22) and self-interest (β=0.07; 
p=0.51) did not add any significant explanatory value to the model. 
To make a judgment on an export ban on military equipment, 
economic efficiency considerations did not play a significant role for 
economists (β=0.20; p=0.16). Instead, fairness emerged as the major 
judgment criterion (β=0.53; p<0.01). Apparently, economic effects are 
of secondary importance, even for economists, and security or ethical 
concerns dominate the decision process. The magnitude of the self-
interest coefficient was considerable but proved only marginally 
statistically significant (β=0.35; p=0.07). For the laypeople, the results 
were similar. The fairness judgment was the most important predictor 
of an export ban on military equipment (β=0.39; p<0.01). Economic 
efficiency (β=-0.17; p=0.24) and self-interest (β=0.16; p=0.31) did not 
significantly influence the acceptance rating.  
5.4. Discussion  
In this study, we aimed to determine how economists judge three 
national policy proposals dealing with the immigration of highly 
qualified foreigners, a unilateral reduction of CO2 emissions, and an 
export ban on military equipment compared to economic laypeople. 
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We had hypothesized that the less policy issues are covered in the 
economic literature and the more they involve ethical considerations, 
the less economists’ views will differ from the views of laypeople. In 
two telephone surveys, 100 German economists and 100 randomly 
selected laypeople were asked how strongly they supported the 
selected policy proposals and if they found them economically 
efficient, fair, and good for their self-interest. The intensity of 
coverage in the economic literature was greatest for the first policy 
proposal (attract highly qualified foreigners), less for the second one 
(CO2 emissions), and least for the third one (export ban for military 
equipment). The demand for ethical considerations increased in 
parallel. 
As expected, the first policy proposal that addressed the immigration 
of highly qualified foreigners was judged in accordance with the 
evidence from former studies (Haferkamp et al., 2009; Jacob et al. 
2011b). Economists clearly supported the proposal because of its 
positive economic effects. Laypeople based their judgments on a 
mixture of fairness and economic efficiency considerations, slightly 
dominated by fairness. Interestingly, any influence of self-interest on 
the acceptance of the policy was fully mediated, and even reversed, 
by the fairness judgment. Haferkamp et al. (2009) detected a similar 
mediation effect in judgments about various labor market policies. 
Self-interest indeed had some relevance, but it primarily influenced 
the fairness judgment, not the acceptance of the policy proposal. 
For the second policy proposal, the results were more mixed. A 
majority of the economists and the laypeople supported a unilateral 
reduction of CO2 emissions in Germany. For economists, economic 
efficiency remained the most important judgment criterion, but the 
coefficients for fairness and self-interest were also significant. For the 
laypeople, fairness was the only significant predictor of the 
acceptance of the emissions reduction proposal.  
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The third policy proposal, an export ban on military equipment in 
Germany, had received the least coverage in the economic literature 
and was likely to evoke stronger ethical concerns. Congruent with our 
hypothesis, the logic that both the economists and the laypeople 
applied to their judgments was very similar. Both respondent groups 
relied on fairness as the most important (and the only significant) 
judgment criterion. However, the two groups did not come to the 
same conclusions. While laypeople, on average, endorsed an export 
ban on military equipment, economists did not. Consequently, 
economists and laypeople disagreed on the fairness of an export ban. 
Although economists did not base their judgment on economic 
efficiency considerations, they still have, on average, a different idea 
of what is fair than laypeople did. Economists and laypeople might 
both apply a deontological ethics, but follow different principles of 
justice. For example, some economists might judge an export ban to 
be unfair because they value the individual freedom of domestic 
companies to produce and export the products they prefer. 
Laypeople, in contrast, might follow a moral rule that it is not 
appropriate to earn money by providing other countries with arms.  
These speculations show that there are many potential 
interpretations of the notion of fairness. It remains a challenge for 
future research to better understand the considerations that lead to 
the fairness judgment in the context of economic policy. Several 
economists, for example, remarked during the interviews that 
fairness was not a clear concept, that it had to be more precisely 
defined and that it was not a valid criterion for analyzing economic 
policy.  
Compared to the previous studies on judgment criteria for economic 
policy by Haferkamp et al. (2009) and Jacob et al. (2011), some of the 
results of this study, such as the differences between economists and 
laypeople or the regression coefficients, appear less clear and 
convincing at first sight. One reason is that we used a 5-point Likert 
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scale in our survey, compared to the dichotomous scale used in the 
previous studies. Our scale may have increased the accuracy of the 
measurements, but it also decreased the clarity of the results. For 
example, the respondents could choose a neutral option, which 
reduces approval or disapproval rates per se. A second reason for the 
more diverse results is that we intentionally selected policy proposals 
for our study that could not be easily answered referring to an 
economics textbook. This created considerable variance in the 
respondents’ answers. What is more, the selected policy proposals 
apparently required additional considerations (e.g., ethical ones) that 
were not covered by the judgment criteria economic efficiency, 
fairness, and self-interest. A relatively large part of the variance 
remained unexplained by the regression analysis, with coefficients of 
determination ranging from R2=.18 to R2=.56.  
Our conclusions about the factors that lead economists to judge 
policies in the same manner as laypeople are still preliminary. It may 
be simplistic to count database entries or mentions in reports of the 
German Council of Economic Experts to assess how thoroughly a 
policy issue is covered by economic literature. For example, the 
neglect of military exports in GCEE reports may reflect that the issue 
is of minor importance, at least economically. Furthermore, 
identifying the political issues that involve stronger ethical 
considerations than other issues is difficult and leaves much room for 
debate. Notwithstanding these limitations, we find it remarkable that 
the judgments of economists and laypeople can be similar and that 
economists do not always rely on economic efficiency considerations. 
One final point is worth mentioning. A clear majority of the 
economists in our survey supported a unilateral reduction of CO2 
emissions in Germany, although standard economic reasoning 
recommends otherwise (Feld et al., 2011; Sinn, 2008). One 
explanation would be that the economists in our sample did not know 
the standard economic reasoning, which seems rather unlikely for 
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such a large group of professionals. An alternative explanation is that 
they do not believe in the empirical validity of the standard 
theoretical claims. They may have ignored the theoretical claims in 
favor of a personal preference, and they may have looked for post-hoc 
arguments that an emissions reduction would have positive economic 
effects to preserve their self-image as rational professional 
economists. One participant’s comment during the interview supports 
this hypothesis: “As an environmental economist, I have to be for the 
reduction of CO2 emissions.” From the perspective of a rational 
scientist, this reasoning may seem problematic. However, it also 
reflects that the propositions of economic theory do not have the 
status of natural laws. Occasionally, taking personal preferences and 
beliefs into account may be a reasonable strategy for a skeptical 
economist. It makes economists look more human. In addition, it 
may help bridge the gap between economists’ arguments and the 
general public, potentially addressing an obstacle to widely accepted 
and economically reasonable policy reform. 
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6. General Discussion  
The research presented in the previous four chapters was based on 
two findings that have been well established by previous research. 
First, economic laypeople and economists differ considerably in their 
views on the economy and economic policy. Second, economists base 
their economic policy judgments primarily on economic efficiency 
considerations, whereas laypeople use fairness as the major decision 
criterion. Based on empirical studies using economic policy proposals 
from the trade and immigration policy domain, these observations 
have been confirmed in this dissertation (see chapters 2, 3, and 5). 
Beyond that, three major results stand out, which I will summarize 
and discuss in the following chapter 6.1.  
In chapter 6.2, the dichotomy of fairness and efficiency in the 
judgments of economic policies will receive more attention. 
Preliminary ideas for future research will be presented in chapters 
6.1 and 6.2 when appropriate rather than integrating them into a 
separate chapter. In chapter 6.3, I will present some normative 
considerations and potential implications of laypeople’s and 
economists’ views in an essay style. Chapter 6.4 will conclude this 
dissertation with practical recommendations for politicians, 
journalists, teachers, laypeople, and economists.  
6.1. Summary and discussion of major results 
6.1.1. Teachers and journalists do not apply the economists’ way 
of reasoning 
Teachers and journalists apply a judgment logic similar to that of 
laypeople. Their policy judgments in the trade and immigration policy 
domains are mainly based on perceived fairness (chapter 3). The 
study in chapter 3 focused on secondary school teachers of 
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economics or social sciences and journalists working in policy or 
economics editorial departments. These groups are important 
promoters of economic knowledge transfer given that economic 
education mainly occurs in schools, and background information on 
economic policies is primarily transferred through the media.  
Empirical results regarding teachers and journalists indicate that the 
economist’s way of reasoning about economic policy is more 
uncommon than economists might believe. The lay way of reasoning 
is not limited to people with low levels of education who are not used 
to routinely thinking about economic policy. Social science teachers 
and economic journalists usually hold academic degrees and deal 
with economic policy issues on a regular basis. 
Evidence further suggests that teachers and journalists reinforce or 
even shape the lay way of reasoning about economic policy. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the promotional role of teachers and 
journalists in economic reasoning remains unclear.  
Regarding the role of teachers and economic education, past research 
has shown that explicit economics courses in high school 
significantly improve students’ performance in tests of economic 
literacy (Walstad & Buckles, 2008; Walstad & Rebeck, 2001). 
Students’ level of economic literacy is positively influenced by the 
number of economics courses taken by their teachers at universities 
(Allgood & Walstad, 1999). The level of economic literacy, in turn, 
influences economic policy judgments (Walstad & Rebeck, 2002).  
This evidence is limited to the USA, however. In Germany, only a few 
federal states offer Economics as a separate subject, and only a 
minority of economics and social science teachers have taken courses 
in economics departments during their studies (Burkard, 2004). 
Some experts generally oppose Economics as a separate subject in 
German secondary schools because they fear a curriculum shaped by 
the “neoliberal mainstream” (Neumaier, 2007; for an opposing 
position, cf. Kaminski, 2007). This widespread skepticism and 
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German federalism have resulted in very different approaches to 
teaching the basics of economics across the 16 federal states.  
The fragmented educational landscape also suggests opportunities for 
future research on the effects of economic education. Such research 
is currently lacking in Germany (Seeber, 2008). Longitudinal surveys 
of students’ economic literacy would help to assess the effectiveness 
of economic education in general. Cross-sectional surveys or panel 
studies across several states would help to understand the 
effectiveness of different teaching approaches as well as potential 
implications of normative views of students, such as the judgment 
criteria for economic policy. More general thoughts on economic 
education and its potential normative implications will follow in 
chapter 6.3.5. 
Regarding journalists, political and mass communications research 
has generally confirmed an important role of the media as agenda 
setters for public opinion (e.g., Bennett, 2010, McCombs, 2004; 
Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). However, empirical effects are 
nuanced and complex (Goidel et al., 2010; Kleinnijenhuis & Rietberg, 
1995; Soroka, 2006; Takeshita, 2006). Political and mass 
communications research generally explores opinions on political and 
economic issues. It would be interesting to examine whether the 
media’s influence reaches deeper. Research could explore to what 
extent the media does shape the more complex and deeply rooted 
cognitive models that laypeople use to reason about economic 
phenomena and judge economic policies. 
What would an experimental study investigating this research 
question look like?  
Participants could be presented with different versions of a 
newspaper article on an economic issue. For example, a German 
newspaper reported last year that massive donations of clothing in 
Germany would ruin the apparel industry in Eastern Africa because 
clothes are exported to the region and resold there at very low prices 
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(Höft, 2011). The article concluded with the recommendation to 
destroy old clothes rather than to donate them to protect jobs in the 
African apparel industry. An economist would argue, however, that 
Eastern Africans would be economically better off if they bought 
cheap second-hand clothes from Europe. Additionally, economists 
would argue that workers in the apparel industry could be more 
productively employed in other industries.  
Participants could be presented with two versions of the article in a 
between-subjects design. One version would include explicit 
arguments from economists, and the other would not. Participants 
would be asked to judge the fairness and economic effects in 
Germany and Eastern Africa of the status quo (exports of donated 
clothes) and an alternative (destruction or recycling of clothes). To 
explore potential effects on more deeply rooted cognitive models, 
participants should also make judgments on different economic 
issues. These issues should be unrelated to the clothing donation 
story but should draw on similar economic concepts, such as the 
issue of cheap coal and steel imports leading to the decline of the 
German coal and steel industry. Finally, subjects could be retested 
several weeks later to study the long-term effects of the intervention 
on economic reasoning. Beyond analyzing specific media effects, the 
results of this study would help to understand how laypeople 
generally acquire economic ideas. 
6.1.2. Economists prefer free trade and immigration because of 
the positive effects for their home country 
Economists show more positive views on free trade and immigration 
than do laypeople. However, economists do not share these views 
because they hold more cosmopolitan attitudes or because of the 
positive global economic effects of free exchange. Instead, economists 
support liberal immigration policies as well as other policies, such as 
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the reduction of CO2 emissions, because of expected positive 
economic effects for their home country (chapters 2 and 4).  
The results of chapter 5 show that economists judged the 
immigration of highly qualified foreigners and its economic effects for 
Germany significantly more positively than did laypeople (Table 13). 
When economists do not see a particular economic benefit, however, 
their perspective on immigration does not differ from the laypeople’s 
perspective. Survey participants were also asked to make judgments 
about the unrestricted immigration of foreigners to Germany. 
Because this survey question was not covered in the chapter 5 study, 
I briefly report the results here. In contrast to their judgments about 
the immigration of highly qualified foreigners, economists expected, 
on average, negative economic effects from unrestricted immigration. 
Consequently, economists’ acceptance ratings of unrestricted 
immigration were also more skeptical, and the views of laypeople and 
economists no longer differed significantly (mean acceptance ratings: 
M=2.34 for economists, M=2.44 for laypeople; t=0.59; p=.56; mean 
national economic efficiency ratings: M=2.70 for economists, M=2.59 
for laypeople, t=0.75, p=0.45). 
Economists might be objective, and unbiased by motives of national 
attachment, in their positive analysis of economic phenomena. With 
regard to policy recommendations, however, economists have a 
fatherland and base their policy judgments on national economic 
efficiency considerations. Furthermore, they might not be fully aware 
of this bias toward their home country. Economists who reported 
having held a global perspective throughout the survey based their 
policy judgment on national efficiency considerations as well. 
Concerning the validity of those conclusions, two major limitations 
exist (see chapter 4.4), which offer fruitful avenues for future 
research. First, only German economists were interviewed. This 
limitation could be addressed through additional surveys across 
several countries. Second, global economic effects may have been 
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difficult to evaluate or may have been negligible. This issue may have 
decreased their potential importance as judgment criteria for the 
acceptance of national economic policies compared to national 
economic effects.  
What would a study addressing this limitation look like? 
Economists could be presented with various hypothetical “sandbox” 
policy scenarios that present fixed and quantified economic effects for 
the home country and either a neighboring country or the rest of the 
world. Economists would be asked to indicate whether they 
supported the policy scenario. As an example, lifting a certain trade 
restriction or business subsidy could be said to increase the gross 
domestic product in China by 100 million Euros while reducing the 
gross domestic product in Germany by 20 million Euros. 
Implementation of the policy would be efficient from a global, but not 
a German national, perspective.  
The study design could be further extended by modifying direction 
and magnitude of the economic effects (positive global vs. negative 
national consequences and vice versa), the country concerned 
(e.g., China or France) and the category (different types of products 
imported, people immigrating, or climate protected). Assumptions on 
the resulting distribution of income could also be introduced into the 
scenarios to reflect fairness concerns. The results of such a study 
would deepen the understanding of economists’ motivation to support 
certain national economic policies that entail significant global 
effects. 
6.1.3. Economists and laypeople sometimes apply a similar same 
way of reasoning  
Economists do not always base their policy judgments on economic 
efficiency considerations. The less policy issues are covered by 
economic science and the more they demand ethical considerations, 
the less the judgment logic economists apply differs from the 
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judgment logic of laypeople (chapter 5). For example, economists base 
their judgment of an export ban on military equipment, which is 
rarely discussed in the economic scientific community and clearly 
involves ethical issues, on fairness considerations, as laypeople do. 
Apparently, economists are not purely utilitarian technocrats; they 
are human beings with a conscience. They prefer economic policies 
that benefit their home country, as discussed in the previous 
subchapter. In addition, they revert to fairness as a judgment 
criterion for economic policy, at least when reliable economic 
expertise is not available. 
The methodology of the study in chapter 5 may have underestimated 
the similarities between economists and laypeople. Economists were 
surveyed in the professional environment of their office. Therefore, 
the interviewed economists might have felt obliged to provide answers 
consistent with the professional economist’s way of reasoning, which 
would imply a strong focus on economic efficiency. In the telephone 
survey, 54% of the economists reported that it would not make a 
difference for their policy judgments if they took a professional 
economist’s or a private person’s perspective. Thus, it remains 
speculative whether an economist’s private opinion would actually be 
closer to the perspective of laypeople than his or her professional 
opinion.  
A potential area for future research is to better understand why 
certain issues are analyzed and researched by economic science while 
other issues are not. One reason might be economic impact. Labor 
market regulation is likely to have higher economic importance than 
export restrictions on military equipment. A second reason might be 
pragmatism, such as data availability or convenience of formal 
modeling. A third reason might be that an issue is interpreted as 
“non-economic” or inappropriate for economic analysis because it 
demands strong ethical considerations. Most economists are likely to 
intuitively agree that organ trade or emergency relief after a natural 
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disaster involve more ethical or fairness considerations than does 
minimum wage legislation. Why this is the case, however, remains 
unclear. For laypeople, at least, all of the previously mentioned issues 
involve fairness considerations. 
Potential studies are likely to initially be exploratory. For example, 
economists could be asked in an open-question format which issues 
they deem appropriate for economic analysis, which policy issues 
should be decided based on economic efficiency considerations, and 
what they judge as fair for which reasons in different policy domains, 
such as labor market regulations or immigration. Such studies would 
help to understand the implicit normative foundations of economics 
and how economists define fairness in an economic policy context.  
In their academic work, economists are wary of using the concept of 
fairness because it is highly normative and not analytically precise 
(see chapter 4.4). Fairness norms are difficult to operationalize, and 
incorporating them into economic models makes those models more 
complex and less parsimonious (Akerlof, 2007). Skepticism (or even 
ignorance) regarding fairness became apparent during the telephone 
interviews with German economists, which were conducted for the 
studies of chapters 4 and 5. Numerous interviewees commented 
skeptically on the fairness item. They complained that it needed to be 
more precisely defined (e.g., fair for whom?) or that it would not be a 
valid category to analyze economic policy. I conclude the chapter with 
some exemplary quotes from the interview transcripts:  
“Fairness? I do not have an opinion on such a topic.” 
“Fairness is no analytical category for me.” 
“These policy issues have nothing to do with fairness at all.” 
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6.2. The dichotomy of fairness and efficiency 
The research presented in this dissertation corroborates previous 
research (e.g., Haferkamp & Fetchenhauer, 2007; Haferkamp et al., 
2009). Material self-interest is a relatively weak predictor for the 
acceptance of economic policies. Perceived fairness and economic 
efficiency are the major criteria that influence the judgment of 
economic policies. Therefore, these two criteria will receive more 
attention in this chapter. First, I will propose a systematization of the 
role of fairness in the judgment logic applied by economists and 
laypeople (chapter 6.2.1). Subsequently, some background on the 
concept of fairness and potential drivers of fairness judgments will be 
given (chapter 6.2.2). In the following chapter 6.2.3, I will discuss 
how laypeople derive their efficiency judgments. Chapter 6.2.4 will 
examine why laypeople’s models of how the economy works differ 
from the economic standard models. Finally, I will argue why 
cognitive heuristics to judge economic phenomena cannot be 
expected to be ecologically rational and effective (chapter 6.2.5). The 
designs of the empirical studies in this dissertation did not allow an 
inference of causality to be made. Therefore, some thoughts on 
potential causal relations between economic efficiency, fairness, and 
the acceptance of economic policy are also included in the following 
discussion. 
6.2.1. Systematizing the role of fairness in the policy judgments 
of laypeople and economists  
Laypeople base their judgment of economic policy measures on what 
they perceive as fair. In contrast to assessments of economic 
efficiency, fairness judgments can be reached rather intuitively and 
do not require much cognitive effort (Haidt, 2001). According to 
Baron (1993; 1998), individuals follow intuitive moral rules when 
they evaluate decisions or public policy. These intuitive moral rules 
often refer to what we deem fair or just. Such a rule-based approach 
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corresponds with a non-consequentialist, deontological ethics, which 
judges the morality of an action based on intentions and general 
moral principles. For example, people follow the do-no-harm-heuristic 
(Baron, 1995), stating that an action or policy should not cause harm 
to anyone. On these grounds, laypeople may even oppose political 
reforms if they are convinced that everyone would be better off on 
average, because the reform involves coercion and would thus harm 
people (Baron & Jurney, 1993). An example is compulsory 
vaccination legislation, which causes harm to people, who are 
coerced into vaccination. 
For economists, this perspective on economic policy is rather 
unintuitive. They generally support a policy if it is economically 
efficient and thus increases overall welfare. They base their policy 
judgments on a policy’s consequences, corresponding to a 
consequentialist or utilitarian ethics. The economic efficiency 
judgment, in turn, serves as a basis for what economists consider 
fair. Although this causal relation from efficiency to fairness could 
not be derived directly from the data, it is the most plausible 
interpretation (cf. chapter 3.6). Economists’ fairness judgments were 
strongly mediated by the efficiency judgments. An inverse causation 
is rather unlikely. It would imply that economists make an intuitive 
fairness judgment, which they use as a basis for assessing economic 
efficiency. 
As a consequence of these different ethical orientations, the fairness 
judgments of laypeople and economists may conflict. In the 
compulsory vaccination example from Baron and Jurney (1993) cited 
above, a utilitarian approach (everyone better off on average; thus, do 
vaccinate everyone) and a deontological approach (some harmed by 
vaccination; thus, do not vaccinate everyone) would arrive at different 
conclusions.  
Furthermore, results of chapter 5 suggest that economists do not 
always or exclusively base their policy judgments on economic 
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efficiency considerations. If policy issues are not at the core of 
economic science or do involve strong ethical considerations, 
economists revert to fairness as a major judgment criterion.  
Based on these considerations, the fairness judgments of economists 
and laypeople can be differentiated along two dimensions. The first 
dimension follows the guiding question: Do economists and laypeople 
base their policy judgment on the same judgment criterion, namely 
fairness, or do they use different judgment criteria? The second 
dimension follows the question: Do economists and laypeople arrive 
at the same fairness judgment or not? Table 15 reflects this logic in a 
2x2 matrix.  
Table 15: Systematization of the role of fairness in the policy judgments of 
economists and laypeople 
 Different fairness judgments Same fairness judgment  
Different decision 
criteria 
(fairness for 
laypeople, 
economic efficiency 
for economists) 
 
Laypeople with 
deontological,  
economists with utilitarian 
perspective 
Deontological ≠ utilitarian 
perspective 
Issue with high economic 
relevance and/or low ethical 
relevance 
Example: minimum wage  
Laypeople with 
deontological,  
economists with utilitarian 
perspective 
Deontological = utilitarian 
perspective 
Issue with high economic 
relevance and/or low ethical 
relevance 
Example: attraction of highly 
qualified foreigners 
Same decision 
criteria 
(fairness for 
laypeople and 
economists) 
 
Laypeople and economists 
with deontological 
perspective 
Laypeople’s deontological ≠ 
economists’ deontological 
perspective 
Issue with low economic 
relevance and/or high 
ethical relevance 
Example: military exports  
Laypeople and economists 
with deontological 
perspective 
Laypeople’s deontological = 
economists’ deontological 
perspective 
Issue with low economic 
relevance and/or high 
ethical relevance 
Example: organ trade* 
* Example speculative, underlying policy proposal not included in present empirical studies 
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The first case in the upper left corner reflects the standard case of 
economic reasoning for economists and laypeople. For example, 
laypeople perceive a minimum wage as fair and base their approval of 
a minimum wage on this judgment. Economists, on the contrary, 
expect negative economic consequences from a minimum wage. 
Therefore, they oppose a minimum wage and perceive it as unfair.  
In other instances, fairness judgments of laypeople and economists 
may be congruent, although the two groups use different judgment 
criteria. Utilitarian reasoning and a deontological decision making 
approach may lead to the same results. This case is reflected in the 
upper right corner. Economists approve of the immigration of highly 
qualified foreigners because of its positive effects for the national 
economy. Therefore, they also judge this policy fair. Laypeople, 
however, support this policy proposal for fairness reasons. They 
might find it fair that highly qualified foreigners are allowed to move 
to Germany where they are able to earn more money than before. 
In contrast to the top row, economists base their policy judgments in 
the bottom row on fairness considerations, because the issues 
involved have low economic relevance or require strong ethical 
considerations. Nevertheless, fairness judgments of economists and 
laypeople can differ. They might base their decisions on different 
moral rules, which is expressed in the lower left corner. Economists, 
for example, might judge an export ban on military exports as unfair 
because economists value the individual freedom of domestic 
companies to produce and export the products they prefer. 
Laypeople, on the contrary, might support an export ban because 
they find it unfair to earn money by providing other countries with 
arms. 
Economists may also apply the same deontological decision-making 
process as laypeople and arrive at the same conclusions. This case is 
reflected in the lower right corner. An example would be trade with 
human organs. This issue was not tested in the empirical studies in 
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this dissertation. However, evidence from a survey among British 
economists (Ricketts & Shoesmith, 1992) suggests that economists 
are reluctant to apply utilitarian reasoning in this case. In that 
survey, they disagreed whether efficiency can be determined at all 
and whether it is a valid concept in this context. 
Certainly, the proposed framework is rather idealized. It has at least 
three limitations. First, reality is not dichotomous and borders 
between one case and the other can be fuzzy. Second, the 
conclusions regarding the ethical considerations of economists and 
laypeople are just plausible hypotheses, given that these ethical 
considerations have not been investigated directly in the empirical 
studies. Third, the hypotheses regarding the ethical considerations in 
the four fields of Table 15 are exemplary, and not necessarily 
exhaustive. For example, an alternative scenario leading us to the 
lower right corner would be a utilitarian orientation among 
economists, which is based on non-monetary criteria, such as 
individual pain or happiness. Such reasoning could also result in 
fairness judgments that are congruent with laypeople’s deontological 
fairness judgments. 
Another general limitation concerns the explanatory value of the 
fairness variable in the present empirical studies. The regression 
analyses in the previous chapters left a considerable share of the 
variance unexplained. For example, the level of determination of the 
export of military equipment was only R2=0.18 for laypeople, and 
R2=0.38 for economists (cf. Table 14). This evidence suggests that the 
fairness notion does not capture all factors that influence the 
acceptance of economic policies beyond economic efficiency and self-
interest. Additional factors not covered may include general ethical 
principles, social desirability, a preference for cultural diversity, or for 
protection of the environment. They are worth investigating in future 
studies. 
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The systematization in this subchapter was based on the observation 
that economists and laypeople have a different understanding of what 
is fair. Similarly, journalists and laypeople showed a different 
understanding of fairness in the chapter 3 study (Tables 5 and 6), 
although fairness was a judgment criterion of similar importance for 
both groups (Table 7). In the next subchapter, I will present potential 
factors that influence fairness judgments. 
6.2.2. What lies behind fairness judgments? 
The results presented in this dissertation have shown the diversity of 
fairness judgments. The variance of the fairness ratings was 
consistently higher than the variance of economic efficiency ratings 
for economists and laypeople (Tables 9 and 13). Moreover, the 
fairness judgments of economists and laypeople clearly diverged 
across all of the studies presented in this dissertation. These 
differences could even be observed for policy proposals where both 
economists and laypeople used fairness as the major judgment 
criterion, such as the export ban on military equipment (see chapter 
5.3). This observation might be explained by different ethical 
orientations, as hypothesized in the previous subchapter. 
Knowledge of the drivers of fairness judgments in the political context 
is rather limited, which seems surprising. The present research has 
demonstrated that fairness is a major decision criterion in the 
political context. Moreover, references to fairness and justice are 
omnipresent in political debates. To clarify, the concepts of fairness 
and justice can be used mostly synonymously in the political context 
(for disambiguation, see Velasquez, Andre, Shanks & Meyer, 1990).  
Justice research has identified two major components of the concept 
of justice: procedural and distributive justice (Tyler, 1994). In the 
context of the studies presented here, distributive concerns were 
probably more important than procedural concerns. The policy 
proposals in the telephone surveys did not address concrete 
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procedures, such as decision processes, means of implementation, or 
the behavior of public authorities. In political reality, however, 
procedural justice is an important factor. People value fair decision-
making procedures (Tyler, 2000). Procedural justice can even serve as 
a heuristic for determining if an outcome, which is often uncertain in 
advance, is seen as fair (Smith & Tyler, 1996). 
What is true for fairness judgments in general also holds for 
judgments of distributive justice: they are not easy to explain. Two 
important aspects are (a) who is included in the ingroup, that is, who 
shall receive a fair share from the resources to be distributed and (b) 
what distributional principle shall be applied to distribute the 
resources. 
Regarding the first aspect, the results of the studies in chapter 2 and 
3 revealed that laypeople hold parochialistic views. Their fairness 
judgments depended on whether the individuals affected by the policy 
were part of the ingroup, that is, their own country. These results 
correspond with what Clayton and Opotow (2005) argued: social 
identity influences justice judgments. It is relevant for justice 
judgments whether people take the perspective of individuals or see 
themselves as representatives of a larger group.  
Regarding the second aspect, judgments of distributive justice can 
relate to different moral principles of distribution (Mitchell, Tetlock, 
Mellers & Ordonez, 1993), such as equality (giving everyone the same 
share of income), efficiency (maximizing total income), or the maximin 
principle (maximizing the income share of the poorest). Which 
principle of distribution is preferred, depends on various factors. 
Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1993) synthesize philosophical literature as well 
as experimental evidence and conclude that individuals tend to 
accept different principles of distribution in different situations: 
equality for civil rights, maximin for basic needs, efficiency for capital 
goods or means of production. People accept less equal and more 
efficient allocations if the distribution of higher-level resources or 
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luxury goods is involved compared to the distribution of basic 
resources (Matania & Yaniv, 2007). In this context, the immigration 
of highly qualified foreigners, which was judged fair by a majority of 
laypeople (Table 5), could be interpreted as a “luxury problem.” This 
policy measure does not directly influence basic needs or imperil low-
paid jobs. This interpretation remains speculative, however, and it is 
difficult to say how other policy proposals, such as financial support 
for businesses exclusively producing in Germany or unilateral 
reductions of CO2 emissions, fit into this logic. 
These exemplary considerations indicate that the understanding of 
what drives fairness judgments of different policies is still in its early 
stages. One challenge for research is that fairness judgments in the 
political context do not primarily concern the individual who is 
making the judgments, but rather involve a social group that is 
sometimes not clearly defined, such as all people benefiting from a 
tax cut. Moreover, the potential consequences of a policy are often 
abstract and uncertain.  
An interesting question for future research would be how distributive 
and procedural concerns and different general ethical principles do 
interact. One example from a different policy area may serve to 
illustrate this challenge. People in Germany prefer a certain level of 
redistribution of income (Schwarze & Härpfer, 2007), which requires 
a progressive tax system. At the same time, people prefer value-added 
tax increases over income tax increases (Noelle-Neumann & Köcher, 
2002), although this effectively reduces the redistribution of income 
(Bach, Hahn, Hoffmeister & Steiner, 2006). It is unclear, however, 
why people prefer the value-added tax. Presumably, factors other 
than distributive concerns drive the fairness judgment of a tax 
system. People might judge a value-added tax as more transparent 
than an income tax or may prefer a taxation of consumption to a 
taxation of labor income. Additionally, it is possible that laypeople do 
not correctly judge the distributional effects of the different taxes, 
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which may result in a tax system that does not reflect people’s 
preferences for redistribution. How and why laypeople can come to 
biased judgments about the consequences of economic policies, will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
6.2.3. What lies behind laypeople’s economic efficiency 
judgments? 
As discussed at length in the previous chapters (e.g., chapter 2.1), 
laypeople lack basic economic expertise. To overcome their knowledge 
deficits, laypeople could simply follow economists’ recommendations. 
However, people react with mistrust and resistance to economic 
experts as communicators of economic policy proposals (Förg et al., 
2007). The results of previous studies as well as the present research 
clearly show that laypeople derive their own economic efficiency 
judgments that do not necessarily correspond with economists’ 
conclusions.  
The results from the stepwise regression in chapter 3.3.2 indicate 
that laypeople’s economic efficiency judgments are strongly mediated 
by their perceptions of fairness (Table 7). However, there remains a 
residual of the economic efficiency coefficient that is not explained by 
fairness. Thus, there appear to be two driving forces behind the 
economic efficiency considerations of economic laypeople. First, they 
use their intuitive fairness judgment as a heuristic for determining 
the economic efficiency of economic policies. Second, they develop 
their own mental models on how the economy works.  
Regarding the first driving force, it has been mentioned that fairness 
judgments can be reached far more easily and intuitively than can 
conclusions from causal models on how the economy works. Using 
perceived fairness as a heuristic for the assessment of economic 
efficiency saves cognitive resources. The role of fairness as a heuristic 
can be observed in other situations as well. In group contexts, for 
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example, fair treatment by others or the fairness judgments of others 
serve as a heuristic for their trustworthiness (Lind, 2001).  
It remains a question for future research if there actually is a causal 
relation from fairness to economic efficiency. What would a study 
that explores this assumed causation look like? 
As a starting point, two policy scenarios should be selected that elicit 
different fairness judgments through, for example, different 
distributions of income. The economic consequences of the two 
scenarios should be the same or at least very similar. Participants 
would be asked to judge the fairness of the two scenarios in a 
between-subjects design. Subsequently, they would assess the overall 
economic consequences of the scenario. If laypeople derive efficiency 
judgments from their fairness judgments, the economic efficiency 
judgments of the two economically equivalent scenarios should differ 
significantly. The experimental design could be further modified by 
providing additional information between the questions on fairness 
and those on economic efficiency. Participants could be given either 
trivial, unrelated information, such as a newspaper article on show 
business, or an article providing economic background on the 
presented scenario. This extension would allow us to understand 
which factors tend to decouple the assumed causal relation between 
fairness and economic efficiency. The participants’ level of economic 
literacy should also be measured because it can be assumed to be an 
important moderator for the fairness-efficiency relation. 
Regarding the second driving force of laypeople’s economic efficiency 
judgments, it is generally acknowledged in the literature that 
laypeople develop their own “cognitive models” (Williamson & 
Wearing, 1996) or “systems of positive beliefs” (Slembeck, 2003) on 
how the economy works. The resulting views of laypeople are not 
always consistent. For example, people regularly demand a higher 
level of social security and increased tax cuts at the same time 
(Noelle-Neumann & Köcher, 2002, p.635ff). Furthermore, cognitive 
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models and positive beliefs often deviate considerably from standard 
economic models and their conclusions. Measured against the 
economic consensus and the homo oeconomicus model, numerous 
biases can be identified in the lay models of the economy (for 
overviews, see Baron et al., 2006; Caplan, 2007; Henderson, 1986). 
Research has rarely explored so far how biases exactly operate in the 
evaluation of economic policies. Likewise, the empirical methodology 
in this dissertation did not allow us to detect specific biases. One 
challenge for future research is that biases often interact when policy 
scenarios are evaluated. For example, people clearly disapprove of the 
loss of one job in their country even if five new jobs are created 
abroad in turn (chapter 2.3.2). This answer pattern reveals an anti-
foreign bias (Caplan, 2007) as well as a parochialistic preference 
(Baron et al., 2006; Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1991) for a status 
quo (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) in order to preserve (loss 
aversion: Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986) existing employment 
(make-work bias: Caplan, 2007) and thus to prevent harm (do-no-
harm heuristic: Baron, 1995; Baron & Jurney, 1993) from the 
employed in the home country.  
6.2.4. Why do laypeople’s and economists’ models of the 
economy differ? 
There are different ways to explain inconsistencies, biases, and 
deviations from the economic consensus in lay economic models. 
According to Denzau and North (1994), the logical consistency and 
accuracy of mental models depend on (a) the complexity of the issue, 
(b) the availability of information, and (c) motivation, as measured by 
the potential impact of the issue on the individual and the 
individual’s potential influence on the outcome.  
Regarding the complexity of the issue and the availability of 
information, one would not expect laypeople to develop consistent 
and accurate models of the economy. Even economists do not always 
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agree on the consequences of different economic policies (e.g., GCEE, 
2007, for a controversy on labor market policy). Economic reasoning 
is rather abstract and sometimes counter-intuitive, as Krugman 
(1994) and Baron and Kemp (2004) have illustrated with the principle 
of comparative advantage. Furthermore, in contrast to private 
judgments and decisions, there is no immediate negative feedback 
from holding an inaccurate view on, for example, free trade. If there is 
feedback, it might not deliver the full picture. For example, negative 
consequences of free trade, such as closed factories or lost jobs, are 
more visible, accessible, and intense than are future productivity 
gains or slightly lower prices for imported goods (Cass, 2000).  
Motivation to develop consistent and accurate mental models about 
how the economy works is likely to be low because these models have 
little influence on daily decisions. These models only help to evaluate 
economic policy alternatives and to make informed voting decisions 
in democratic elections, where a single vote has a small impact. 
Based on such cost-benefit considerations, Caplan (2003) has 
claimed that it is rational to hold irrational views about economic 
policy issues because irrationality saves scarce mental resources. 
The lack of motivation and the complexity of the issue directly 
influence the formation of lay models of the economy through a 
cognitive-psychological channel. A low level of motivation and the 
cognitive effort necessary to process information increase the need for 
cognitive closure (Kruglanski, 2012, Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). 
The need for cognitive closure is an important element of lay 
epistemic theory (Kruglanski 2012, 1989), which explains how 
laypeople achieve knowledge on cause-and-effect relationships. 
Laypeople constantly generate causal hypotheses about their 
environment, including the economy. To achieve confident 
knowledge, laypeople stop the hypothesis generation process at a 
certain point, “seize” the evidence that affords cognitive closure and 
then “freeze” the attained judgments or beliefs; that is, they maintain 
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these judgments for as long as possible (Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996). Lay theories are generally stable and difficult to revise by 
contrary evidence. Furthermore, they may be both inconsistent and 
biased because the desire for cognitive closure impedes the 
processing of additional relevant information. 
The difficulties in arriving at accurate economic efficiency judgments 
can also be explained by human evolution (e.g., Barkow, Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1992; Rubin, 2002). The human mind adapted to the 
exigencies of its environment, which, for the longest part of the 
history of human evolution, was the environment of a hunter-
gatherer society. Rubin (2002, 2003) argues that there was 
comparably little opportunity for specialization, division of labor, and 
economic growth in the long history of the human species. The 
absence of significant economic growth and gains from free trade led, 
for example, to the prevalence of zero-sum thinking and the 
associated fixed-pie myth (Baron et al., 2006): the economic gain of 
one exchange partner must mean the economic loss of the other 
partner. For these evolutionary reasons, simple and accurate 
heuristics to judge economic phenomena could hardly emerge. The 
next subchapter provides more detailed arguments in this regard 
based on the concept of ecological rationality. 
6.2.5. Ecologically rational heuristics to judge economic 
policies? 
Following the concept of ecological rationality (e.g., Todd & 
Gigerenzer, 2000; Gigerenzer & Todd, 2003), heuristics may be 
simple rules that are fast, frugal, and effective. On the one hand, they 
enable individuals to make decisions with limited mental resources. 
On the other hand, they are well adapted to individuals’ complex 
environments. In the context of economic policies, laypeople apply 
various heuristics. It has been hypothesized, for example, that they 
use their quick and intuitive fairness judgment as a heuristic to judge 
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the consequences of economic policies (chapter 6.2.3). This approach 
may make sense because it clearly requires fewer mental resources 
than does substantial economic reasoning. The approach may also 
make sense because the complex economic environment makes it 
difficult to come to reliable conclusions and predictions. There is 
generally little “hard evidence” in social science. Occasionally, there 
are conflicting viewpoints in the economic community (e.g., GCEE, 
2007). The results of chapters 4 and 5 revealed considerable variance 
in the economic efficiency judgments of economic experts. If even 
experts do not come to definite conclusions, it may be more 
reasonable, or ecologically rational, to follow simple moral rules than 
to calculate and weigh individual utilities. 
Although that argument has some appeal, the ecological rationality of 
the fairness heuristic as a fast and frugal heuristic to judge economic 
efficiency is questionable. Evidence does not suggest that the 
layperson’s way of reasoning leads to better or similar results than 
the application of sound economic thinking. In fact, the contrary is 
true (e.g., Baron et al., 2006; Blendon et al., 1997; Caplan, 2003). An 
example introduced by Todd and Gigerenzer (2000) will illustrate 
why. 
A ball player catches a ball without computing the spot where the 
ball would land by applying the gaze heuristic. The player simply 
keeps the angle of gaze to the ball constant and moves towards the 
ball accordingly (McLeod & Dienes, 1996). In the course of evolution, 
humans have continuously developed and optimized such heuristics 
to adapt to particular environmental structures (Todd & Gigerenzer, 
2000). However, in the context of economic policy, such a heuristic 
would not have evolved for two reasons. First, one peculiarity of 
economic reasoning is that there has been little opportunity to adapt. 
Complex economic problems have not existed for a large part of 
human history (Rubin, 2002). That is, because the economic ball has 
been discovered very recently, there has been little opportunity to 
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practice catching. Second, learning and adapting are difficult because 
economic policy judgments are less about actual decision making 
with immediate consequences and direct feedback for the decision 
maker and more about abstract reasoning. That is, people sit at home 
and imagine what it would be like to catch a ball, but they have little 
opportunity or incentive to actually go out and catch a ball.  
Further research is required to better evaluate the potentially fruitful 
role of fast and frugal heuristics in lay judgments about the economy. 
One starting point may be real-world decisions that are related to 
judgments about how the economy works and that entail direct 
consequences for the individual. In democratic elections, for example, 
people might follow simple decision rules based on few pieces of 
information about national economic conditions to choose their 
favorite party or candidate.  
One methodological challenge is to evaluate what actually constitutes 
a good decision. This evaluation requires a normative judgment of 
what is a good or correct result. What may be easy for catching a ball 
and conceivable for economic facts and basic economic principles is 
difficult, if not impossible, for economic policy judgments. In the next 
chapter, I will discuss this normative challenge in more detail. 
6.3. Are economists right and laypeople wrong? 
Laypeople are prone to cognitive biases when judging the economic 
effects of economic policies. This well-established argument might 
suggest that there is a right or wrong way to judge economic policies. 
Certainly, there is not. The notion of biased views refers to the 
theoretical standard of a rational, utility-maximizing individual 
(i.e., homo oeconomicus). Developing and testing hypotheses regarding 
human behavior with respect to this standard does not imply that 
this standard is a superior norm that people should apply.  
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Empirical research observes that economists value economic 
efficiency when judging economic policies, whereas laypeople value 
fairness. Research cannot provide an answer to the question of who 
is right. Nevertheless, the different reasoning of economists and 
laypeople has particular implications, which I will discuss in this 
essay chapter. Regarding laypeople, inaccurate judgments of 
economic efficiency, which are partly reached by applying a fairness 
heuristic, may conflict with the actual consequences of economic 
policy (chapter 6.3.1). It is questionable, however, whether 
economists arrive at perfectly accurate judgments (chapters 6.3.2, 
6.3.3, and 6.3.4). The chapter will conclude with some thoughts on 
economic education (6.2.5). 
6.3.1. Caught between intuitive fairness principles and desired 
results? 
The results of the present research suggest that laypeople base their 
judgments of the economic efficiency of economic policies at least 
partially on the perceived fairness of the policy (chapter 6.2.3). They 
use fairness as a heuristic to judge the consequences of economic 
policy. Thus, laypeople’s assessments of economic consequences, 
which basically are descriptive or positive statements, are affected by 
the values they hold. For example, laypeople find a minimum wage 
fair. From this value judgment, they infer that a minimum wage has 
positive consequences for employment and economic growth 
(Haferkamp et al., 2009). In a transposition of the term “normative 
power of the factual,” this logic of reasoning could be termed the 
“factual power of the normative.” Jacob and Lehmann-Waffenschmidt 
(2007) called a similar observation from their survey of economic 
laypeople “normative contextualization.” 
This way of reasoning may have peculiar implications. The actual 
consequences of an economic policy are not necessarily congruent 
with lay expectations of the consequences derived from a fairness 
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judgment. For example, minimum wage may not increase but may 
reduce employment and economic growth. Laypeople may be 
surprised that the actual effects of a policy they favored are different 
from what they had expected because economic reality did not bend 
to their moral principles. Furthermore, this conflict may be inefficient 
from a public choice perspective. Voters may favor policies whose 
results do not maximize their utility function because the voters held 
biased beliefs about the policy’s consequences (Caplan, 2007).  
This potential inconsistency between prior beliefs and actual 
consequences is not necessarily a conflict between fairness and 
economic efficiency judgments. It may also involve conflicting fairness 
norms. For example, people prefer a value-added tax to an income tax 
based on an intuitive fairness judgment (cf. chapter 6.2.2). 
Subsequently, they may oppose the resulting distribution of income 
because the value-added tax does not reduce income inequality as 
much as a progressive income tax would. 
The conflict between expected consequences, which are strongly 
influenced by value judgments, and actual consequences only arises 
if laypeople care about economic results. Laypeople may favor a 
minimum wage because they value decent pay for regular jobs. They 
may simply accept or consciously ignore potentially negative 
consequences for total employment or economic wealth. Do we know 
whether laypeople care about results in the economic policy context? 
We know that laypeople prefer a deontological approach valuing 
general fairness rules over a utilitarian approach focusing on 
economic consequences when judging economic policies ex ante. 
However, this observation does not preclude that laypeople care 
about economic consequences of those policies ex post.  
Some evidence suggests that humans follow moral rules or intuitions 
and care about consequences: “So we are constantly facing conflicts 
between the intuitive principles that we all follow and the results we 
all want” (Baron, 1998, p.3). To some extent, people feel deonto-
119 
 
 
logically, but think utilitarianly. Three lines of research are important 
to mention in this context. 
First, Lerner (2003) argues that preferences for justice are replaced 
by efficiency or self-interest considerations if individuals are engaged 
in thoughtful decision making. In contrast, low impact situations 
tend to elicit intuitive heuristic judgments, such as a fairness 
judgment. In an experiment by Bazerman, White, and Lowenstein 
(1995), participants were presented with two scenarios where 
hypothetical outcomes had to be distributed. One outcome was 
distributed equally between the participant and an anonymous 
counterpart (i.e., $400 for both parties), whereas the other outcome 
was larger but distributed unequally (i.e., $700 for oneself, $500 for 
the counterpart). A larger share of participants favored the scenario 
with the equal but smaller outcome when the participants were 
confronted with just one scenario. However, when confronted with 
both scenarios and asked to make comparative judgments, most 
participants chose the efficient alternative that offered a higher 
outcome to both parties. Choosing between two alternatives engaged 
participants in thoughtful consideration of consequences, which 
made them override their initial fairness intuition. 
A second line of explanation builds upon the general observation that 
consequences of certain policies for economic growth, national 
income, employment, or the federal budget are vividly discussed in 
the media. Apparently, economic consequences do matter in political 
discussions. A large body of literature finds that current economic 
conditions influence voting behavior and the popularity of political 
incumbents, for example, in presidential elections in the USA (for an 
overview, see Powell & Whitten, 1993; Kiewit, 1983). 
A third argument can be derived from liberal paternalism (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2003; 2008). Liberal paternalism builds on the assumption 
that a wise design of legal and organizational frames, based on 
findings from psychology and behavioral economics, can improve 
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individuals’ decisions with respect to the standards of rational choice. 
It can be contested whether rational or utilitarian decisions are better 
decisions and whether the liberal paternalist approach yields the 
results for which it advocates (cf. Rizzo & Whitman, 2009; 
Schnellenbach, 2011). Nevertheless, literature on liberal paternalism 
suggests that people generally appreciate being nudged toward more 
utilitarian decisions through an alternative decision design, such as 
in retirement savings (Benartzi & Thaler, 2007).  
From a normative point of view, empirical research cannot determine 
whether laypeople ought to come to judgments of consequences of 
economic policy that are unbiased by the laypeople’s fairness 
perception. What we know, however, is that humans value a certain 
degree of rationality. Most people would agree that conclusions drawn 
from biased or incorrect information ought to be corrected if new 
information becomes available that is unbiased and correct. 
The normative supposition that people should aim to reach unbiased 
judgments of economic consequences of policy measures has one 
prerequisite and one implication. The prerequisite is that unbiased 
and correct information must be available, which relates to the 
question of whether there is an objective truth in economics. This 
issue will be discussed in the following three subchapters. The 
implication would be that we ought to promote economic education to 
improve the quality of laypeople’s judgments of economic efficiency. 
This implication will be the topic of the concluding subchapter. 
6.3.2. Are economists right? 
Classifying lay views of the economy as biased and inaccurate only 
makes sense if there is objective truth regarding economic 
phenomena and in economic science. Does this objective truth exist? 
There is most likely no universally valid answer to this question. One 
must distinguish between different levels of epistemic reliability in 
economics. 
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On the first level, there are economic facts concerning topics such as 
unemployment, the structure of the federal budget, or the 
distribution of incomes within the society. These facts are more or 
less certain and objective, apart from methodological challenges to 
measure them consistently. On the next level, there are economic 
findings that are based on sound theoretical foundations and 
confirmed by a wide array of empirical research. These findings 
include, for example, the negative effects of monopolies on overall 
economic wealth (Varian, 2010) or education as an important 
precondition for economic development (Todaro & Smith, 2008). On 
the last level, there are economic findings, based on well-established 
theoretical conjectures but for which empirical results are still 
inconclusive or limited, such as the model of the rational voter 
(Brennan & Lomasky, 1993; Wittman, 1997; cf. Caplan, 2007) or the 
economic consequences of a minimum wage legislation (GCEE, 2007). 
The transition between the levels of epistemic uncertainty is gradual.  
That some of the findings of economics are arguable does not imply 
that they might not be true in the end. Furthermore, economics often 
provides the best answer available. Naturally, the reliability of 
economic predictions decreases as the complexity of the environment 
increases because many side conditions and disturbing factors can 
be neither measured nor controlled. When implementing economic 
policy recommendations, the famous ceteris paribus condition of 
economic theory does not hold.  
The conclusion that economic science is not omniscient might seem 
trivial, but it has implications for the identification of biases in 
laypeople’s views of the economy. Biases always refer to a certain 
normative standard. Cognitive biases from the literature on classical 
heuristics and biases (Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002; 
Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982) refer to the standard of the 
rational, utility-maximizing homo oeconomicus. Although some 
authors question if those heuristics actually lead to less rational 
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decisions (cf. Gigerenzer, Todd & ABC Research Group, 1999), it is 
undisputed that homo oeconomicus is a clear and consistent standard 
against which real human behavior can be conveniently measured. 
Other biases used to describe the views of laypeople on the economy 
do not refer to a clear theoretical standard but to empirical findings of 
economic science. These findings are characterized by a higher level 
of epistemic uncertainty. For example, the fixed-pie myth (Baron et 
al., 2006) presumes that the economy actually is not a zero-sum 
game, and the make-work bias presumes that preserving jobs for 
their own sake while disregarding their productivity is irrational 
(Caplan, 2007; for a differentiated position, cf. Kemp, 2007). As a 
consequence, those biases are relative to the current state of 
economic research as well as to normative presumptions on what is 
desirable and what is not. 
These considerations illustrate that the notion of biased views of 
laypeople on the economy does not come without problems. In the 
following, I will present further reservations regarding the relativity of 
economic knowledge and the potential fallibility of economists. 
6.3.3. What are the blind spots of economics? 
Findings of economic science are imperfect, and economic models are 
imperfect representations of reality. On the one hand, economic 
methodology has proven that it is flexible enough to incorporate 
many facets of human life into models, such as altruistic behavior 
(Fehr & Gächter, 2000) or the external effects of climate change 
(Stern, 2007). On the other hand, some important aspects of reality 
are not sufficiently covered by economic analysis, such as the social 
cost of unemployment or migration (Rodrik, 1997; Schiff, 1992). This 
neglect may have pragmatic reasons. It may be more difficult to 
model and measure indirect social cost than direct benefits from 
efficiently working labor markets. As a result, economics may 
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overestimate the benefits from flexible labor markets and free 
immigration.  
A second reservation regarding the accuracy of standard economic 
reasoning concerns the homo oeconomicus assumption. The basic 
problem is not that this assumption is unrealistic. Most economists 
agree that people are not perfectly rational. Economists stick to the 
rationality assumption because it is a useful reference point for 
parsimonious model building and empirical testing (Kirchgässner, 
2008). They argue that it should not be generally condemned but 
should be judged based on its success in empirical testing. The 
problem is that empirical testing of the rationality assumption can 
lead to formally correct but unsound conclusions. That an empirical 
analysis in economics is consistent with the rationality assumption 
does not imply that the analysis is valid or true. Instead, alternative 
explanations may have been discarded beforehand because they 
contradict the rationality assumption. Two examples shall illustrate 
this problem. 
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) successfully explain the resistance to 
economic policy reform with specific uncertainty among the voters 
regarding the distribution of future gains and losses of policy reforms. 
Although individuals are not sure if they will be among the winners 
or losers of policy reforms, they are assumed to hold rational 
(i.e., correct and unbiased) expectations about the effects of policy 
reforms. An alternative explanation for resistance to policy reforms 
could be that economic laypeople underestimate their positive effects 
(cf. Caplan, 2007).  
A second example addresses reasons for the disapproval of free trade 
policies. O’Rourke, Sinnott, Richardson, and Rodrik (2001) found 
that lower-skilled workers in developed countries whose jobs were 
more at risk due to free trade with developing countries held more 
negative views about free trade. They concluded that workers’ trade 
policy preferences were obviously driven by self-interest. However, a 
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variable that is highly correlated with skill level was omitted from the 
analysis: economic education. Workers might hold negative attitudes 
toward free trade because they do not understand the basic economic 
principle of comparative advantage. A study by Baron and Kemp 
(2004) lends support to this alternative explanation.  
The two example studies did not test alternative explanations 
because those alternative explanations violate the basic rationality 
assumption. This assumption implies that people have sufficient 
economic expertise to take economic policy judgments to their best 
advantage. Strangely, the research presented in this dissertation is 
based on evidence that suggests the opposite. What is more, 
economics measures the empirical success of conclusions by its 
static, descriptive success that holds all explanatory variables 
constant, not by the success of its predictive accuracy. To evaluate 
whether the rational choice model of O’Rourke et al. (2001) is 
empirically valid, one would have to test, for example, whether views 
about free trade among workers in sectors that are vulnerable to 
competition from overseas become more positive if the sectors are 
subsidized or bailed out by the government. Taking the psychological 
evidence from Baron and Kemp (2004), this seems unlikely.  
The ball-catching example from chapter 6.2.5 can illustrate the 
problems which the described methodological approach may incur. If 
economists observe that ball players regularly succeed to catch a ball, 
they would conclude that the players’ behavior is consistent with the 
rationality assumption. Certainly, players do not calculate the 
ballistic curve of the ball based on its initial speed, throwing angle, 
wind resistance, and other factors. But from an economist’s 
perspective, players behave as if they perform these calculations. 
Economists may correctly predict that the probability of catching the 
ball increases if the throwing distance increases (because there is 
more time to perform calculations). In reality, players do not 
calculate, but have more time to apply the gaze heuristic and move 
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toward the ball (McLeod & Dienes, 1996). Nevertheless, the 
deliberately wrong rationality assumption works well in this case as 
an as-if-assumption. In other cases, however, economists would 
miserably fail. Imagine that the ball is thrown to the side of the ball 
player and one aims to predict the route that the player runs to reach 
the point where the ball drops. Based on the rationality assumption, 
economists would predict that players run straight to the point where 
the ball will land. In reality, however, players do not know this point 
in advance. Applying the gaze heuristic leads them to run a curve 
(Gigerenzer, 2004), because they continuously adjust their running 
direction to approach the ball. When confronted with this evidence, 
economists would probably try to find a more complicated rational 
choice explanation for the strange running behavior. 
Interestingly, economists judge their analytical approach, which is 
built on an empirically dubious rationality assumption, as somewhat 
superior: “… [rational choice models explaining policy reform] confirm 
that we can do better than resort to myopia or irrationality when 
explaining social phenomena” (Rodrik, 1996; p.25; italics added by 
author). However, Rodrik does not provide further justification for 
this normative statement. Beyond this, Slembeck (2003) makes a 
more general point. Economics implicitly assumes that individuals 
whose behavior is to be modeled and explained hold the same beliefs 
as the model-builders. This observation is true for both positive 
beliefs, such as economic expertise, and normative beliefs, such as 
judgment criteria for economic policy.  
6.3.4. What are blind spots of economists? 
Few economists would characterize themselves as prototypical 
homines oeconomici. Economists are human, too. They are prone to 
cognitive heuristics and biases in their thinking. The results in 
chapter 4 revealed a certain bias toward the home country among 
economists. They preferred policy alternatives that benefitted their 
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home country even when they reported holding a global perspective 
throughout the survey. Furthermore, economists are not immune to 
the overconfidence bias (Angner, 2006; Fischhoff, Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 1977) or the bias blind spot, that is, the inability to 
compensate for one’s own biases even though one is aware of them 
(Pronin, Lin & Ross, 2002). Recent research suggests that the bias 
blind spot might be even larger for individuals with high cognitive 
sophistication, such as academics (West, Meserve & Stanovich, 
2012).  
In academic work, time and the capacity for deliberate thinking and 
extensive peer feedback might mitigate the above and other biases. 
Therefore, economists may be less susceptible to cognitive biases 
when they judge common economic problems or well-defined policy 
issues. For example, it is unlikely that a trained economist would fall 
prey to the fixed-pie myth when arguing about free trade in his or her 
academic work. 
One problem arises from the fact that economists are not only 
independent academic observers but also actors in the politico-
economic sphere—they act as policy advisors or communicators of 
their research. Attitudes and values influence their judgments of 
economic policy and are likely to influence their policy 
recommendations. Do economists share different values and 
attitudes than non-economists? Two studies used the Schwartz 
Personal Values Inventory (Schwartz, 1994) to compare the values of 
economists with the general population (Lucey & Delaney, 2007) and 
of economics students with students of other social sciences (Gandal, 
Roccas, Sagiv & Wrzesniewski, 2005). Neither study found a 
significant difference between the groups in the benevolence 
dimension, which helps to explain why economists do not behave 
more selfishly in real-life situations than do non-economists (chapter 
4.1.2). However, the two studies revealed that economists attribute 
slightly more importance to openness to change or self-enhancement 
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values, such as self-direction. At the same time, economists attach 
less importance to universalist or conservative values, such as 
tradition and conformity. This tendency toward individualism and an 
appetite for change helps to explain why economists feel more at ease 
with economic policies promoting liberalization, deregulation and far-
reaching reforms than laypeople do. Economists should not assume, 
however, that their values and attitudes are shared by the general 
population. 
6.3.5. Is more economic education a blessing? 
Few people would disagree that education is a good thing. More 
knowledge allows for more informed decisions. More economic 
knowledge allows for more informed individual economic decisions as 
well as more informed economic policy judgments. A call for more 
economic education, however, has normative implications. More 
informed economic policy judgments imply that laypeople’s 
judgments of economic efficiency are less influenced by cognitive 
heuristics and biases. Particularly, more economic education may 
weaken the presumed causal connection between fairness perception 
and judgments of economic efficiency (chapter 6.2.3). Indeed, the 
higher their level of economic literacy, the more likely that individuals 
hold views on economic issues similar to the views of economists 
(Walstad & Rebeck, 2002). 
More economic expertise may eventually change people’s normative 
orientations. More economically educated laypeople might base their 
policy judgments on economic efficiency instead of fairness. It is not 
likely, however, that people would turn into economists so easily. 
Although economic courses in high school or college significantly 
improve economic literacy, absolute improvements are rather modest 
when compared to a professional economist’s level of economic 
literacy (Walstad & Buckles, 2008; Walstad & Allgood, 1999). The 
results from chapter 3 provide additional evidence. Social science 
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teachers and economic journalists, who possess at least some 
economic expertise and who regularly deal with economic policy 
issues, applied the same judgment criteria as did laypeople. Finally, 
even trained economists know that there is something beyond 
economic efficiency, as chapter 5 illustrated. 
Potential normative biases in the curricula and implications for 
students’ political views are important reasons why some experts 
generally oppose Economics as a separate subject in German 
secondary schools (e.g., Tschirner, 2007; cf. Burkard, 2004, for a 
differentiated view). Fears of “neoliberal indoctrination” (Neumaier, 
2007) or “brainwashing” (Kretz, 2012) characterize the debate on 
economic education. As a consequence, two debates are mixed that 
should be conducted separately: First, is more economic education 
useful? Second, what should an economics curriculum look like?  
Regarding the second issue, several authors attempt to attenuate 
fears of indoctrination (Kaminski, 2007; Klein, 2012). On the one 
hand, opposition to explicit economic education is partly due to a 
misunderstanding of the methodological approach of economics. 
Teaching the rational choice model does not aim to turn innocent 
students into homines oeconomici. Learning basic economic concepts, 
such as marginal returns, individuals’ sensitivity to incentives, or 
opportunity cost, is not likely to result in turning political views 
upside down. On the other hand, economic education is sensitive to 
normative influence, particularly because it is embedded in a societal 
and political context. Economics in school can hardly refrain from 
presenting different options for economic policy, including comparing 
and weighting the advantages and disadvantages of policy options. 
This comparison always involves value judgments. Moreover, the 
previous subchapters made clear that economics is a social science 
whose findings are far from being epistemically certain. Therefore, 
prudence is recommended to achieve a fair balance of different views 
in the curriculum on economic education. 
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To some extent, economic education can be interpreted as a type of 
liberal paternalism (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, 2008). Students are 
made more aware of the economic consequences of individual and 
political decisions to enable them to make more informed decisions. 
In this context, Baron (1998) has suggested integrating economic 
content in a general high school course on social theory and decision 
making. The curriculum would include basic moral philosophy and 
an introduction to psychology to understand the role of biases in 
human judgment. More education in economics or social science 
allows people to still have a choice. They are not coerced to make 
more utilitarian decisions based on efficiency considerations. 
Nevertheless, this is a possible consequence, be it intentional or not. 
6.4. Practical recommendations 
The nature of practical recommendations depends on a normative 
judgment about the desired outcome. From my perspective, it would 
be desirable to bridge the gap between economic experts and 
laypeople regarding judgments of economic policies. In this chapter, I 
will briefly sketch some ideas on how this could be achieved. I will 
provide recommendations for the major actors in the politico-
economic sphere: politicians, journalists, teachers, laypeople, and 
economists. 
6.4.1. Politicians 
Politicians often argue for fairness instead of economic effects, exploit 
voters’ myopia when breaking election promises, or frame policy 
proposals in a positive way to circumvent the adverse effects of loss 
aversion. Thus, politicians seem to be aware of the relevant research 
from social psychology and public choice, for example, that people fall 
prey to cognitive biases or have little incentive to dedicate cognitive 
resources to reasoning about politics. Politicians may not actually 
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know this research; instead, they have successfully learned from 
experience. However, they may attempt to systematically benefit from 
psychological research on cognitive biases and the laypeople’s way of 
reasoning about economic policy. This would allow them to avoid 
random mistakes that are inevitable when learning from experience, 
as in the following example. 
In February 2012, a group of politicians around the Member of the 
Bundestag Marco Wanderwitz suggested introducing an extra tax for 
people without children. The group around Wanderwitz aimed to 
distribute the fiscal burden arising from demographic change more 
equally among people with and without children. Feedback from 
other politicians and the media was devastating, and the idea was 
dismissed very quickly (dpa, 2012; Sadigh, 2012). The negative 
reactions were partly the result of a framing effect. The following 
alternative framing of the Wanderwitz proposal would have basically 
equivalent distributional effects: an increase in the child allowance, 
which is paid in cash for every child in Germany, in addition to a 
moderate increase in the income tax or the value-added tax to 
rebalance the budget. Arguably, such a proposal would have received 
more positive feedback. In fact, increases in both child allowances 
and the value-added tax have been implemented several times in 
Germany without provoking significant protest. Thus, more 
knowledge about the importance of positive framing, loss aversion, 
and the do-no-harm heuristic would have helped Marco Wanderwitz 
and his followers. 
Another recommendation for politicians would be to promote more 
economic education in schools. In the long run, more economic 
education may improve the quality of voters’ economic policy 
judgments and increase the probability of economically efficient 
political reforms. It remains an open question, however, whether 
more informed voters’ judgments are advantageous or 
disadvantageous for the work of politicians. 
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6.4.2. Journalists 
Like politicians, journalists are well aware of which strategies do and 
do not work to attract the attention of the public. They use vivid 
examples, prefer catchy messages, and simplify, or sometimes 
oversimplify, complex issues. They are also likely to be aware of 
laypeople’s priority for fairness. When searching the website of the 
most important German tabloid newspaper, “BILD”, the search term 
“justice” (”Gerechtigkeit”) yields 1326 hits, whereas “economic 
growth” (“Wirtschaftswachstum”) provides only 657 results (as of 
October 28, 2012). The most important German quality newspaper, 
“Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,” places less emphasis on quickly 
catching the attention of the reader than does “BILD”. Consequently, 
“justice” (4,420 hits) is relatively less important than “economic 
growth” (5,902 hits). This evidence is anecdotal, but it shows that 
journalists have the power to select and frame issues. They may 
attempt to use this power and their communication capabilities to 
promote economic knowledge and enable laypeople to reach more 
informed and balanced judgments on economic policy. Journalists 
could clarify in their arguments that economic policy always involves 
both economic efficiency and fairness considerations, not only one of 
the two. Furthermore, they could note more often that determining 
economic effects of any policy is essentially a matter of fact, not a 
matter of values and desires. 
6.4.3. Teachers 
Teachers could benefit from the present research findings when 
discussing current political issues in school. Based on the typical 
judgments of laypeople and economists, teachers could explain the 
difference between normative and positive judgment or describe the 
different goals of economic policy, such as efficiency and fairness. 
Additionally, they could apply different debiasing strategies for 
cognitive illusions (cf. Larrick, 2004). These debiasing strategies 
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include training in decision rules, the considering-the-opposite 
technique, or training in representations (e.g., using frequencies 
instead of probabilities). 
6.4.4. Laypeople 
Laypeople could attempt to avoid confounding normative judgments, 
such as fairness, with positive judgments, such as the consequences 
of economic policies. Moreover, laypeople could see basic economic 
and psychological education as useful for improving their judgments 
and decisions. Economics seems to have the image of being a dismal 
science, whereas psychology is seen as somewhat esoteric. If 
laypeople lack the necessary economic expertise, they could begin to 
trust economic experts, which they rarely do at the present time (Förg 
et al., 2007; Caplan, 2003). However, the reasons for this mistrust 
among laypeople can also be found in the attitudes and the way of 
communication of economists. 
6.4.5. Economists 
For economists, a general recommendation would be to understand 
that their way of reasoning about economic policies is not the only 
way or the only correct way of reasoning. There are at least two 
implications.  
First, economists could keep in mind that they are also susceptible to 
certain biases and that their views are not independent of personal 
values and interests. This could facilitate, for example, more 
normatively balanced communication when developing teaching 
material for schools, which helps to mitigate the reproach of bias 
toward big business and free markets (chapter 6.3.5). Furthermore, 
economists could be careful not to accuse laypeople of ignorance or 
biased views. Those diagnoses are only valid with respect to a 
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normative standard of rationality and a utilitarian orientation, which 
are not objectively true but rather debatable.  
Second, economists could realize that non-economic considerations, 
particularly intuitive fairness judgments, have a high relevance for 
laypeople. In addition, economic reasoning is often not intuitively 
understood by laypeople because they tend to follow a deontological 
instead of a consequentialist ethics. As a consequence, economists 
could make their communication in public more compatible with the 
lay way of thinking.  
Why is the communication between economists and the public 
complicated? Economists’ argumentations aim to be value-free and 
based on facts. Precisely because of these characteristics, however, 
the public accuses economists of being unsocial and theoretical, 
disregarding political feasibility and justice concerns. On the one 
hand, the public ignores that what ought to be implemented does not 
logically derive from what is described by economists. This 
phenomenon is particular to social science. No one would accuse a 
physicist of promoting a nuclear war against a country because he 
describes in detail how using nuclear weapons would destroy that 
country. On the other hand, economists ignore that they suggest 
what ought to be by giving policy recommendations. These 
recommendations are only valid if increasing economic wealth is the 
primary goal for society. Economists rightly argue that this goal is not 
imposed on society by the economists themselves. From their 
perspective, arguing with economic efficiency is simply a prerequisite 
for fact-based economic analysis that is not distorted by value 
judgments. Society is free to pursue different goals, such as 
distributional justice. However, two additional problems arise from 
this seemingly value-free communication.  
First, economists’ argumentations in public are not statements of 
independent observers standing outside society. These arguments 
retroact on society and may be partly self-fulfilling, which reflects the 
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problem of reflexivity. Reflexivity has been identified as a critical 
issue in social science in general (e.g., Flanagan, 1981) and in 
economics in particular (Soros, 2008; Lehmann-Waffenschmidt & 
Sandri, 2007). If economists’ communication to the public focuses 
exclusively on how to increase national income, the public might 
eventually believe that a higher national income should be the 
primary goal for society.  
The second problem is that the focus on economic efficiency provokes 
misunderstandings. It suggests that the implementation of 
economists’ policy recommendations excludes other potential goals, 
such as distributional justice. On the contrary, economists’ 
recommendations can help to achieve such social justice goals. 
Economists generally care about using given resources more 
efficiently to achieve certain goals. These goals, however, are not 
carved in stone.  
Economists could include fairness arguments in their policy analyses 
and recommendations to avoid misunderstandings and to indicate 
that people care about more than just increasing national income. 
One starting point could be to highlight how certain economically 
efficient policy proposals help or fail to achieve social justice goals. 
Indeed, this makes economists’ argumentations less analytically 
precise and more normative. However, economics is not analytically 
precise or value-free.  
Fairness judgments are value judgments, but they are not arbitrary. 
There are consistent patterns that can be described and perhaps even 
formalized and translated into utility functions. This may sound 
unlikely, and it may be impossible. However, two decades ago, no one 
would have bet on an economic theory of altruism and reciprocity 
(Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000), which is well 
established by now.  
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